Saving the Nation or Betraying It:The Black and White of Wang Jingwei (Part 1)

In modern Chinese history, there may never be another person like this. In the first half of his life, he was a hero worshiped by the masses, and in the second half, he was a traitor despised by all. He once risked his life to assassinate a high-ranking Qing official for the revolution, but later, in the name of so-called peace, he kneeled before the invaders.

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Author ｜ Er Daye

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In modern Chinese history, there may never be another person like this. In the first half of his life, he was a hero worshiped by the masses, and in the second half, he was a traitor despised by all. He once risked his life to assassinate a high-ranking Qing official for the revolution, but later, in the name of so-called peace, he kneeled before the invaders.

He was a revolutionary leader and also a national traitor. Why did his life take such a sharp turn? Was there any hidden story unknown to the public? Hello, everyone, this is Er Ye Stories.

When you think of the word “traitor,” who comes to your mind first? I guess more than 90% of Chinese people would immediately think of Wang Jingwei.

Wang Jingwei, whose real name was Wang Zhaoming, was born in 1883 in Sanshui, Guangdong. His family originally came from Shaoxing, Zhejiang. His great-grandfather, Wang Kui, once served as an advisor to the governor of Hunan and was a famous Shaoxing “shiye.” The term “shiye” refers to advisors and think tanks for local officials during the Ming and Qing dynasties. They were not part of the official system but were personal consultants to the officials. Many of them came from the culturally rich region of Shaoxing, known for producing scholars.

Many Shaoxing intellectuals, unable to succeed in the highly competitive imperial examination system, chose to become advisors to officials. This is how the term “Shaoxing shiye” originated.

Wang Jingwei’s grandfather was a juren (successful candidate in the provincial imperial examinations) during the reign of the Daoguang Emperor and served as a minor official in Suichang, Zhejiang. His father, Wang Chu, was an unsuccessful scholar who inherited the tradition of the Shaoxing shiye and worked as an advisor in several counties, including Sanshui, Qujiang, and Yingde in Guangdong. As a result, Wang Jingwei was born in Sanshui, Guangdong, and their family residence is now located on Haoxian Street in Guangzhou.

His mother was his father’s second wife, and there was a significant age difference between them. Wang Jingwei was the fourth son in the family, and when he was born, his father was already 62 years old. Due to his mother’s Panyu origins, Wang Jingwei was fluent in Cantonese from an early age, which later played a role in his decision to follow Sun Yat-sen.

Being born into a scholarly family, Wang Jingwei received an excellent education in his childhood. However, he lost his mother at the age of 13 and his father at 14, leaving him to rely on his eldest brother for support. His teenage years were relatively difficult.

At the age of 17, Wang Jingwei began teaching at a private school in Lechang, Guangdong, to make a living. He even called himself “Teacher Confucius.” In 1901, at the age of 18, Wang Jingwei and his second brother both participated in the county examination in Panyu and were both successful. Wang Jingwei ranked first, earning the title of xiucai (a scholar who passed the imperial examination at the county level).

Due to his good looks, Li Zhun, the naval commander of Guangdong, specifically hired Wang Jingwei as a family tutor, solving his financial problems.

Here, I must emphasize Wang Jingwei’s appearance. Throughout history, good-looking people, whether male or female, often had more opportunities. Wang Jingwei’s appearance was undeniably outstanding, often compared to the legendary beauty Pan An.

The photo you see now might make you think I posted the wrong picture. At first glance, you might think, “Isn’t that Leslie Cheung?” But no, this is actually a photo of a young Wang Jingwei, who was widely recognized as a handsome man. Even the poet Xu Zhimo, known for his high standards, met Wang Jingwei in 1918 and couldn’t help but exclaim, “I once met him on a boat in Nanjing, and he truly is a handsome man, very lovable. Hu Shi said if he were a woman, he would fall in love with him; even as a man, he still loves him.”

So, throughout history, good looks have always been a powerful tool to capture people’s hearts. Grand theories can’t compete with good looks.

