I gave a talk about the history of the Whampoa Military Academy and Sun Yat-sen. Some audience members felt that my section on the Beiyang government was too brief and had questions about that period of history. The brevity was intentional to keep the program within its time limits and avoid straying off-topic. Today, I’ll use this members-only program to delve deeper into the story of the Beiyang government. First, it’s important to clarify that the term “Beiyang government” is somewhat imprecise. It actually refers to the Republic of China before 1928. The term was used later to distinguish it from the National Government established in Nanjing after Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition in 1928. During this period, the presidents and prime ministers were mainly Beiyang faction politicians. To justify their rebellion, the Kuomintang derogatorily labeled the previous Republican government as the “Beiyang government.”

The term “Beiyang” comes from when Yuan Shikai trained the Qing Dynasty’s new army at the Xiaozhan in Tianjin, known as the Beiyang Army. Thus, the warlords and politicians associated with Yuan Shikai were called the Beiyang faction.

Although both the Beiyang government and the later Chiang Kai-shek government were officially called the Republic of China, they were fundamentally different. The Beiyang government was established based on the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China following the Xinhai Revolution, modeled after the American separation of powers system. It adopted a presidential system with both a Senate and House of Representatives. Both the president and the members of parliament were elected regularly. Despite the immature democracy, with incidents of bribery and scandal, elections were still held. Unlike the American system, the Beiyang government had a Premier, a powerful position second only to the president, providing a check on presidential power. Thus, the Beiyang government was a hybrid between a presidential and parliamentary system.

Moreover, provinces during the Beiyang era had their own assemblies, exercising full local autonomy. Technically, the Beiyang government was a federal system under the guise of a republic. In contrast, the Kuomintang era was characterized by authoritarian one-party rule, or what was termed as a party-state.

The Beiyang era flag was the Five-Colored Flag, symbolizing the harmony of five ethnic groups, and its national anthem was “The Song of the Clouds.” The Chiang Kai-shek government adopted the Blue Sky with a White Sun flag and the anthem “The Three Principles of the People,” derived from the Whampoa Military Academy’s anthem. Therefore, although both were called the Republic of China, it was essentially a regime change. Despite being the weakest central government in modern Chinese history, the Beiyang government did not lose any territory. Conversely, the subsequent Kuomintang and Communist parties lost significant lands. Many political figures in the Beiyang period were reformists from the late Qing Dynasty, imbued with traditional scholar-official values and the spirit of constitutional democracy. They maintained high ethical standards in both personal and professional conduct. Although the Beiyang factions often fought among themselves, they rarely resorted to ruthless extermination. Many warlords who lost power lived out their lives in peace. Regardless of who was in power, the Beiyang government did not become dictatorial but continued to function democratically. During its nearly 17-year rule, the Beiyang government convened five national assemblies without significant interruptions. Even after suppressing Sun Yat-sen’s Second Revolution, Yuan Shikai did not dissolve the Kuomintang, allowing it to participate in elections as per the established electoral laws.

In 1923, the Beiyang government enacted China’s first true democratic constitution, the “Constitution of the Republic of China.” Modeled after the U.S. Constitution but modified for Chinese conditions, it was China’s only federal constitution that implemented a true separation of powers and local autonomy. It specified the terms and election methods for the president and legislators, clearly delineating central and local powers. Provincial assemblies and county magistrates were directly elected, which enabled local self-governance in Guangdong as implemented by figures like Chen Jiongming.

The Beiyang era was the most pluralistic period in modern Chinese history. There was no official ideology, allowing a diverse range of thoughts to flourish. Intellectuals enjoyed academic and speech freedom, leading to successive cultural enlightenment movements and a golden era in Chinese cultural and educational history. While many know this period for its scholarly giants like Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Chen Yinke, Wang Guowei, Zhang Taiyan, and Lu Xun, few realize that China’s technological development was also impressive. For instance, in March 1912, Feng Ru’s Guangdong Aircraft Company produced the first domestically made airplane, a global innovation at the time. In 1918, during World War I, the U.S. contracted Jiangnan Shipyard to build 10,000-ton freighters to transport military supplies to Europe, recognizing China’s shipbuilding capabilities. This partnership was worth a staggering $7.8 million.

The Communist claim that pre-1949 China was a backward society unable to produce even nails or matches is a baseless lie. Despite frequent local conflicts among warlords, China’s economy grew rapidly, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing economies during that time. Economists call this the golden age of Chinese national capitalism.

In my previous talk about Whampoa, I mentioned that the Beiyang government was assertive in foreign affairs, especially against Russia, reclaiming Outer Mongolia, deploying troops to Vladivostok, and evacuating Chinese nationals. However, their tough stance wasn’t limited to Russia. The Beiyang government also stood firm against Britain, an established power.

In 1914, Britain and the Dalai government of Tibet signed a secret treaty. Britain promised support for Tibetan independence in exchange for about 90,000 square kilometers of territory in Southern Tibet, now known as the McMahon Line. Despite its inability to control Tibet, Yuan Shikai’s government refused to recognize the treaty, defying Britain. This stance remains the root of the unresolved Southern Tibet issue. In 1917, the Beiyang government strategically joined the Allies and declared war on Germany and the Central Powers. Though they only sent laborers rather than troops, they leveraged their status as a victorious nation to reclaim German and Austro-Hungarian concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. More importantly, they abolished extraterritorial rights and suspended the Boxer Indemnity payments. Other nations followed suit, and China even received 84 million taels of silver in war reparations from Germany, the largest indemnity China had ever secured voluntarily in modern history.

At the 1921 Washington Conference, the Beiyang government recovered Japanese-occupied Shandong and effectively nullified the Twenty-One Demands. These significant diplomatic achievements have been largely overlooked in later historical accounts. However, many still view the Beiyang government as traitorous, primarily due to its relationship with Japan. From Yuan Shikai onwards, the Beiyang government’s diplomatic approach was criticized for being too pro-Japanese, favoring loans from Japan, and granting Japan many privileges. This dynamic stemmed from the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. After the Boxer Rebellion, Russia occupied Northeast China and seemed unwilling to leave, displaying clear ambitions. Japan, having annexed Korea, clashed with Russian interests. Lacking the strength to reclaim the Northeast, the Qing Dynasty secretly invited Japan to expel the Russians, promising them the transferred Russian interests.

Though inviting another nation to fight on home soil was humiliating, it was a desperate yet pragmatic choice for the Qing, which proved successful. Japan, eager to dominate East Asia, waged a costly war, losing nearly 100,000 troops and depleting its reserves, to defeat Russia and preserve the Northeast for the Qing Dynasty.

At that time, the Qing court and officials had a great admiration for Japan, and it was during this period that the peak of learning from Japan occurred. For the Japanese, fighting on behalf of the Qing was certainly not out of altruism; such significant sacrifices were made with the expectation of some return. This return was the special rights in Northeast China. In this sense, the Beiyang government inherited the Qing policy and had to bear this historical debt from the start. The subsequent troubles were actually influenced by this Qing legacy, leaving the Beiyang government with no choice.

The so-called Twenty-One Demands were later delayed by the Beiyang government with various excuses and were not implemented. Eventually, a few years later, they were abolished at the Washington Conference. From a diplomatic perspective, this was a classic case of the Beiyang era’s diplomatic achievements. However, from the public’s point of view, any unequal treaty signed would tarnish one’s reputation, as ordinary people care more about the outcome than the process. Political figures are often judged in a binary manner of good or evil, with little consideration for the historical context.

The diplomatic failure at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, particularly the transfer of German rights in Shandong to Japan, is regarded in textbooks as one of the greatest diplomatic failures of the Beiyang government. In reality, the Beiyang government’s diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference was not a failure. The delegation made several demands, with the return of Shandong’s rights being just one of them.

After negotiations with the major powers, the delegation achieved the abolition of consular jurisdiction, the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity, tariff autonomy, and compensation for losses, among other things. Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang believed that the rights in Shandong were already effectively controlled by Japan and could not be reclaimed without military action in the short term. If they did not sign under the current conditions, the already achieved negotiation results might be lost. This practical consideration was the main reason Lu advocated for signing the agreement at the Paris Peace Conference, which had nothing to do with treason.

