Saving the Nation or Betraying It:The Black and White of Wang Jingwei (Part 2)

In modern Chinese history, there may never be another person like this. In the first half of his life, he was a hero worshiped by the masses, and in the second half, he was a traitor despised by all. He once risked his life to assassinate a high-ranking Qing official for the revolution, but later, in the name of so-called peace, he kneeled before the invaders.

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Author ｜ Er Daye

– After recovering from illness in Europe and returning to China, Wang Jingwei became the Vice President of the Kuomintang, the second most important figure. However, he and Chiang Kai-shek began to diverge on their policies towards Japan. In 1938, Wang Jingwei proposed the famous Peace Movement. The core argument of this movement was that China could not win the war against Japan. Therefore, negotiating peace before total defeat would be more advantageous and could secure better treatment for the people in Japanese-occupied areas.

Wang Jingwei’s thoughts at the time were not surprising because China’s resistance was isolated without effective international support. In today’s Ukraine-Russia conflict, almost all European and American countries are supporting Ukraine, but China at that time truly lacked international allies. At the Nine-Power Treaty Conference in Brussels, even Britain and the United States did not support China and instead suggested negotiating to resolve the issue.

To be honest, if it weren’t for World War II breaking out and Japan joining the Axis powers against the Allies, it’s a real question whether they would have helped China. It was only after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of the Pacific War that the United States truly began to fully support China. Therefore, Wang Jingwei’s pessimism in 1937 when the full-scale resistance began was quite normal.

After Japan occupied Nanjing in 1938, all negotiations between China and Japan broke down, diplomatic relations were severed, and the situation became more critical. Wang Jingwei, along with Zhou Fohai, Mei Siping, Tao Xisheng, Gao Zongwu, and others, formed a low-profile club. The aim of this club was to promote the Peace Movement, arguing that continuing the war was pointless. However, Wang Jingwei also knew that Chiang Kai-shek would no longer agree to Japan’s proposed terms.

So, privately, he sent Gao Zongwu, a former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, secretly to Japan to test their bottom line. At that time, despite Japan’s occupation of large territories after battles like the Battle of Taiyuan, Battle of Xuzhou, and Battle of Wuhan, the Chinese forces still had significant strength. Japan, stretched thin due to the long front lines, realized it would be difficult to quickly defeat China, especially after the Chinese Nationalist Army achieved a major victory in the Battle of Taierzhuang, causing heavy losses to the Japanese. They urgently needed a pause.

Wang Jingwei’s proposal for the Peace Movement at this time was well received by Japan. Subsequently, after negotiations between Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro and Gao Zongwu, they reached the famous “Wang-Japan Secret Agreement.” This agreement had six main points:

China and Japan would sign an anti-communist agreement, with Inner Mongolia designated as a special anti-communist zone where Japan could station troops. China would recognize the independence of Manchukuo. Japan would abolish extraterritoriality in China and return concessions in China. China would allow Japan to exploit natural resources in North China, and China would grant Japan most favored nation status in trade. Japan would not demand war reparations, but China would compensate Japanese nationals for war losses. Upon restoration of peace, Japan would withdraw its troops within two years. While this agreement indeed compromised China’s sovereignty, considering Japan’s occupation of large territories, achieving these conditions was not considered entirely unfavorable. Most importantly, it secured Japan’s commitment to withdraw its troops, which meant achieving peace. Therefore, Wang Jingwei was very satisfied and believed it was the best outcome achievable.

With Japan’s commitment, Wang Jingwei was determined to implement his peace plan. However, it was clear that Chiang Kai-shek would never agree to the terms proposed by Japan. Therefore, Wang Jingwei planned to establish a new government in Yunnan, in the still unoccupied southern regions, to negotiate with Japan and then accept the Japanese-occupied areas after reaching an agreement. This way, he wouldn’t be seen as a traitor and wouldn’t have to bear the stigma of collaboration.

After gaining assurances of support from Yunnan warlord Long Yun, Wang Jingwei secretly fled Chongqing with his family and supporters on December 18, 1938, flying to Kunming, and then to Hanoi in Vietnam. Before leaving, he left a long letter to Chiang Kai-shek, concluding with the words, “You handle what’s easy, I’ll handle what’s difficult.” Essentially, he meant that Chiang should focus on military matters, while he would handle negotiations.