In 1904, in order to train new talents, the Qing government recruited a group of government-sponsored students from Guangdong to study in Japan. Wang Jingwei took the exam and was successfully admitted. In September of the same year, he went to Japan and became a government-sponsored student in the accelerated program at Japan’s Hosei University.

At that time, Japan was the base for Chinese revolutionaries, and influenced by revolutionary ideas, Wang Jingwei joined the Tongmenghui in 1905, becoming one of its founding members. Due to his excellent writing skills, he was appointed as the head of the evaluation department, responsible for propaganda work.

It was during this time that Wang Jingwei began using the pen name “Jingwei” to publish articles advocating for revolution. The name “Jingwei” comes from a Chinese myth in The Classic of Mountains and Seas. According to the myth, the daughter of Emperor Yan drowned in the East Sea, and her spirit transformed into a bird called Jingwei, who frequently picked up stones to fill the sea. Later, the story of “Jingwei filling the sea” was used to describe someone who is determined and persistent in the face of difficulties.

After Wang Jingwei’s pen name became famous, people stopped calling him Wang Zhaoming and started calling him Wang Jingwei. However, in daily life, he still went by Wang Zhaoming. I have visited the tomb of the 72 martyrs of Huanghuagang in Guangzhou many times, and the inscriptions Wang Jingwei wrote for his revolutionary comrades all bear the signature “Wang Zhaoming.”

I specifically went to see it several times. To be honest, Wang Jingwei’s calligraphy is truly excellent. Wang Jingwei, as a government-sponsored student of the Qing Dynasty, publicly joined the Tongmenghui to oppose the Qing. This was really biting the hand that fed him.

His elder brother, Wang Zhaoyong, was serving as an advisor to Cen Chunxuan, the governor-general of Liangguang at the time. Under pressure, he asked Wang Jingwei to return home quickly. However, Wang Jingwei, to avoid implicating his family, publicly announced that he was severing ties with his brother. Due to Wang Jingwei’s resolute revolutionary attitude, he quickly earned the admiration of his fellow townsman Sun Yat-sen and became Sun’s chief strategist. Many of Sun Yat-sen’s speeches were written by Wang Jingwei.

In 1906, Wang Jingwei graduated from Nihon University in Japan, ranking second among more than 200 students, and began following Sun Yat-sen around Southeast Asia, setting up branches of the Tongmenghui. One of the most important tasks was raising funds for the revolution.

At this time, Wang Jingwei’s extraordinary talents began to shine. Not only was he a great writer, but he was also an even better speaker. You can listen to a recording of Wang Jingwei’s speech:

“We know that China cannot be relied upon. After so many wars, not to mention civil wars, in foreign wars, it was always a case of blood slowly dripping. Only in this particular war is there truly a war for independence and self-determination.”

His speeches were easy to understand and highly motivational, often drawing full houses even before he took the stage. Hu Hanmin, a senior figure in the Kuomintang, greatly admired this, saying, “In the past 20 years, I have never seen anyone better at public speaking than Jingwei.”

As I mentioned earlier, Wang Jingwei was already a handsome man, and with his literary talent and eloquence, it was impossible not to like him. When he gave a speech in Penang, Malaysia, he won over a young admirer named Chen Bijun, who would later become his wife.

Chen Bijun was no ordinary person; she was the daughter of Chen Gengji, a wealthy overseas Chinese businessman whose family was in the rubber business in Southeast Asia. They were known as the “Millionaire Chen Family” and were also major financial supporters of Sun Yat-sen. The wealthy young lady Chen Bijun, who was only 16 years old at the time, fell in love with Wang Jingwei. To follow him, she actively joined the Tongmenghui and applied to work as Sun Yat-sen’s English secretary. In 1909, she and Wang Jingwei planned the assassination of the Prince Regent, an event that shocked the nation.