As I mentioned, although China was a victor in World War I, it did not send any troops to the battlefield, only laborers. Given this situation, expecting to gain rights equal to those of other major powers was unrealistic in the international order of the time. Diplomatic negotiations often involve compromise, especially for weaker nations. It’s easy for the public to express indignation and chant slogans under nationalist fervor, but the actual implementation is far more challenging.

Lu Zhengxiang, the foreign minister criticized during the May Fourth Movement, was actually one of the few professional diplomats of the Beiyang era. He had served as ambassador to the Netherlands during the Qing Dynasty, held very progressive views, married a Belgian woman, and cut his queue in 1905, even before the Qing fell. During his tenure as Foreign Minister, he abolished the practice of appointing diplomats through high official recommendations and insisted on selecting highly educated and qualified diplomats.

During the Beiyang era, diplomats were required to have foreign language and diplomatic expertise, even causing Yuan Shikai’s own nephew to lose his position for not meeting the requirements. Beiyang-era diplomats were recognized as the best-educated and most qualified in modern Chinese history, incomparable to today’s “wolf warrior” diplomats.

Despite his professionalism, Lu Zhengxiang, burdened with infamy from the Paris Peace Conference, never returned to China and later became a clergyman in Belgium.

The most prominent slogan of the May Fourth Movement was “Fight for sovereignty externally, eradicate national traitors internally.” These “traitors” included Cao Rulin, Minister of Transport, and Zhang Zongxiang, Minister to Japan, who were key figures in Sino-Japanese diplomacy at the time. However, they were not the decision-makers.

The famous burning of Zhao Jia Lou involved setting fire to Cao Rulin’s residence, but he escaped, leaving Zhang Zongxiang to be beaten severely. Zhang Zongxiang later requested the government to release the students who beat him, and those arrested for arson were treated well in custody, with the police chief personally visiting them. Public pressure soon led to the dismissal of these high officials.

After being dismissed, Cao Rulin’s reputation was ruined. Deeply affected, he withdrew from politics and turned to industry, founding the Central Hospital, the predecessor of today’s Peking University People’s Hospital. This hospital, established for charitable purposes, provided free treatment to the poor, funded entirely by Cao Rulin.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, Cao Rulin steadfastly refused the lucrative positions offered by the Japanese, despite being considered an ideal candidate for collaboration. Although the Japanese forced several titles on him, he never accepted them. Ironically, Mei Siping, a student leader in the May Fourth Movement who had labeled Cao a traitor, later served in high positions in the puppet government and was executed for treason after the war. The so-called patriotic youth ended up betraying the country, while the alleged traitor upheld national integrity.

Similarly, Beiyang officials were notably strong in their national integrity. For example, after the September 18 Incident, warlord Wu Peifu, though retired, fiercely denounced Japan’s actions. When Japan occupied Beiping in 1935 and proposed so-called North China autonomy, Wu Peifu, despite being highly respected, adamantly refused their overtures.

Japan’s top envoy in Beiping, Kenji Dohihara, personally invited Wu Peifu to return to power, but Wu firmly refused. Living without an income, Wu relied on financial support from his old subordinate Qi Xieyuan, but he cut ties with Qi upon learning Qi had accepted a position in the puppet government. Wu Peifu declared, “I’d rather be poor than take your money.”

In December 1939, Wu Peifu died of sepsis in Beijing after a tooth extraction by a Japanese dentist, with rumors suggesting he was poisoned for refusing Japan’s offers.

Other Beiyang officials, such as Duan Qirui, Yuan Keding, and Jin Yunpeng, also refused to collaborate with Japan, despite their high social standing and Japan’s attempts to recruit them. Compared to the opportunistic political figures of the KMT and CCP, these Beiyang officials displayed a commendable level of integrity.

Modern Chinese textbooks only retain the May Fourth Movement as the legacy of the Beiyang era, mainly focusing on the cultural heritage of Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. However, the broader May Fourth Movement, which started with the founding of “New Youth” in 1915 and lasted until the early 1920s, emphasized human rights and science equally. Chen Duxiu, founder of “New Youth,” advocated for personal freedom and individualism, aligning with the social reform declarations of figures like Cai Yuanpei at the founding of the Republic of China, promoting public morality and human rights, and opposing despotism and superstition with a scientific spirit.

Hu Shih, a prominent figure in the May Fourth Movement, emphasized that the core of the New Culture Movement was the liberation of thought and individual rights. This concept was highly advanced, even more significant than democracy and science, highlighting the importance of protecting personal rights and freedom as the foundation of modern civilization. Understanding this helps us better appreciate the true achievements of the May Fourth Movement and the Beiyang era over a century later. （This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）

In modern Chinese textbooks, the three major battles during the Chinese Civil War, especially the Liao-Shen Campaign, are historical events that most Chinese people must learn about. However, hidden within this history is a siege that has been deliberately buried and never dared to be mentioned.

This 150-day horrific siege resulted in the starvation deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, possibly exceeding the number in the infamous Nanjing Massacre. This is the little-known Siege of Changchun.

Changchun is a city with a relatively short history. Although it has become a third-tier city due to the decline of the Northeast in recent years, before 1945, it was a genuine first-tier city in China and even Asia.

As the homeland of the Manchu people, after the Qing Dynasty established its regime, it implemented a 200-year-long policy of sealing off the area outside the Great Wall to reserve it for themselves and prevent other ethnic groups from occupying the Manchu’s ancestral land. This policy remained until after the Opium Wars when, under the threat from Russia, the Qing Dynasty allowed immigrants to settle, leading to the historically famous “Move to the Northeast.”

Large numbers of farmers from the Central Plains began migrating to the Manchurian region in the Northeast. Changchun, located at the center of the Northeast, rapidly developed under these circumstances. Especially after the South Manchuria Railway began operating, the population soared. In 1907, Changchun officially opened to trade, becoming one of the most important trade ports in the Northeast.

Before the “Mukden Incident,” Changchun had already grown into a major city with a population of 300,000. In 1932, with the support of Japan, the puppet state of Manchukuo was established with Puyi as its emperor, and its capital was set in Changchun, which was renamed Hsinking. The Japanese had grand plans for Changchun, treating it as the future base of their empire, and thus planned the city with standards surpassing those of Tokyo.

In 1932, the Japanese formulated the “Great Hsinking Metropolitan Plan,” which borrowed from the 19th-century Paris reconstruction plans and the British Garden City movement, initiating large-scale, high-standard infrastructure construction in Changchun.

For example, the city’s roads were planned to be 26-60 meters wide, with central arteries reaching 54 meters, divided into fast and slow lanes, which few Chinese cities today can match. Changchun was the first city in Asia to fully implement flush toilets, and at that time, flush toilets were already widespread in Changchun. Changchun was also the first city in Asia to fully implement piped gas and to bury all electrical lines underground. The Japanese even had foresight in planning a subway system, although it was never implemented.

Thanks to the Japanese emphasis, Changchun’s economy developed rapidly during the puppet Manchukuo period, quickly becoming the leading economic center in the Northeast. By 1944, its urban area had expanded to 80 square kilometers, with a population of 1.217 million, including 140,000 Japanese immigrants, making it a super metropolitan city in China, second only to Shanghai.

Manchukuo, centered around Changchun, had a solid foundation in various aspects due to the Japanese construction over 14 years, and its economic output even surpassed that of mainland Japan, earning it the nickname “Asian Ruhr.” This is the origin of the Northeast being considered a heavy industry base.

It is not an exaggeration to say that all these achievements were due to the Japanese construction. After Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the Soviet Union, with sinister intentions, entered the Northeast first, declared war on the Kwantung Army, and seized people, food, and machinery before the Japanese defeat was settled.

After looting, the cunning Russians did not withdraw. Instead of returning the territory to the Nationalist government, they secretly notified their ally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who were still hiding in Yan’an, to quickly move into the Northeast and seize the territory. This is the familiar Liao-Shen Campaign in our textbooks.

While reading history, have you ever wondered how the CCP, who were hiding in Yan’an caves during the entire Anti-Japanese War, suddenly had an army of hundreds of thousands and a large territory in the Northeast capable of engaging the Nationalist forces in strategic battles?