Even at this point, Wang Jingwei didn’t want to openly confront Chiang Kai-shek. On December 29, he issued the famous “Yan Telegram” in Hanoi, responding to Japan’s peace proposal and preparing to negotiate and implement the peace plan with Japan. Why was it called “Yan Telegram”? At that time, telegrams were charged by word count, so the fewer words used, the cheaper it was. The word for the 29th corresponded to “Yan,” hence the telegram sent by Wang Jingwei that day was named “Yan Telegram.”

Wang Jingwei’s departure completely disrupted Chiang’s plans and dealt a significant blow to the morale of the Chongqing Nationalist Government, which had been inspiring the nation with propaganda about resisting Japan. With Wang Jingwei, a figure of such stature and position, defecting to Japan, could the people still have confidence in the government and Chiang Kai-shek? Internationally, it also raised doubts about China’s determination to resist the war, which was detrimental to gaining foreign aid and support. If even you are preparing to cooperate with Japan, who will support you?

Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek was very anxious about this matter. He publicly claimed that Wang Jingwei went to Hanoi for medical treatment, leaving him a way back, while dispatching several envoys to persuade Wang Jingwei to return home. However, by this time, Wang Jingwei’s resolve was firm, and after issuing the “Yan Telegram,” there was no turning back.

However, at this time, the situation took a dramatic turn. The Japanese Prime Minister, Konoe Fumimaro, who had previously reached an agreement with Wang Jingwei, suddenly resigned a few days after the “Yan Telegram” was issued. The new Japanese cabinet had no interest in the agreement and left Wang Jingwei hanging in Vietnam. Wang Jingwei was taken aback. After issuing the “Yan Telegram,” he was expelled from the Kuomintang and all positions, unanimously denounced by the entire nation, completely destroying his reputation.

Even Long Yun, the Yunnan warlord who had promised to support him, turned against him, making it impossible to establish a new government in the South. Now that Japan was backtracking, it was a complete betrayal from both sides. From this, it can be seen that Wang Jingwei, with his idealistic tendencies, sometimes lacked basic political judgment.

The reason Japan was initially willing to court him was that he was the best pawn to restrain Chiang Kai-shek. His appeal was unmatched by other Chinese figures. After Chiang Kai-shek began full-scale resistance, Japan repeatedly made it clear that the prerequisite for Sino-Japanese negotiations was for Chiang Kai-shek to step down. Therefore, the key motivation for courting Wang Jingwei was to undermine Chiang Kai-shek’s prestige and divide China’s anti-Japanese camp.

However, for Japan to achieve this goal, it depended on Wang Jingwei’s ability to use his personal prestige. When the war between China and Japan was raging, and both sides valued national sentiment and dignity, Wang Jingwei fled to Hanoi and issued the “Yan Telegram.” This stark contrast, regardless of his motives, was enough to completely collapse his reputation overnight. In today’s terms, it was a complete disaster.

Wang Jingwei never held military power and did not have a core team in politics. The reason he remained in high office was based on his established persona and reputation over the past few decades. With his persona shattered and his reputation lost, Wang Jingwei was left with few bargaining chips. After achieving the goal of dividing China’s anti-Japanese resistance and undermining the Chiang Kai-shek government, what motivation did Japan have to fulfill its promises to him? From then on, Wang Jingwei’s fate was no longer in his control.

Finally, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to order agents to Hanoi to carry out an assassination plan. However, fate seemed to favor Wang Jingwei. On the day of the assassination, he had just switched rooms with his secretary, Zeng Zhongming. As a result, the assassins from the intelligence agency killed Zeng Zhongming instead, sparing Wang Jingwei’s life. This incident ultimately strengthened his resolve to escape to Shanghai and negotiate with the Japanese to establish a government.

However, by this time, the Japanese had firmly grasped Wang Jingwei because he had no retreat. Therefore, Japan’s new Prime Minister, a military man named Abe Nobuyuki, drastically revised the previous agreement and proposed the “Outline for Adjustment of Japan-China New Relations.” Not only did they no longer mention the so-called withdrawal commitment, but they also demanded an expansion of the Japanese military’s presence. Diplomatically, China had to recognize the existing Manchukuo and several puppet regimes in North China. The central government to local governments, technical advisors would all be appointed by Japanese.