Wang Jingwei, as Sun Yat-sen’s strategist, was mainly responsible for propaganda and had no prior involvement in assassination missions. But in 1909, after several failed uprisings, both Sun Yat-sen and Wang Jingwei were widely questioned. Internally, many people said they had raised a lot of money but had accomplished nothing. Wasn’t that just lining their own pockets? Externally, monarchists like Liang Qichao mocked them as “remote revolutionaries,” only stirring others to revolution while they themselves lived comfortably overseas.

The young and hot-blooded Wang Jingwei couldn’t swallow this insult. To prove himself, he and Yu Peilun, Huang Fusheng, Chen Bijun, and five others planned a major assassination attempt, intending to die for their cause and restore their reputation. Their target was a high-ranking Qing official.

Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing, and Hu Hanmin all believed the chances of success were slim and unanimously opposed the plan. However, the impassioned Wang Jingwei felt that this was necessary to boost the revolutionary spirit, so he insisted on going ahead with it.

Before leaving, he wrote a nearly final letter titled “A Letter to Comrade Nanyang”: “Regardless of the success or failure of this trip, there is no hope of returning alive. If we shed blood in the streets, we will still look towards the capital in hope of seeing the revolutionary army enter the gates.” He was determined to die for the cause.

In December 1909, Wang Jingwei, Chen Bijun, Yu Peilun, and Huang Fusheng arrived in Beijing. They secretly hid in the Liulichang district, using a photography studio as a front, to prepare for the assassination. Among the women involved in this assassination attempt was another young lady from Tianjin, named Zheng Yuxiu, who was also a member of the Tongmenghui. She personally volunteered to transport the large bomb used in the assassination from Tianjin to Beijing.

At the time, the Tongmenghui was truly an elite organization filled with talent. Regardless of gender, most came from well-off families and had no need to seek fame or fortune through revolution. They were all young people with noble ideals. These passionate youths were worthy of their country, but unfortunately, the country at that time did not live up to them.

Upon arriving in Beijing, Wang Jingwei initially selected several high-ranking Qing officials as targets, but all were difficult to approach, so he abandoned those plans. Finally, they chose the highest-ranking official, the Prince Regent Zaifeng, the father of the last emperor, Puyi.

Wang Jingwei’s plan was to plant a bomb on the Silver Ingot Bridge on the north bank of Houhai Lake in Beijing, a route Zaifeng took every day to attend court. He would then hide under the bridge and detonate the bomb using a wire, taking both himself and Zaifeng down together.

The plan was good, but because they lacked experience, they discovered after burying the bomb that the detonation wire was too short. They had to return the next day to buy more wire and rebury the bomb. However, the commotion was too noticeable and a passing cart driver saw them and reported it to the authorities.

The assassination attempt failed before it even began. The Qing authorities launched a large-scale search based on the clues and deliberately released false information, claiming they had already caught the culprits. Wang Jingwei and Huang Fusheng thought the Qing had arrested the wrong people, so instead of fleeing, they stayed behind to plan their next move, only to be arrested by the police.

After being captured, Wang Jingwei believed there was no chance of escaping death, so he wrote the famous poem “A Poem Upon Arrest” while in prison:

“Boldly sing in the Yan market, Calmly become a prisoner of Chu.”

The policies of Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek towards Japan at the time did indeed take into account the practical situation, but they completely lacked popular support. This issue also deepened the rift between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek.

Because Wang Jingwei’s wife, Chen Bijun, firmly believed that this assassination attempt was definitely instigated by Chiang Kai-shek. Otherwise, how could it be such a coincidence? Just when Chiang suddenly decided not to take a photo, it didn’t make sense, did it? So Chen Bijun hated Chiang Kai-shek from then on. Her thoughts had a significant influence on Wang Jingwei.

Chiang Kai-shek himself was deeply affected by this incident. He realized that the previous compromise policy towards Japan had been very unpopular. So, not long after Wang Jingwei’s assassination attempt, Chiang Kai-shek took a firm stand at the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, stating that he would not tolerate any infringement on territorial sovereignty and would be determined to make the ultimate sacrifice if the survival of the country were at stake.