Did the CCP’s forces and territory fall from the sky? This is closely related to the Russians’ secret assistance. The Russians handed over a large number of advanced weapons left by the surrendering Kwantung Army to the CCP, giving them an advantage over the Nationalist forces in terms of weaponry. Moreover, many key members of the surrendered Japanese army were directly incorporated into the CCP’s forces.

These Japanese soldiers were willing to serve the CCP mainly to ensure the safe return of other Japanese troops and civilians in the Northeast to Japan. At that time, the lives of Japanese civilians were in the hands of the Russians, so they had no choice but to comply. Those left in China who joined the CCP were essentially the backbone of the Kwantung Army.

For example, in 2006, journalist Fu Leping from Phoenix Weekly published an article revisiting some of the Japanese soldiers from that time, writing a report titled “The Almost Forgotten History: Decoding the Japanese Veterans in the Fourth Field Army.” One officer of the former Kwantung Army’s Second Air Corps, named Miichiro Hayashi, led 20 pilots, 24 mechanics, 72 technicians, and nearly 200 ground support personnel to join the CCP. These Japanese formed the backbone of the CCP’s Northeast Old Aviation School, the cradle of the Chinese Air Force. Prominent figures such as former PLA Air Force Commander Wang Hai and Deputy Commander Lin Hu were among their students.

In 2002, on the 30th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, NHK aired a documentary titled “The Japanese Who Were Kept,” where a Japanese veteran recalled that Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army typically included a Japanese infantry squad in each regiment. These Japanese soldiers, well-trained and experienced, significantly boosted the combat effectiveness of the Fourth Field Army.

The addition of these Japanese soldiers allowed the CCP to quickly establish a powerful force upon entering the Northeast. Combined with the elite troops Lin Biao brought from within China, they formed the basis of the formidable Fourth Field Army. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director Kato Matsudaira publicly announced on September 28, 1948, that according to the Kwantung Army’s data, a total of 140,000 former Kwantung Army officers and their families were incorporated into the CCP’s forces, with at least 60,000 directly serving the CCP, mainly providing technical and tactical guidance, and some even directly engaging the Nationalist forces as mercenaries.

Japan now has a “Fourth Field Army Veterans’ Association,” which organized a reunion visit to China in April 1990. This event was publicly reported. Zhou Enlai, in a meeting with a Japanese delegation on June 27, 1956, acknowledged the contribution of some Japanese, saying, “We are grateful to some Japanese who participated in the liberation war as doctors, nurses, and technicians, which strengthened our confidence in forming friendly relations with the Japanese people.”

With the Russians’ support in weaponry and the Japanese’s help in personnel, the CCP quickly accumulated enough power to rival the Nationalist forces upon entering the Northeast. With General Lin Biao in charge, it was no surprise that the Nationalists were at a disadvantage. Initially, Chiang Kai-shek, who held illusions about the Russians, only took control of a few major cities in the Northeast and did not fully grasp the region. However, the Nationalists still had a numerical advantage, and the fate of the Northeast was still uncertain.

At this critical juncture, the Nationalist’s Northeast Administrator Chen Cheng made an unforgivable mistake. Distrusting the former puppet army, which had previously served under Manchukuo, Chen Cheng disbanded 500,000 puppet soldiers upon arriving in the Northeast, retaining only 70,000. These disbanded puppet soldiers, although not as formidable as the Kwantung Army, were still trained regulars, with some being highly capable. With no other options, they had to join the CCP if they did not want to become bandits.

According to the “Biography of Chen Cheng,” at least 400,000 of these disbanded soldiers were incorporated by Lin Biao. By August 1948, Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army had grown from 110,000 to over 700,000 within two years. Additionally, there were 330,000 local militia, bringing the total strength of the Fourth Field Army to over one million. Meanwhile, the Nationalist forces in the Northeast had only 550,000, primarily confined to the major cities of Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou, isolated and unsupported, causing a reversal in the Northeast battlefield’s situation.

Lin Biao aimed to encircle and annihilate the Nationalist forces, making the capture of Changchun crucial. In May 1948, Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan decided to lay siege to Changchun without attacking, intending to force the garrison to surrender through starvation, thus avoiding significant casualties from direct assault. This strategy was adopted after a failed attempt to capture the city in mid-May 1948, resulting in heavy casualties with nearly 40,000 troops lost.

On May 29, 1948, Lin Biao sent a telegram to Mao Zedong: “After the battle on the 24th, we repeatedly considered and discussed it with the Northeast Bureau Standing Committee, and the commanders at all levels did not express much confidence in taking Changchun.” The next day, Lin Biao proposed:

“Take a long-term siege approach against Changchun, fighting off reinforcements first, then attacking the city. We should prepare for a period of 2 to 4 months. We can be confident in destroying the enemy and capturing Changchun.”

Subsequently, Mao Zedong agreed to this plan. Lin Biao then issued the “Methods for the Siege of Changchun,” even proposing a slogan: “Make Changchun a dead city.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) mobilized 12 independent divisions to complete the siege. They implemented a complete blockade within a radius of 45 kilometers centered on Changchun, with a depth of 25 kilometers. They prohibited the entry of grain, vegetables, fuel, cattle, and horses into the blockade zone. Under the strict control of the PLA, a food crisis quickly emerged in Changchun. After Changchun Airport fell at the end of May 1948, all contact with the outside world was cut off. Food supplies in the city could only rely on air drops.

To prevent the Nationalist forces from receiving the air drops, the PLA set up numerous artillery and anti-aircraft gun positions around Changchun, forming a tight air defense. Nationalist planes often had to escape before completing air drops to avoid being shot down or dropped supplies haphazardly from high altitudes. As a result, very little food actually reached the city, far from meeting the needs of the 700,000 people.

Out of desperation, at the end of June, the Nationalist commander Zheng Dongguo issued the “Temporary Measures for Grain Control in Wartime Changchun,” which stipulated that citizens could only keep enough grain for three months and had to sell the rest to the municipal government at fixed prices to ensure the needs of the garrison. Any violations would result in the confiscation of grain and severe punishment. This order essentially robbed Changchun residents of their food.

Without any food reserves, a large-scale famine quickly appeared among Changchun’s residents. Grain prices in the city soared from a few yuan per jin to 10,000 yuan per jin, yet it was still impossible to buy. Later, Zheng Dongguo said in his memoirs, “Since July, there have been deaths from starvation in the city. Many civilians, having exhausted their grain or having had it confiscated by the military, had to survive by eating tree leaves and grass roots, eventually dying from extreme weakness. The number of people dying from starvation increased, with some collapsing and dying suddenly while walking on the streets. Corpses were left unburied. The tragedy of people selling human flesh even appeared on the streets.”

At this point, some may ask, with no food in the city, why didn’t people flee? Soldiers couldn’t escape, but ordinary civilians couldn’t either? The answer is they couldn’t escape.

Because Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan’s siege strategy aimed to force the large population of Changchun to consume limited grain, causing the Nationalist forces to quickly run out of food and become unsustainable. If civilians were allowed to leave, the burden of grain consumption would be reduced, and the Nationalist forces would hold out longer. So, Lin Biao’s deputy, the political commissar of the Fourth Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on September 9, 1948:

“Two months of siege have yielded significant results, causing a severe food shortage in the city. Sorghum costs 30 million yuan per jin but is unavailable. Residents rely on tree leaves and grass for sustenance, with many dying from starvation. Our strategy is mainly to prohibit passage. We set up sentries every 50 meters on the front line with barbed wire and trenches, closely monitoring gaps, and preventing refugees from coming out. Those who attempt to leave are persuaded to return.”

In plain terms, the Communist Party’s strategy was to accelerate the consumption of grain by innocent civilians in the city to starve out Changchun, achieving the goal of subduing the city without fighting. The number of people who died of starvation was not a consideration.

By June 28, the extreme food shortage in Changchun had reached the point of cannibalism. Large numbers of desperate starving people began to break through the defenses to steal the Nationalist forces’ grain supplies. The Nationalist forces and police opened fire, resulting in many deaths.

From August 1, under Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, the Nationalist forces began to evacuate large numbers of residents to reduce the city’s grain consumption. The political commissar of the First Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army, Xiao Hua, ordered at the time: “Prevent all departures of people from Changchun. Even if individuals on the verge of starvation need to be dealt with, it should be handled by the regiment but not become the responsibility of the besieging forces.”