If the previous “Zhongguang Hall Secret Agreement” was already a humiliation and a loss of sovereignty, then this new treaty is truly an outright act of treason. Not only did it completely transform into a puppet regime controlled by the Japanese, but it also, in effect, recognized the legitimacy of Japan’s division of China. To put it bluntly, it was even worse than the Manchukuo.

After Wang Jingwei saw Japan’s new demands, he knew he had been played, but who could he blame? He had no bargaining chips left. So, with tears in his eyes, he said to his wife, Chen Bijun: “If Japan can conquer China, then let them conquer it. They can’t conquer China, yet they want me to sign my name on their plans; this is simply treason. China is not something I can sell. If I sign, it’s nothing but a contract of servitude for me.”

Wang Jingwei’s attitude of complete submission even made Gao Zongwu, who had followed him out of Chongqing, unable to bear it. Gao Zongwu was the person who handled the “Zhongguang Hall Secret Agreement.” He saw the Japanese raise their demands arbitrarily, clearly wanting to annex China. He deeply regretted it. If there was still a chance to find a way out according to the previous agreement, once this new agreement was implemented, it would be an eternal downfall.

So, on New Year’s Day in 1940, Gao Zongwu and another negotiator, Tao Qisheng, fled to Hong Kong under the arrangement of the Shanghai gang leader Du Yuesheng. Subsequently, they contacted the Central Bureau’s agents, and on January 6 of that year, Gao Zongwu published the full text of the “Zhongguang Hall Secret Agreement” in the Dagongbao, resulting in the sensational “Gao-Tao Incident.”

After reading this secret agreement, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary: “I did not know that Wang traitor sold out to such an extent. He is utterly indifferent to the loss of territory and sovereignty, which is indeed worse than a dog or pig.” This was also the fundamental reason why Chiang Kai-shek later sought to completely eradicate Wang Jingwei.

Once this news was made public, Wang Jingwei’s reputation as a traitor became irreparable. Even the overseas Chinese from Nanyang, who had once supported him, despised him. The famous overseas Chinese leader Chen Jiageng publicly declared: “Wang Jingwei sells the country for fame, and the world has abandoned him.”

As Wang Jingwei’s reputation plummeted, it also left some Chinese who still harbored illusions about Japan in despair. They realized that the Japanese did not genuinely desire peace and instead became resolute proponents of war.

Carrying an immense burden of humiliation, Wang Jingwei ultimately established a regime in Nanjing on March 30, 1940, calling it the Republic of China and using the Blue Sky with a White Sun flag. However, this regime, aside from receiving recognition from Japan and other Axis powers, failed to gain effective recognition from other countries. Like Manchukuo, it was widely referred to as the Puppet Nanjing Government.

At that time, the Japanese merged some of the puppet regimes previously established in China under Wang Jingwei’s banner. Nevertheless, even so, the actual jurisdiction of Wang Jingwei’s regime was very limited; he could effectively control only today’s Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui provinces, as well as parts of Guangdong and Fujian.

During this period, under Japanese control, Wang Jingwei was unable to carry out the so-called peace plan he had envisioned. Aside from regaining some foreign concessions, his achievements were meager. Worse still, in January 1943, he was forced to join the Axis powers, declaring war on Britain and the United States, and even exchanged ambassadors with Manchukuo.

Wang Jingwei also recruited some fringe figures and local warlords from the Chongqing camp, effectively cooperating with Japan’s strategy to dismantle China’s anti-Japanese coalition. Wang Jingwei’s regime, in terms of propaganda, also largely aligned with Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” frequently lauding Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. These actions were entirely contrary to the peace plan he had once advocated, solidifying his status as a puppet government. It was difficult for him to stand on moral ground, both internationally and domestically.

Under the guise of peace, Wang Jingwei went too far under Japanese coercion. In contrast, contemporary Beiyang warlords who were also under Japan’s roof, such as Duan Qirui, Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, and Cao Kun, resolutely maintained their integrity. These old Beiyang warlords had their own dark histories, but in their later years, they refused to cooperate with the Japanese despite the temptation of fame and fortune, showing true national integrity. Therefore, in comparison, it was not too unfair for Wang Jingwei to be labeled a traitor.