Especially after the Xi’an Incident in 1937, when Chiang Kai-shek reconciled with the Chinese Communist Party and gained the support of the Soviet Union, he actually benefitted from the situation. Local warlords also unanimously declared their support for his resistance against Japan. Chiang realized that advocating for war was the best way for him to restore his prestige. If he continued with the previous policy towards Japan, it would be difficult for him to maintain moral standing domestically and within the party, making the costs outweigh the benefits.

Therefore, Chiang made a dramatic shift and began advocating for war, winning over public support. Especially after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, as the full-scale war against Japan broke out, Chiang’s reputation soared, and he became the widely recognized national leader.

But at that time, Wang Jingwei was not as pragmatic as Chiang Kai-shek. He had not yet grasped the changing situation and still clung to the idea of peace, leading to his growing estrangement from Chiang Kai-shek.

So, how did Wang Jingwei end up on the path of siding with Japan? Please stay tuned for the next episode. Thank you for your company today, and I’ll see you in the next one.

“Let my head be lifted to a swift death, so as not to betray my youthful years.”

This poem was widely circulated among the people at the time, and everyone praised it. The Chinese have always highly revered assassins who stand against the strong and sacrifice themselves for justice, especially when the assassin is both handsome and talented, making it even more remarkable. This earned Wang Jingwei great social acclaim.

At that time, the official responsible for interrogating Wang Jingwei was Shanqi, the Minister of Civil Affairs. He had a very famous daughter—legendary spy Kawashima Yoshiko. We’ll talk about her story later. Shanqi, a member of the Qing royal family, was relatively enlightened and greatly admired Wang Jingwei’s talents, so he treated Wang very favorably. Not only did he not require Wang to kneel during the interrogation, but he also provided good food and allowed visits, even frequently visiting the prison to chat with Wang about poetry and literature. Wang’s poems were able to circulate, thanks to Shanqi.

Although the Qing government was an autocratic monarchy at the time, they still organized a public trial according to the law and allowed Wang Jingwei and Huang Fusheng to defend themselves. These two, indeed elite members of the Tongmenghui, spoke eloquently in court. Not only did they refuse to confess any accomplices, but they also competed to claim responsibility for the plot in order to reduce the other’s punishment. The Qing officials present were greatly impressed by their integrity.

Initially, the Prince Regent Zaifeng was furious and intended to execute Wang Jingwei, but Shanqi, who did not want to kill Wang, persuaded Zaifeng by saying, “If we kill Wang Jingwei now, it won’t serve as a deterrent. It will only make him a great hero, and more revolutionaries will take him as a role model and seek revenge for him. We won’t have peace in the future.” In the end, Zaifeng reluctantly sentenced Wang Jingwei to life imprisonment.

During Wang Jingwei’s imprisonment, Chen Bijun, undeterred by the danger, personally bribed the guards to bring Wang food and letters every day. This kind of loyalty and devotion is truly rare. Although Chen Bijun was not beautiful, the courage she displayed in their love was something most women could hardly aspire to. This ultimately cemented her marriage with Wang Jingwei.

In terms of personal character, Wang Jingwei was a very sentimental person. He was well aware of Shanqi’s preferential treatment in prison and was very grateful. In the later stages of his imprisonment, his attitude towards the Qing court changed significantly. He felt that there were still good people among the Qing officials, and that the Qing dynasty was not entirely without merit. He even compared the conflict between the revolutionaries and the Qing government to a quarrel between brothers.

Later, when the Qing dynasty fell and Shanqi passed away in Dalian, Wang Jingwei made a special trip to Dalian to pay his respects. In politics, they were enemies, but in personal character, they were friends—this was the traditional Chinese ideal of a gentleman’s friendship.

After the Wuchang Uprising, the Qing government, in an attempt to quell the revolutionary tide, declared an amnesty for political prisoners. In November 1911, less than two years after his imprisonment, Wang Jingwei was released. On the day of his release, over a thousand elites from Beijing gathered at the prison gate to welcome him, a grand spectacle. By this time, he was no longer just a key figure in the Tongmenghui but a revolutionary hero renowned across the country.