Due to the Communist Party’s strict siege, approximately 200,000 refugees were trapped between the Nationalist and Communist positions, unable to advance or retreat. Hundreds of people starved to death in the wilderness every day. Luo Ronghuan explained at the time:

“In the blockade struggle, a basic prohibition of entry and exit must be enforced. Those who have already left can be released in batches, but not in large numbers at once, so the enemy cannot quickly evacuate. If none are released, the high number of deaths would also be bad.”

The situation was so dire that Luo Ronghuan’s report mentioned, “They knelt in groups before our sentries, begging for passage. Some abandoned their babies and children and fled, others hanged themselves in front of our sentries. Soldiers, seeing this tragic situation, softened and cried along with the starving people, saying, ‘It’s the orders from above, we can’t help it.’ Some soldiers even secretly let the refugees pass. After correction, another extreme occurred: beating, tying up, and even shooting refugees. The number of deaths and injuries is not yet counted.”

They preferred to shoot starving refugees rather than let them out. Reading Luo Ronghuan’s report, what emotions do you feel? This was not liberation but massacre. The so-called People’s Liberation Army did such things.

However, the PLA would release certain special people. For instance, to undermine the Nationalist forces’ morale, they would release deserters or those who surrendered. They would also release valuable technical personnel. The famous storyteller Shan Tianfang, a native of Changchun, once recalled, “During the siege, the Shan family paid 17 taels of gold and a diamond watch to buy a way out. A Nationalist platoon leader said, ‘I’ll send you out through the east bridge checkpoint. The PLA has a checkpoint specifically for receiving Nationalist defectors. You just pretend to be a defector, and the PLA, treating defectors well, will surely take you in.’”

A Japanese female writer named Endo Homare, who was 7 years old during the Changchun siege, later wrote a book titled “A Japanese Girl in the Changchun Siege: How I Survived the Tragedy of War in China,” recounting her experience. Her father, Okubo, was one of the Japanese who stayed in Changchun. Their family ran the “New Kyoto Pharmaceutical Factory,” producing addiction treatment drugs. Okubo once gave medicine to the Communist forces, so the underground Communist Party leader in Changchun, Lin Feng (later Liu Shaoqi’s secretary), wrote a cloth note with the PLA stamp as a token of gratitude. The note said that if their family needed to go to the liberated area, they could present the note to the PLA.

During the siege, Endo Homare’s elder brother, sister-in-law, and nephew starved to death. Desperate, her father Okubo led 90 surviving Japanese out of Changchun on September 20, 1948. They crossed the refugee area littered with corpses, slept among the dead, and finally reached the PLA positions the next day. Okubo presented the cloth note from Lin Feng to negotiate with the PLA, but they outright rejected its validity.

（This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）

I gave a talk about the history of the Whampoa Military Academy and Sun Yat-sen. Some audience members felt that my section on the Beiyang government was too brief and had questions about that period of history. The brevity was intentional to keep the program within its time limits and avoid straying off-topic. Today, I’ll use this members-only program to delve deeper into the story of the Beiyang government. First, it’s important to clarify that the term “Beiyang government” is somewhat imprecise. It actually refers to the Republic of China before 1928. The term was used later to distinguish it from the National Government established in Nanjing after Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition in 1928. During this period, the presidents and prime ministers were mainly Beiyang faction politicians. To justify their rebellion, the Kuomintang derogatorily labeled the previous Republican government as the “Beiyang government.”

The term “Beiyang” comes from when Yuan Shikai trained the Qing Dynasty’s new army at the Xiaozhan in Tianjin, known as the Beiyang Army. Thus, the warlords and politicians associated with Yuan Shikai were called the Beiyang faction.

Although both the Beiyang government and the later Chiang Kai-shek government were officially called the Republic of China, they were fundamentally different. The Beiyang government was established based on the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China following the Xinhai Revolution, modeled after the American separation of powers system. It adopted a presidential system with both a Senate and House of Representatives. Both the president and the members of parliament were elected regularly. Despite the immature democracy, with incidents of bribery and scandal, elections were still held. Unlike the American system, the Beiyang government had a Premier, a powerful position second only to the president, providing a check on presidential power. Thus, the Beiyang government was a hybrid between a presidential and parliamentary system.

Moreover, provinces during the Beiyang era had their own assemblies, exercising full local autonomy. Technically, the Beiyang government was a federal system under the guise of a republic. In contrast, the Kuomintang era was characterized by authoritarian one-party rule, or what was termed as a party-state.

The Beiyang era flag was the Five-Colored Flag, symbolizing the harmony of five ethnic groups, and its national anthem was “The Song of the Clouds.” The Chiang Kai-shek government adopted the Blue Sky with a White Sun flag and the anthem “The Three Principles of the People,” derived from the Whampoa Military Academy’s anthem. Therefore, although both were called the Republic of China, it was essentially a regime change. Despite being the weakest central government in modern Chinese history, the Beiyang government did not lose any territory. Conversely, the subsequent Kuomintang and Communist parties lost significant lands. Many political figures in the Beiyang period were reformists from the late Qing Dynasty, imbued with traditional scholar-official values and the spirit of constitutional democracy. They maintained high ethical standards in both personal and professional conduct. Although the Beiyang factions often fought among themselves, they rarely resorted to ruthless extermination. Many warlords who lost power lived out their lives in peace. Regardless of who was in power, the Beiyang government did not become dictatorial but continued to function democratically. During its nearly 17-year rule, the Beiyang government convened five national assemblies without significant interruptions. Even after suppressing Sun Yat-sen’s Second Revolution, Yuan Shikai did not dissolve the Kuomintang, allowing it to participate in elections as per the established electoral laws.

In 1923, the Beiyang government enacted China’s first true democratic constitution, the “Constitution of the Republic of China.” Modeled after the U.S. Constitution but modified for Chinese conditions, it was China’s only federal constitution that implemented a true separation of powers and local autonomy. It specified the terms and election methods for the president and legislators, clearly delineating central and local powers. Provincial assemblies and county magistrates were directly elected, which enabled local self-governance in Guangdong as implemented by figures like Chen Jiongming.

The Beiyang era was the most pluralistic period in modern Chinese history. There was no official ideology, allowing a diverse range of thoughts to flourish. Intellectuals enjoyed academic and speech freedom, leading to successive cultural enlightenment movements and a golden era in Chinese cultural and educational history. While many know this period for its scholarly giants like Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Chen Yinke, Wang Guowei, Zhang Taiyan, and Lu Xun, few realize that China’s technological development was also impressive. For instance, in March 1912, Feng Ru’s Guangdong Aircraft Company produced the first domestically made airplane, a global innovation at the time. In 1918, during World War I, the U.S. contracted Jiangnan Shipyard to build 10,000-ton freighters to transport military supplies to Europe, recognizing China’s shipbuilding capabilities. This partnership was worth a staggering $7.8 million.

The Communist claim that pre-1949 China was a backward society unable to produce even nails or matches is a baseless lie. Despite frequent local conflicts among warlords, China’s economy grew rapidly, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing economies during that time. Economists call this the golden age of Chinese national capitalism.

In my previous talk about Whampoa, I mentioned that the Beiyang government was assertive in foreign affairs, especially against Russia, reclaiming Outer Mongolia, deploying troops to Vladivostok, and evacuating Chinese nationals. However, their tough stance wasn’t limited to Russia. The Beiyang government also stood firm against Britain, an established power.

In 1914, Britain and the Dalai government of Tibet signed a secret treaty. Britain promised support for Tibetan independence in exchange for about 90,000 square kilometers of territory in Southern Tibet, now known as the McMahon Line. Despite its inability to control Tibet, Yuan Shikai’s government refused to recognize the treaty, defying Britain. This stance remains the root of the unresolved Southern Tibet issue. In 1917, the Beiyang government strategically joined the Allies and declared war on Germany and the Central Powers. Though they only sent laborers rather than troops, they leveraged their status as a victorious nation to reclaim German and Austro-Hungarian concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. More importantly, they abolished extraterritorial rights and suspended the Boxer Indemnity payments. Other nations followed suit, and China even received 84 million taels of silver in war reparations from Germany, the largest indemnity China had ever secured voluntarily in modern history.