Of course, it must be said that Wang Jingwei did do many good things within the limits of his ability. For instance, with Japanese help, he managed to control an army of about 400,000, which he mainly used for domestic stability and never fought against Chiang Kai-shek or the Communist Party, hardly ever attacking his fellow countrymen. Li Zongren, a major general of the Kuomintang, remarked in his memoirs:

“However, we should also say a fair word: although Wang Zhaoming became a traitor, he did not actively sabotage the anti-Japanese effort. For example, after Wang defected, the Kuomintang generals who had the deepest connections with him, like the Fourth War Zone Commander Zhang Fakui and the Eleventh Group Army Commander Huang Qixiang, were pillars of the anti-Japanese coalition. Yet during Wang’s time, he never once sent any correspondence to Zhang and Huang to surrender, which shows great righteousness. Even as a traitor, he felt that he was not going too far and exercised self-restraint.”

The renowned anti-Japanese general Zhang Fakui, who was responsible for post-war administration in Guangdong, stated: “I did not hear any complaints or criticisms from the people of Guangzhou about the Wang puppet regime, nor did I perceive any negative feelings towards the puppet government among the people of Guangzhou. I did not see any evidence of the puppet government oppressing the people in Guangdong.” Therefore, to speak objectively, Wang Jingwei’s regime was indeed a puppet regime, but he also retained some baseline integrity, ensuring stability within his controlled territory, engaging in superficial cooperation with the Japanese, refraining from internal conflict, and even tacitly allowing intelligence connections with Chongqing.

For example, when the Japanese demanded he join the Axis powers and declare war on Britain and the United States, he used this as leverage to request that Japan amend previous agreements and abolish a series of Japanese privileges. However, when the Japanese asked him to send troops to participate in the Pacific War, he made numerous excuses to avoid doing so. Thus, while he declared war on Britain and the United States, in reality, he did nothing substantive apart from verbal declarations.

However, these actions, under the label of traitor, were bound to be unrecognized by others. In extreme frustration, Wang Jingwei somewhat anticipated his own fate. During the Double Ninth Festival in 1943, he wrote his last poem:

“On the tower a hundred feet high leaning against the sky, the geese fly low and glide. All around, the falling leaves rustle, while yellow flowers catch the slanting sun. The railing beaten, my heart is heavy, my eyes reflect the vicissitudes of life. I ask the green mountains and clear waters, how many times can they witness the rise and fall?”

This poem can be said to be filled with the sorrow of loss from the Southern Tang Dynasty’s Emperor Li, and it serves as a prophetic statement. In March 1944, the bullet lodged in Wang Jingwei’s body triggered a malignant tumor, quickly leading him to become bedridden. He was forced to go to Japan for treatment, and ultimately died in November of that year at Nagoya Imperial University Hospital in Japan. His last words before his death were: “I want to go back to China.”

Afterwards, according to his wishes, he was buried on Meihua Mountain southwest of Sun Yat-sen’s mausoleum. One could say that Wang Jingwei died at the right time, as by the time he passed away, Japan’s defeat was certain; it was only a matter of time before American forces reached Japan’s homeland. Soon after, Japan surrendered the following year, and Wang Jingwei’s Nanjing government was naturally dissolved and taken over by Chiang Kai-shek.

Before returning to Nanjing, the first thing Chiang Kai-shek did was to order He Yingqin to blow up Wang Jingwei’s grave, exhuming his body, cremating it, and scattering the ashes directly into the Yangtze River, truly achieving “shattering his bones into dust.” A once-renowned youthful hero was thus recorded in history textbooks under the title of traitor.

Wang Jingwei’s wife, Chen Bijun, was sentenced to life imprisonment. After the establishment of the Communist regime, Song Qingling, who had connections with Chen Bijun, pleaded for her with Mao Zedong. Mao also gave her a way out, saying that as long as she wrote a letter of repentance, he would release her. However, Chen Bijun was indeed resolute; she refused to repent and never slandered Wang Jingwei, ultimately dying in Shanghai’s Tilanqiao Prison in 1959.

Many believe that Chen Bijun’s strong personality greatly influenced Wang Jingwei, even playing a key role in his leaning towards Japan.For example, Chen Gongbo, a subordinate of Wang Jingwei, once said, “Mr. Wang cannot accomplish great things without Chen Bichun, but without Chen Bichun, he cannot ruin great things.” The famous general Zhang Fakui also believed that placing personal hatred above national interests was wrong. It is clear that Wang Jingwei’s hatred for Chiang Kai-shek—and even more importantly, his wife’s hatred for Chiang—has surpassed the larger cause of the nation.

Having discussed the pros and cons of Wang Jingwei, how should we view him? The historical controversy surrounding Wang Jingwei ultimately boils down to one question: was he trying to save the nation through indirect means, or was he a traitor seeking personal gain?

Chen Gongbo, also defined as a traitor, defended Wang Jingwei during his trial by stating: “I believe that resistance should be pursued, but peace is unavoidable. If we think calmly, when Mr. Wang came to Beijing, there were already over a dozen provinces under enemy occupation; the people needed rescue, and there was no country to sell. In Nanjing, for years, he was overwhelmed trying to preserve the vitality of the nation and the people, enduring humiliation and accusations. For individuals, there was only suffering and no glory to pursue.”

This viewpoint actually represents the majority of the controversies surrounding Wang Jingwei. Let me outline Wang Jingwei’s strengths and weaknesses, and you can form your own judgment afterward.

Wang Jingwei’s first strength is that he consistently had a strong sense of martyrdom typical of scholar-officials, embodying the impulse of “If I don’t enter hell, who will?” From his assassination attempt on the regent that made him famous nationwide, to the establishment of the Republic of China, he had countless opportunities for wealth and power as a revolutionary leader, yet he disregarded them and repeatedly chose to give them up. He truly embodied the noble ideal of the Tongmenghui (Chinese Revolutionary Alliance) of achieving success and retreating. He and Chiang Kai-shek spent a lifetime in ideological conflict over governance and national structure, without resorting to a fight to the death for personal ambition. Ultimately, he was deceived by the Japanese into implementing the so-called peace plan and became a puppet, also due to this martyrdom complex.

His second strength is his commitment to democratic republicanism, preferring to avoid resorting to violence. Since the Second Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen, the republic that the Chinese had painstakingly established had become a mere facade. Various ambitious individuals and warlords, under the pretense of saving the people, fought fiercely, wielding their guns to settle disputes. Only Wang Jingwei truly practiced the idea of republicanism, having advised Yuan Shikai, Sun Yat-sen, and Chiang Kai-shek. Most of the time, he opposed the use of force, and ultimately, because of this belief, he aligned himself with Japan.

After Sun Yat-sen’s death, Wang Jingwei had ample opportunity to seize power, but he did not. When faced with issues, he preferred collective consultation and decision-making, rarely acting unilaterally. Whenever he encountered setbacks, he would quickly take the blame and resign instead of using power struggles to eliminate political rivals. This is relatively rare among political figures in the Republic of China.

His third strength is his impeccable personal morality. Wang Jingwei proposed the “Six No’s” principle early in his career and lived by it. Many politicians of the Republic, including Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, had multiple wives and engaged in various immoral behaviors. However, as a famous handsome man, Wang Jingwei maintained his integrity, with no bad habits, embodying gentlemanly conduct. Even his opponents could not find faults in his personal morals. More remarkably, as an elder of the Kuomintang, he held a high position for a long time without forming cliques or using his power for personal gain.

There is an old saying in China: “When the water is too clear, there are no fish; when a person is too observant, there are no followers.” Those who follow someone like Wang Jingwei cannot gain any benefits, so naturally, there are few who would wholeheartedly support him. Therefore, he did not have a true faction within the Kuomintang, relying solely on his reputation, which is also quite rare.

However, Wang Jingwei’s shortcomings far outweigh his strengths.

What are Wang Jingwei’s shortcomings? Four significant and fatal ones. The first is the indecisiveness I mentioned earlier, often wavering between choices. Deep down, Wang Jingwei was a passionate intellectual. He had independent thoughts and principles, refusing to easily go with the flow. Yet, as a political leader, he lacked a firm stance and often fluctuated in his decisions.

For instance, during the assassination of the regent, he was a determined revolutionary. After being influenced by Prince Su, he began to view the Qing dynasty favorably, believing that the revolution was a brotherly conflict. Regarding his attitude toward the Communist Party, he initially strongly opposed the alliance with the Soviets and the Communists. When Sun Yat-sen insisted, he flipped to support the alliance. Once the Soviet Union’s intentions were revealed, and he had to turn against the Communists, he did so. Likewise, concerning the anti-Japanese war, he started as a firm advocate for fighting, but after setbacks, he became a staunch supporter of peace. This frequent 180-degree turn led to his lack of the steadfast will and comprehensive solutions expected of a politician when faced with major issues, often opting for compromise.