At the 1921 Washington Conference, the Beiyang government recovered Japanese-occupied Shandong and effectively nullified the Twenty-One Demands. These significant diplomatic achievements have been largely overlooked in later historical accounts. However, many still view the Beiyang government as traitorous, primarily due to its relationship with Japan. From Yuan Shikai onwards, the Beiyang government’s diplomatic approach was criticized for being too pro-Japanese, favoring loans from Japan, and granting Japan many privileges. This dynamic stemmed from the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. After the Boxer Rebellion, Russia occupied Northeast China and seemed unwilling to leave, displaying clear ambitions. Japan, having annexed Korea, clashed with Russian interests. Lacking the strength to reclaim the Northeast, the Qing Dynasty secretly invited Japan to expel the Russians, promising them the transferred Russian interests.

Though inviting another nation to fight on home soil was humiliating, it was a desperate yet pragmatic choice for the Qing, which proved successful. Japan, eager to dominate East Asia, waged a costly war, losing nearly 100,000 troops and depleting its reserves, to defeat Russia and preserve the Northeast for the Qing Dynasty.

At that time, the Qing court and officials had a great admiration for Japan, and it was during this period that the peak of learning from Japan occurred. For the Japanese, fighting on behalf of the Qing was certainly not out of altruism; such significant sacrifices were made with the expectation of some return. This return was the special rights in Northeast China. In this sense, the Beiyang government inherited the Qing policy and had to bear this historical debt from the start. The subsequent troubles were actually influenced by this Qing legacy, leaving the Beiyang government with no choice.

The so-called Twenty-One Demands were later delayed by the Beiyang government with various excuses and were not implemented. Eventually, a few years later, they were abolished at the Washington Conference. From a diplomatic perspective, this was a classic case of the Beiyang era’s diplomatic achievements. However, from the public’s point of view, any unequal treaty signed would tarnish one’s reputation, as ordinary people care more about the outcome than the process. Political figures are often judged in a binary manner of good or evil, with little consideration for the historical context.

The diplomatic failure at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, particularly the transfer of German rights in Shandong to Japan, is regarded in textbooks as one of the greatest diplomatic failures of the Beiyang government. In reality, the Beiyang government’s diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference was not a failure. The delegation made several demands, with the return of Shandong’s rights being just one of them.

After negotiations with the major powers, the delegation achieved the abolition of consular jurisdiction, the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity, tariff autonomy, and compensation for losses, among other things. Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang believed that the rights in Shandong were already effectively controlled by Japan and could not be reclaimed without military action in the short term. If they did not sign under the current conditions, the already achieved negotiation results might be lost. This practical consideration was the main reason Lu advocated for signing the agreement at the Paris Peace Conference, which had nothing to do with treason.

As I mentioned, although China was a victor in World War I, it did not send any troops to the battlefield, only laborers. Given this situation, expecting to gain rights equal to those of other major powers was unrealistic in the international order of the time. Diplomatic negotiations often involve compromise, especially for weaker nations. It’s easy for the public to express indignation and chant slogans under nationalist fervor, but the actual implementation is far more challenging.

Lu Zhengxiang, the foreign minister criticized during the May Fourth Movement, was actually one of the few professional diplomats of the Beiyang era. He had served as ambassador to the Netherlands during the Qing Dynasty, held very progressive views, married a Belgian woman, and cut his queue in 1905, even before the Qing fell. During his tenure as Foreign Minister, he abolished the practice of appointing diplomats through high official recommendations and insisted on selecting highly educated and qualified diplomats.

During the Beiyang era, diplomats were required to have foreign language and diplomatic expertise, even causing Yuan Shikai’s own nephew to lose his position for not meeting the requirements. Beiyang-era diplomats were recognized as the best-educated and most qualified in modern Chinese history, incomparable to today’s “wolf warrior” diplomats.

Despite his professionalism, Lu Zhengxiang, burdened with infamy from the Paris Peace Conference, never returned to China and later became a clergyman in Belgium.

The most prominent slogan of the May Fourth Movement was “Fight for sovereignty externally, eradicate national traitors internally.” These “traitors” included Cao Rulin, Minister of Transport, and Zhang Zongxiang, Minister to Japan, who were key figures in Sino-Japanese diplomacy at the time. However, they were not the decision-makers.

The famous burning of Zhao Jia Lou involved setting fire to Cao Rulin’s residence, but he escaped, leaving Zhang Zongxiang to be beaten severely. Zhang Zongxiang later requested the government to release the students who beat him, and those arrested for arson were treated well in custody, with the police chief personally visiting them. Public pressure soon led to the dismissal of these high officials.

After being dismissed, Cao Rulin’s reputation was ruined. Deeply affected, he withdrew from politics and turned to industry, founding the Central Hospital, the predecessor of today’s Peking University People’s Hospital. This hospital, established for charitable purposes, provided free treatment to the poor, funded entirely by Cao Rulin.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, Cao Rulin steadfastly refused the lucrative positions offered by the Japanese, despite being considered an ideal candidate for collaboration. Although the Japanese forced several titles on him, he never accepted them. Ironically, Mei Siping, a student leader in the May Fourth Movement who had labeled Cao a traitor, later served in high positions in the puppet government and was executed for treason after the war. The so-called patriotic youth ended up betraying the country, while the alleged traitor upheld national integrity.

Similarly, Beiyang officials were notably strong in their national integrity. For example, after the September 18 Incident, warlord Wu Peifu, though retired, fiercely denounced Japan’s actions. When Japan occupied Beiping in 1935 and proposed so-called North China autonomy, Wu Peifu, despite being highly respected, adamantly refused their overtures.

Japan’s top envoy in Beiping, Kenji Dohihara, personally invited Wu Peifu to return to power, but Wu firmly refused. Living without an income, Wu relied on financial support from his old subordinate Qi Xieyuan, but he cut ties with Qi upon learning Qi had accepted a position in the puppet government. Wu Peifu declared, “I’d rather be poor than take your money.”

In December 1939, Wu Peifu died of sepsis in Beijing after a tooth extraction by a Japanese dentist, with rumors suggesting he was poisoned for refusing Japan’s offers.

Other Beiyang officials, such as Duan Qirui, Yuan Keding, and Jin Yunpeng, also refused to collaborate with Japan, despite their high social standing and Japan’s attempts to recruit them. Compared to the opportunistic political figures of the KMT and CCP, these Beiyang officials displayed a commendable level of integrity.

Modern Chinese textbooks only retain the May Fourth Movement as the legacy of the Beiyang era, mainly focusing on the cultural heritage of Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. However, the broader May Fourth Movement, which started with the founding of “New Youth” in 1915 and lasted until the early 1920s, emphasized human rights and science equally. Chen Duxiu, founder of “New Youth,” advocated for personal freedom and individualism, aligning with the social reform declarations of figures like Cai Yuanpei at the founding of the Republic of China, promoting public morality and human rights, and opposing despotism and superstition with a scientific spirit.

Hu Shih, a prominent figure in the May Fourth Movement, emphasized that the core of the New Culture Movement was the liberation of thought and individual rights. This concept was highly advanced, even more significant than democracy and science, highlighting the importance of protecting personal rights and freedom as the foundation of modern civilization. Understanding this helps us better appreciate the true achievements of the May Fourth Movement and the Beiyang era over a century later. （This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）

This is the Er Ye Story. These past few days, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have coincidentally been commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy. Xi Jinping and Lai Ching-te have each given speeches interpreting the Whampoa spirit in their own ways. Xi Jinping emphasized leveraging unique advantages to firmly oppose independence and promote reunification. Lai Ching-te argued that fighting for the survival and development of the Republic of China is the true path, and anything else is false Whampoa. The interpretations of the Whampoa spirit from both sides of the Strait are diametrically opposed and sharply confrontational.

As many of you know, I used to work in Guangzhou’s Huangpu for 17 years. The Whampoa Military Academy is located on Changzhou Island, which was in my jurisdiction. As a popular tourist spot, I visited it no fewer than 20 times. Whether for private or official receptions, everyone always wanted to visit there because of its fame. So, I am very familiar with the Whampoa Military Academy and have read extensively about its history. However, I believe that the history of this famous military academy, which encapsulates half of modern Chinese history, has been greatly distorted and covered up, leading to misunderstandings on both sides of the Strait today. Therefore, I want to talk about the lesser-known history behind the Whampoa Military Academy. Today’s content might be quite subversive and reflect my personal opinions, which some may find difficult to accept, but that’s okay. Let’s take it step by step.

The establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy is closely related to the Soviet Union’s revolutionary export. After seizing power in Russia, Lenin, adhering to the fundamental principles of communism, was determined to export the revolution. This naturally led to sharp opposition from Western countries, and the Soviet Union was completely blockaded in Europe. To break this global isolation, Lenin established the so-called Comintern, or Third International, in March 1919, under the guise of an international workers’ organization, to begin planning the export of the revolution to the world. One of their important targets was China, which was then in a state of warlord fragmentation. Lenin set up the Eastern Branch of the Comintern, specifically targeting China.

In April 1920, the Soviet representative, Vi-King Ting, who went by the Chinese name Wu Tingkang, secretly came to China and established the East Asia Secretariat of the Comintern in Shanghai, setting up branches for China, Korea, and Japan, and began planning to establish communist parties in these three countries. The Russians then contacted Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu at Peking University to discuss forming a party. Why these two? Because after the Russian Revolution, as a novel event, it stirred considerable interest among Chinese intellectuals, with many seeing it as a way out for China, and Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were the most active, tirelessly promoting Marxism through their magazine, New Youth.

With Russian support, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in Chen Duxiu’s house in Shanghai in August 1920, with Chen Duxiu elected as the first General Secretary. Many believe the CCP was founded during the First Congress in July 1921, but it was actually in August 1920. Since Chen Duxiu later fell out of favor, the CCP avoided the fact that it was founded in his home and instead promoted the 1921 congress as its founding date.

Although the CCP was established, it was just one of many small parties amid a multitude of political movements in China at the time. By the time of the Third Congress in 1924, the CCP had only 432 members nationwide, mostly operating underground, unable to stir up much trouble. Most Chinese people had no idea such a party existed, let alone that it aimed to seize power. The Russians didn’t expect this favored child to grow up either; they never intended to put all their eggs in one basket.

Initially, the Russians targeted powerful warlords. When the Soviet plenipotentiary representative Yevgeny V. came to Beijing in August 1922 to negotiate establishing diplomatic relations, he was met with resistance from the Beiyang government’s Foreign Minister Gu Weijun, who strongly criticized the Soviet occupation of Outer Mongolia. He said that diplomatic relations could be established if the Soviets withdrew from Outer Mongolia. Since splitting China was a long-term goal for the Soviets, and the separation of Outer Mongolia was a critical first step, the Russians would never agree to this. After failing to negotiate with the Beiyang government, Yevgeny turned to Wu Peifu, the most powerful warlord at the time, attempting to establish a cooperative relationship. Although Wu Peifu was a warlord with conflicts with the central government, he was highly patriotic and refused outright, knowing the Russians had ulterior motives.

After Wu Peifu’s refusal, Yevgeny approached another influential figure, Sun Yat-sen. Pretending to help Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause, they discussed cooperation. Sun Yat-sen, in a difficult situation, quickly aligned with Yevgeny, and on January 26, 1923, they jointly issued the famous Sun-Joffe Manifesto. In exchange for recognizing the Russian military presence in Outer Mongolia, they forged an alliance, marking Sun Yat-sen’s adoption of the policy of alliance with Russia and accommodation of the communists. Why would the clever Sun Yat-sen fall into the Russian trap so easily?

Sun Yat-sen was a very complex figure, often considered the father of the nation but without fully deserving that title. Though he was the leader of the Tongmenghui, it’s fair to say he wasn’t the most crucial in overthrowing the Qing dynasty. During the Wuchang Uprising, he was abroad and not directly involved. Huang Xing led the revolution domestically, and the greatest contributor to the fall of the Qing was Yuan Shikai, who held the most elite military force, the Beiyang Army. If he had decided to fight the revolutionaries, the outcome could have been different. Yuan Shikai’s defection and coercion were pivotal in the Qing’s peaceful abdication. So, it’s not an exaggeration to say the success of the 1911 Revolution owed most to Yuan Shikai in the north and Huang Xing in the south. While Sun Yat-sen, as a spiritual leader, had undeniable contributions, he wasn’t the most critical figure.

The biggest controversy about Sun Yat-sen arose after the revolution’s success. As Yuan Shikai assumed the presidency and tensions grew between the north and south, the Tongmenghui reorganized into the Kuomintang (KMT), with key members like Song Jiaoren advocating for parliamentary struggle and abandoning armed conflict. However, Sun Yat-sen, aiming to wrest power from Yuan Shikai, continued to push for armed struggle. After Song Jiaoren’s assassination, Sun Yat-sen repeatedly called for armed resistance against Yuan, but his stance on violent revolution didn’t even gain much support within the KMT. Many party members wished to cherish the hard-won republic and resist Yuan without violating the Provisional Constitution. Sun Yat-sen, however, broke away from the KMT and formed the Chinese Revolutionary Party, which operated more like a secret society than a political party, requiring members to swear absolute loyalty to him. This approach, contrary to modern parliamentary politics, even alienated his old comrade Huang Xing, who refused to join.

In this context, Sun Yat-sen did not hesitate to sell out national sovereignty. On May 11, 1914, he wrote to the Japanese Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, asking for Japanese support against Yuan Shikai. In return, he promised to open the entire Chinese market to Japan, exempting all Japanese goods from taxes after he seized power. On March 14, 1915, upon hearing that Japan and Yuan Shikai were about to reach an agreement on the Twenty-One Demands, he feared losing Japan’s support and wrote again to the Japanese Foreign Minister, promising even more favorable terms than the Twenty-One Demands if they helped him overthrow Yuan Shikai. The draft of the Sino-Japanese alliance proposed by Sun Yat-sen contained 11 articles, granting Japan extensive military, economic, and financial privileges in China, amounting to a total surrender of national interests. In 1966, Fujiwara Ieyasu, a professor at Japan’s Fuji International University, published “A Study of Sun Wen,” revealing the full content of this secret agreement, which later caused an uproar when the original documents were made public. Those interested can look it up. The Japanese used this secret agreement to blackmail Yuan Shikai, eventually forcing him to accept parts of the Twenty-One Demands. In this process, Sun Yat-sen played a highly detrimental role by disregarding national and ethnic interests for his power struggle.

Sun Yat-sen’s reliance on Japan stemmed from his deep connections with Japan through the Tongmenghui. When the Republic of China was founded, he relied on Japanese financial support and appointed many Japanese to his service, including Kita Ryohei, a Japanese adventurer who advocated for the division of China and planned the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia. These actions show that while Yuan Shikai’s power grab was a fact, and he deserved criticism, Sun Yat-sen was not much better. He had lost his revolutionary ideals and was willing to invite foreign intervention and sell out national sovereignty for power, a step far beyond Wu Peifu’s actions.

Unfortunately, the Japanese did not favor Sun Yat-sen. After Yuan Shikai’s failed attempt to declare himself emperor and subsequent downfall, the Japanese leaned towards supporting the weaker Beiyang government to safeguard Japan’s established interests in China. Therefore, they showed no interest in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary plans. In this desperate situation, Sun Yat-sen turned his attention to another rogue actor, namely Soviet Russia. Isolated globally, Soviet Russia urgently needed to export revolution to China and cultivate agents. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, with no other options, sought external help for his revolution. The two sides struck a deal, leading to the inception of the First United Front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

After Duan Qirui came to power in 1917, power struggles within the Beiyang government persisted. Sun Yat-sen took advantage of this and moved south to Guangzhou, organizing the Constitutional Protection Movement to protect the Provisional Constitution. Subsequently, China entered a period of North-South division. This coincided with World War I, during which the Beiyang government leaned towards joining the Allies (Entente powers), which concerned Germany. Thus, the Germans aimed to weaken the Beiyang government, compelling them to change their stance. They quickly saw Sun Yat-sen, who had long sought to overthrow the government, as an opportunity. In March 1917, German Consul General Kriegsmann secretly contacted Sun Yat-sen and provided him with £2 million in funding to support his uprising. With this substantial sum, Sun Yat-sen immediately bribed parliamentarians to establish a new government in Guangzhou. Eventually, about one-third of the parliamentarians were bought off and moved south to Guangzhou. In September 1917, they formally established a military government, marking the beginning of the North-South division and confrontation.