Li Zongren, in his memoirs, evaluated Wang Jingwei’s character by saying, “Whenever major matters arose, he would waver, lacking stability and determination.”

Wang Jingwei’s second shortcoming is his inability to discern the gravity of responsibility, acting too impulsively. Wang Jingwei was not attached to power and often took the blame and resigned during intense internal party disputes, fleeing to Europe to avoid the storm. In his life, he traveled to Europe six times. Some might say he was principled, but harshly speaking, he simply shirked responsibility. When he should have stood up to solve problems, he left. Once the issues subsided, he would return amid calls for his presence, protecting his own reputation but losing the accountability expected of a politician. This led to inconsistencies in many of his policies. He acted on impulse and failed to find ways to continue when faced with difficulties.

At the beginning of the war, he was resolute in moving to Luoyang to resist, but upon encountering setbacks, he resigned. He played a leading role in the Tanggu Accord negotiations and resigned when accused of treason. The famous general Zhang Fakui, who once loyally followed Wang Jingwei, remarked, “Whenever an issue arose, he would always look to Mr. Chiang for guidance, lacking his own opinions. Once he had money, he would change his attitude, becoming overly bureaucratic and forgetting his previous ideals.”

Wang Jingwei’s third shortcoming is a lack of international political insight, failing to see the bigger picture. In the early stages of the war, China indeed faced a very unfavorable international situation. At that time, the European battlefield had not yet fully erupted into war, the anti-fascist alliance had not yet formed, and both Europe and America were cautious, unwilling to assist China. Therefore, Wang Jingwei believed that China, relying solely on itself, could not withstand Japan; continuing to fight would only lead to national destruction.

This thought was valid in 1938 and even in 1939. However, as China became a member of the Allied Powers and received substantial assistance, especially after the United States declared war on Japan, the Axis powers began to show signs of defeat on various fronts. Yet, Wang Jingwei still failed to recognize this trend; by 1943, he was still siding with Japan, declaring war on Britain and the United States, and promoting Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This short-sightedness, lacking basic international political judgment, is akin to someone who, even when daylight breaks, continues to wet the bed. Such shortsightedness would inevitably lead him to choose the wrong side and align with the wrong camp.

Wang Jingwei’s fourth and most fatal flaw is his failure to stand firm on national righteousness. It is a good thing for a politician to be pragmatic and adaptable, but it is essential to understand that there are certain political bottom lines that must never be crossed or used as a bargaining chip. This bottom line is national righteousness. National righteousness means that when the country faces foreign invasion, one must stand firm on their nation’s position and avoid sacrificing sovereignty and independence or harming national sentiment for the sake of achieving political goals.

A figure highly similar to Wang Jingwei is Marshal Philippe Pétain of France. He gained fame and accolades during World War I, becoming an undisputed national hero in the eyes of the French. However, during World War II, he surrendered to Hitler and accepted a series of humiliating conditions from Nazi Germany, establishing the Vichy government in southern France. The entire process synchronized with Wang Jingwei’s actions, and the outcomes were also entirely similar. After World War II, he was publicly condemned and sentenced to death, which was later commuted to life imprisonment due to his advanced age and frailty. Was Pétain truly devoid of any military integrity? Not at all; his thoughts were actually quite similar to Wang Jingwei’s.

In the Netherlands, a famous figure named Han van Meegeren was sentenced to prison and nearly executed for secretly selling several of his own forged paintings to the Nazis after the war. Even though he desperately tried to prove that these paintings were indeed his and not fake, he was ultimately imprisoned. So, regardless of time and place, national righteousness is the foundation for all public figures, especially politicians. Once you deviate from this point, regardless of whether your motives are good or bad, or whether you have merits or faults, it all becomes unexplainable. The people’s hatred for kneeling and surrendering far exceeds their yearning for a precarious survival; they would rather sacrifice than be enslaved. This is an unchanging national sentiment that exists across the world.

Especially with Wang Jingwei’s compliance with Japan’s intentions to divide China, his recognition of Manchukuo and the puppet regimes in North China seriously harmed the national sentiment. There is no country or nation that allows external forces to arbitrarily divide it. John Hunter, a history professor at Stanford University, commented on Wang Jingwei in his book The Inside Story of Collaborating with the Enemy during the Sino-Japanese War: “Whether intentionally or not, Wang essentially used his great reputation and authority to aid the most resolute continental expansionists in Japan in their divisive cooperation plan. This plan so despised the nationalist sentiments of China that as long as Wang accepted it, his regime was doomed to fail.”

Everyone knows that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was actually flirting with the Japanese during the War of Resistance against Japan, secretly collaborating rather than genuinely resisting; their focus was on developing themselves. However, the CCP dared not publicly stand with Japan, no matter how despicable their actions were in private. Mao Zedong maintained the facade of waving the banner of resistance to gain moral high ground. In February 1940, he even held a public rally in Yan’an to denounce Wang Jingwei. His performance on the stage was quite well-executed.

Chiang Kai-shek was similar. Throughout the war, he was secretly negotiating with the Japanese; the last negotiation took place in March 1945, where they almost reached a separate truce agreement. However, Chiang was clever: he continued negotiations while fighting, allowing Japan to withdraw with dignity, yet he never compromised on sovereignty and territory, balancing realism with his stance. Even to this day, no one criticizes him.

When a politician betrays and becomes an enemy in reality, they politically die. There are no exceptions, ancient or modern, at home or abroad. Perhaps, as Chen Gongbo defended, Wang Jingwei’s intention of seeking a curve of salvation was not for personal gain or loss. However, the final outcome did not fulfill his wishes; instead, it backfired, trampling on the dignity and image of the nation. Therefore, such intentions, whether good or bad, lose their significance.

Looking back at Wang Jingwei today actually holds practical significance. For instance, in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, many right-wing forces represented by Trump have been advocating that Ukraine’s resistance is meaningless, clamoring that Zelensky should recognize the reality of being unable to defeat Russia and should seek peace by ceding territory to protect the people. Many Chinese people also agree with this viewpoint.

Ukraine is indeed weaker than Russia; this is a fact. Continuing the fight will incur enormous sacrifices, and this too is a fact. However, resolute resistance is the foundation of the respect and support that Zelensky and Ukraine have garnered from the world, as well as the moral basis for a nation and a people to stand firm. If Zelensky were to kneel to Russia, just like Wang Jingwei did in pursuit of so-called peace, seeking mercy and ceding territory, Ukraine would not only fail to achieve the desired peace but would also lose the support of the entire world, living in suffering under Russia’s menace.

Thus, resolute resistance is the optimal solution for safeguarding Ukraine’s fundamental and long-term interests. Establishing this point firmly is the capital for Ukraine’s future standing in the world. Kneeling in surrender may reduce sacrifices but will not bring lasting peace and development.

From another perspective, Wang Jingwei offers us another lesson: never align with forces that seek to divide the nation. Wang Jingwei’s recognition of Manchukuo and the mutual appointment of ambassadors severely violated national interests and sentiment. Today, there is a trend in the overseas Chinese community that, under the guise of anti-communism, clamors for the division of China, as if China’s fragmentation could lead to democracy. During the Japanese occupation of China, they supported eight puppet regimes; China was indeed fragmented, but did it achieve democracy? What benefits did the people gain?

Some laughable individuals even shout for the re-establishment of Manchukuo. Shouldn’t you bring back the Emperor Kangde and the Japanese Kwantung Army too? Such statements, which severely ignore historical facts and hurt national sentiments, will be despised by the world, regardless of the slogans they use. They have nothing to do with resisting tyranny or democracy and freedom; they are merely a group of petty individuals who lack the integrity and reputation of Wang Jingwei but wish to achieve what he could not; what results can they expect?

Today, when we revisit Wang Jingwei’s history, we are more inclined to showcase the complexity and multifaceted nature of a historical figure. He was indeed once a hero and also once a sinner. The noble part of his character shaped a brilliant image, but the flawed part shattered this brilliant image. His historical positioning has aspects worth discussing, as well as those that are definitive; there are points that elicit sighs and those that deserve reflection.

Wang Jingwei’s granddaughter, Ms. He Chongjia, said in her evaluation of her grandfather: “Wang Jingwei does not need to be vindicated; whether a person is good or bad is a personal judgment. I will use Wang Jingwei’s own poem to provide a final evaluation of him:

‘In a blur of life, resentment lingers, and after death, worries abound.’

After returning to the country, Wang proposed a ‘peace movement,’ believing that negotiation is more beneficial than war. However, due to the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations, his political judgment was flawed, ultimately signing the humiliating ‘Wang-Ri Secret Agreement’ and bearing the reputation of a traitor.”