Unfortunately, Germany soon suffered defeat, cutting off Sun Yat-sen’s financial support. He struggled for several more years until January 1921, when he convened a portion of the National Assembly to elect himself as the Grand President. He prepared for the Northern Expedition, initiating a new round of violent seizure of power. However, Sun Yat-sen lacked sufficient military forces at the time, mainly relying on two warlords from Guangdong, Chen Jiongming and Chen Jiongming. Chen Jiongming was Sun Yat-sen’s staunch supporter, but Chen Jiongming was not.

Chen Jiongming was a hero of his time. He and Sun Yat-sen were fundamentally different. Chen Jiongming was born in 1878 in Haifeng County, Guangdong Province. He passed the imperial examination at 20 and attended Guangdong Law and Political School at 26. After graduating, he returned home and founded the Haifeng Local Autonomy Association, advocating and practicing local autonomy in China’s first batch of regions. In July 1909, Chen Jiongming was elected as a Guangdong provincial legislator, actively promoting various social reforms and human rights protection bills. In the Huanghuagang Uprising of April 1911, as a legislator, Chen Jiongming led by example as captain of the fourth squad of the vanguard. It can be seen that he was both scholarly and martial, a rare combination. Crucially, he possessed high moral standards, refraining from smoking, drinking, or engaging in gambling or prostitution in daily life. Politically, he advocated for China to remove centralized power and implement provincial autonomy, akin to the federal system of the United States. He was truly a visionary politician. At that time, Chen Jiongming received high praise from people. In 1920, Shanghai’s “New Declaration” described Chen Jiongming as: “Procedurally a person, resolute and decisive, taciturn. His personal morality can be said to be a model for the whole of China.” The scholar Zhang Taiyan praised Chen Jiongming highly.

As a poet in the final days of the Qing Dynasty, based in Guangdong, you can certainly find solace. Even Sun Yat-sen praised him, saying he didn’t visit inns, avoided uncles, and endured hardships. I am no match for him. In the latter half of 1918, Chen Jiongming, as Commander-in-Chief of the Guangdong Army, marched into Zhangzhou, Fujian. Over the course of more than two years in Zhangzhou, Chen Jiongming implemented social reforms and construction, putting his political ideals into practice. He initiated extensive governance projects and improved local elections, earning recognition as the “New Policy of Zhangzhou.”

An official from the American Embassy in China visiting Zhangzhou described it as follows: “Development is evident everywhere in Zhangzhou. Roads are widened, new houses abound, streets are clean, and public safety is good. American expatriates take pride in the city’s governance.”

Due to his outstanding achievements, Chen Jiongming was appointed Governor of Guangdong Province in 1920. Immediately, he put his political ideas about local autonomy into practice. In August 1921, based on the local autonomy regulations announced by the Beiyang government, Chen Jiongming introduced the first-ever direct elections of county magistrates and county councillors in 15 counties of Guangdong. This marked the first time in China’s 2000-year imperial history that ordinary people directly voted for county magistrates and councillors, unprecedented and unparalleled in 1921. Furthermore, Chen Jiongming also pioneered judicial independence in Guangdong. Civil reports and litigation were all transferred to courts for adjudication. For example, in Panyu, electoral fraud was reported. After investigation, the election results were declared invalid by the court, rejecting the appointment of the county magistrate. Can you imagine that? In addition to these reforms, Chen Jiongming also implemented compulsory education in Guangdong, launching the “one township, one school” initiative. He appointed Chen Duxiu as Chairman of the Education Committee in Guangdong, allocating one-tenth of the province’s tax revenue for education, ushering in an unprecedented era of prosperity in Guangdong’s education.

Chen Jiongming’s vision for local autonomy extended beyond these reforms. For instance, he proposed that each province should have its own constitution as a foundation for local autonomy. These initiatives demonstrated his modern and forward-thinking approach. His political ideals, advocating federalism, were fundamentally at odds with Sun Yat-sen’s approach as a revolutionary leader solely focused on seizing power, making reconciliation between the two inevitable.

In 1922, insisting on launching the Northern Expedition, Sun Yat-sen dismissed Chen Jiongming from his position as Governor of Guangdong Province. Subsequently, Chen Jiongming initiated a mutiny and besieged Guangzhou in June 1922, driving Sun Yat-sen out. This event, commonly referred to in our textbooks as Chen Jiongming’s betrayal.

Later, in the histories written by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Chen Jiongming was portrayed as a warlord motivated by power struggles, betraying the revolution for personal gain. However, the true historical record tells a different story. The split between Sun Yat-sen and Chen Jiongming was fundamentally a clash of political ideologies. The true villain later became the founding father, while the true hero ended up branded a criminal.

To eliminate Chen Jiongming, who diverged from his path, Sun Yat-sen bought off Yang Ximin from Yunnan, Liu Zhenghuan from Guangxi, and Xu Chongzhi from Guangdong in 1923, forming an alliance to suppress Chen Jiongming. However, the results were not satisfactory; after all, warlords each pursued their own interests, unwilling to risk everything for Sun Yat-sen’s dreams of power. This realization led Sun Yat-sen to conclude that warlords were ultimately unreliable, necessitating the establishment of his own tightly controlled armed forces. This led to the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy.

Earlier, Sun Yat-sen had already established contact with the Soviet Union’s representative in China, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, as early as December 20, 1922. Sun Yat-sen wrote to Vyacheslav: “My recent work has made it possible for me to request support from your government in practical matters. We need weapons, equipment, technical assistance, and experts.” Successfully lured, the Soviet Union subsequently reached the Sun-Vyacheslav Declaration in January 1923. In his subsequent report to the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav said: “Mr. Sun has promised that once his party takes control of the Chinese government, he will guarantee recognition of Russia and form an alliance with Russia.”

Clearly, Sun Yat-sen employed the same strategy again, bargaining with the devil for the sake of national interests. This was precisely what Soviet Russia desired. In 1921, Soviet Russia invaded Outer Mongolia, promoting its independence, intending to divide and weaken China. Thus, instigating Sun Yat-sen to launch a war in the south of China was perfectly aligned with Soviet Russia’s interests. Stirring up civil war in China was in the best interests of Soviet Russia.

On March 8, 1923, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened a meeting, formally deciding to provide Sun Yat-sen with economic aid of 2 million Mexican silver dollars and dispatch a military delegation to assist in building an army. In addition, the Soviet Union provided 8,000 rifles, 15 machine guns, 4 cannons, and two armored cars. It was with the support of this substantial funding, personnel, and weapons that Sun Yat-sen began the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924.

The subsequent history need not be elaborated upon. Leveraging the elite and backbone provided by the Whampoa Military Academy, the Kuomintang established the most powerful army in China at the time, not only defeating Chen Jiongming but ultimately succeeding in the Northern Expedition, formally unifying China and establishing the one-party rule of the Kuomintang.

Of course, Soviet Russia was not a charitable organization; as the main sponsor, it naturally exerted control over Sun Yat-sen. Hence, the “unite with Russia, unite with the Communist Party” assisted the “agricultural workers” three major policies came into effect. At that time, the relatively unknown Communist Party of China also legitimately penetrated into various levels of the Kuomintang leadership. For example, Zhou Enlai was the head of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy, and Mao Zedong was the Minister of Propaganda of the Kuomintang Central Committee. Among the Communist Party members in the army, there were countless numbers.

In October 1923, the Soviet representative stationed in China privately said: “In the newspaper, I say it’s the Kuomintang, but for us, it’s actually increasing the ultimate influence of the Communist Party. Never forget, what we are actually doing is to stabilize the Communist Party. This goal should be remembered forever.” Later, during the rectification period in Yan’an, Zhou Enlai reflected on the reasons for the failure of the First United Front. He said: “The main reason for the failure of the Great Revolution was not following the instructions of the Communist International to infiltrate the party, government, and military. Transforming the Kuomintang to include large numbers of workers and peasants is infiltrating the party; turning the Farmers’ Associations into rural governments is infiltrating the government; forming a 70,000-strong army, including 20,000 Communist Party members, is infiltrating the military.”

It can be said that relying on Sun Yat-sen’s reputation and the Kuomintang as a strong base, the Communist Party, originally with just over 400 members, found a suitable host and ushered in a leap in development. From then on, the Communist Party truly entered the stage of competing for power. Various Communist Party organizations also penetrated deeply into various strata of Chinese society during this cooperation period, including some senior leaders, most of whom emerged during this period, gaining widespread influence. These became their significant capital for later successful rebellions. Therefore, while Sun Yat-sen’s alliance with Soviet Russia laid the foundation for the Kuomintang’s Northern Expedition and seizure of power, it also planted the seeds of a great disaster for the Communist Party. If one word could describe it, “uniting with Russia” was akin to drinking poison to quench thirst. It resolved Sun Yat-sen’s long-sought goal of seizing power in the short term but fed himself a chronic poison in the long run.

In fact, such concerns arose early. At the end of 1923, as Sun Yat-sen’s representative, Chiang Kai-shek went to Russia to discuss cooperation. Upon returning, Chiang Kai-shek was deeply concerned. He reported: “The Soviet Union’s so-called strategic goal of world revolution is more dangerous than Western colonialism’s impact on the Eastern national independence movement.” Sun Yat-sen reassured him, saying, “Once our Northern Expedition military achieves victory, the Three Principles of the People can be implemented as planned. By then, even if the Communist Party wants to sabotage our national revolution, it will be beyond their ability.” It shows how naive Sun Yat-sen was. The tragedy lies here.

Sun Yat-sen himself never believed in communism and thought that the Soviet system was not suitable for China. That’s why in the first article of the “Sun-Wen-Yue Fei Manifesto,” he insisted on stating: “Communism, and even the Soviet system, are in fact unsuitable for China.” Due to his early revolutionary experiences, he had a stronger affinity towards Japan and the United States. Therefore, he was unwilling to give up on an alliance with the United States and Japan. Unfortunately, both the United States and Japan did not support his dreams of internal conflict, so he took a risky path. Despite knowing the impure motives of the Soviet Union, he ultimately insisted on making deals with the devil, believing he could control them and gain advantages.

In reality, which country has ever profited from making deals with Russia? Who has ended up well? Sun Yat-sen’s dealmaking led China to taste bitter fruits even now. After hearing what I have said, perhaps you all have a better understanding of Sun Yat-sen. He used the guise of revolution to seize power, cooperating with the Japanese, Germans, and Soviets at different times, always using the interests of national democracy as an exchange, dividing the country, and inciting armed uprisings, using every means possible. He owed favors to both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, so both parties regard him as a sacred figure. This is justifiable, because without Sun Yat-sen, there would be neither of them.

Strictly speaking, Sun Yat-sen is not worthy of the title “Father of the Nation.” He did play a role in founding the nation, but he also played a significant role in its chaos. It can even be said that his faults outweighed his merits in the history of the Republic of China. Strictly speaking, he is the founding father of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but he cannot be considered the father of the Republic of China. Some might oppose this. The Beiyang government was so corrupt, warlords were harsh, and people lived in misery. What’s wrong with Sun Yat-sen overthrowing them? This was a good thing. Don’t rush; listen to me slowly explain.

First, I want to clarify a fact for everyone: as Asia’s first republican government, was the Beiyang government really as incompetent, corrupt, and terrible as later history books depict it? The Beiyang government peacefully succeeded the Qing Dynasty through a treaty and established Asia’s first republic. Although its parliamentary politics and local autonomy were immature and had many flaws, it represented a legitimate political power in China. Despite the shameful farce of Yuan Shikai’s restoration, after Yuan Shikai stepped down, the Beiyang government struggled but remained standing, not dictatorial, and still legitimate. It was also the only central government in modern Chinese history to achieve separation of powers.

From our perspective now, it was a typical small government managing a large society. Under its governance, China was effectively in a state of high local autonomy. Warlords frequently fought each other, that’s a fact, but the country remained intact, another fact. Which warlord independently founded a new country, right? This government often seemed chaotic due to the confrontations and squabbles among various warlord factions, but it was not incompetent and certainly not weak. In 1919, despite severe financial difficulties, the Beiyang government borrowed money to send troops. Under Xu Shuzheng’s leadership, they successfully recaptured Outer Mongolia, which had declared independence from China at the time, especially reclaiming the Tang Lu and Ulianghai regions stolen by Russia. They even sent naval and army forces to Vladivostok and forcefully evacuated hundreds of thousands of Chinese during the turmoil of the October Revolution, a process that lasted three years. This caused intense hatred towards the Beiyang government from Russia, making China one of the fourteen armed states that intervened against the Soviet Union.

Under the Beiyang government’s rule, China regained consular jurisdiction over many foreign concessions. They also reclaimed rights to roads in the northeast and Shandong, abolished privileges of foreign nationals, and more. The Beiyang government was firm externally and not overly oppressive internally. On May 21, 1918, a year before the May Fourth Movement, Beijing students learned of an impending military agreement between China and Japan and staged a rally demanding to see President Feng Guozhang. Feng not only personally met with the students but patiently explained each clause of the treaty to satisfy them that the negotiations were not a betrayal, until the students were content and dispersed.

During the Beiyang era, with minimal cultural control, within just over a decade, it fostered a cultural renaissance and produced many eminent scholars rarely seen. Many of China’s academic giants in modern history emerged during that period. Simultaneously, national industry developed rapidly; between 1913 and 1920, private industrial capital in China grew at an average annual rate of 11.9%. This laid the foundation for what was called the Golden Decade of the Republic. In short, although the Kuomintang later overthrew the Beiyang government, it wasn’t necessarily bad for China at that time. In many ways, it was even better than the two governments that followed.

Its tarnished reputation, aside from Yuan Shikai’s attempt at restoration, was also demonized by both the Kuomintang and later the Communist Party who overthrew it. For example, what is commonly viewed as the Treaty of National Humiliation, the 21 Demands, actually culminated in the 13 Articles of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, where only 10 of the demands were agreed upon with Japan. Yuan Shikai’s negotiation strategy at the time was to concede rights that Japan had already effectively obtained but firmly refuse those they had not. Negotiators like Cao Rulin and Gu Weijun antagonized the Japanese by disputing each clause, much to their frustration. Yuan intentionally leaked the negotiations to Western powers and domestic audiences, generating pressure and backlash from all sides. As a result, the final outcome was far from what Japan had initially desired, which was much better compared to the secret treaty Sun Yat-sen signed with the Japanese.

One can imagine, without Sun Yat-sen’s Northern Expedition, if China had continued under the Beiyang era’s small government and large society model, truly achieving the federal dreams of figures like Chen Jiongming, what would China be like today? How many detours could have been avoided? After saying all this, how should we look back at the Whampoa Military Academy a century later? Although it did indeed produce many prominent figures and condensed half of China’s modern history, frankly speaking, its birth itself was a tragedy for the nation, a misfortune for the people. The so-called Whampoa Spirit is essentially a violent logic that uses military force to seize political power, hardly worthy of promotion and praise. After Yuan Shikai stepped down, Sun Yat-sen, driven by personal desires, disregarded democratic principles, refused negotiation and compromise, and repeatedly launched military actions to seize power, even resorting to colluding with foreign powers, inviting the wolf into the house. His actions were undoubtedly treasonous. He is now revered as the founding father on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, a profound tragedy in history. The Kuomintang’s successful Northern Expedition in 1927, overthrowing the legitimate Beiyang government, was actually a setback and regression for the republic. The authoritarian era of the Kuomintang he initiated tacitly accepted the legitimacy of so-called violent revolutions. Therefore, if the Communist Party can rise with the same revolutionary slogans, what objections can the Kuomintang have? If you can seize power through violence, why can’t I?

Even today, certain perspectives on modern history, especially regarding imperialist aggression and colonial history, are still highly similar across the Taiwan Strait. Essentially, they originate from the same logic of violent revolution of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, completely detached from the core of modern democratic politics. Today, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have not yet escaped from this tragic core. The CCP uses the Whampoa Spirit to talk big about national unity, while Taiwan uses the Whampoa Spirit to exaggerate cross-strait opposition. Both sides endlessly debate the Whampoa Spirit, which in reality benefits neither the people on either side of the strait.

Looking back over a century, China’s future is long and the night is dark. How can we truly return to the republican spirit and democratic dreams we once had a century ago? This is the topic we should deeply contemplate today. Thank you for watching this episode of “February Stories.” （This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）