The assassination of the Prince Regent became the most important political capital of Wang Jingwei’s life. After the success of the Xinhai Revolution, Wang continued to follow Sun Yat-sen, but political differences gradually emerged between them. Sun originally appointed him as the governor of Guangdong, a very important position, but Wang Jingwei declined. He believed that the revolution was for the welfare of all people, not for personal gain. Now that the revolution had succeeded, he felt that learned individuals should take on the responsibility of governing the country. He said, “I have not studied enough for the revolution, and now I should go abroad to study.”

He even publicly advocated that revolutionaries should retire after success and follow the “Six Noes” principle: no holding office, no becoming a legislator, no patronizing prostitutes, no gambling, no taking concubines, and no smoking opium. In fact, the oath of the Tongmenghui included a line: “Retire after success,” which reflected the desire to break free from the cycle of violent revolutions that aimed to seize and retain power. This noble vision has yet to be realized today.

When Sun Yat-sen became the provisional president, negotiations with Yuan Shikai were not going smoothly. Old habits resurfaced, and he was ready to launch a Northern Expedition to overthrow Yuan by force and unify China. Wang Jingwei was very displeased, openly stating, “Power is the evil of the world, and prolonging war for the sake of power is inexcusable.” He even directly criticized Sun Yat-sen to his face: “If you’re against negotiations, is it because you’re reluctant to give up the presidency?” These words were very harsh and hit Sun right where it hurt.

Amid widespread opposition, Sun Yat-sen was forced to relinquish the presidency to Yuan Shikai. At this point, Wang Jingwei was truly acting with noble integrity, standing in stark contrast to the many bureaucrats who were only interested in dividing the spoils. This was a unique trait of many revolutionaries of that era.

After Yuan Shikai became president, Wang Jingwei fulfilled his promise by resigning from all positions and went to France with Chen Bijun to study, intending to stay out of politics. He said, “The greatest hope after the revolution is to use the freedom of speech and publication to spread truth and transform the thoughts of the people.” Yuan Shikai repeatedly offered him money and invited him to join the Beiyang government, but Wang refused every time.

However, as the saying goes, “The tree wishes to be still, but the wind will not stop.” When Song Jiaoren was assassinated, Wang Jingwei was forced to return to China and participate in the second revolution of the revolutionary party. Even then, to avoid civil war between the North and South, Wang made efforts to mediate. During Sun Yat-sen’s second revolution, Wang Jingwei was opposed to it, advocating instead for a legal resolution to Song Jiaoren’s assassination. He even traveled to Guangzhou to urge revolutionaries to lay down their arms and negotiate with Yuan Shikai.

As a founding revolutionary leader, Wang Jingwei was deeply disillusioned with the domestic situation at the time. He did not want conflicts but was forced to participate, putting him in a state of internal torment. He even said, “I am tired of life, yet death has not come.”

Eventually, during Sun Yat-sen’s Constitutional Protection Movement, Wang returned to France. This back-and-forth continued for several years, until 1920, when he finally agreed to serve as the Minister of Education in the Guangzhou Military Government. As a key figure in the Xinhai Revolution, this was his first time holding public office.

From Wang Jingwei’s early behaviors, it was evident that at that time he was indeed indifferent to fame and fortune, embodying the typical characteristics of a traditional Chinese intellectual. He had ideals of saving the country and its people amidst the tides of history, but he was also weary of the filth in political struggles. In the end, he was forced into a position where he gradually became a person who had no control over his own fate.

Wang Jingwei’s internal struggles actually manifested early on. In July 1914, Sun Yat-sen organized the Chinese Revolutionary Party in Tokyo, demanding that all party members pledge allegiance to him personally and classifying them into several ranks: founding citizens, meritorious citizens, and advanced citizens. Wang Jingwei was particularly disgusted by this. In a letter to Wu Zhihui, a senior member of the Kuomintang, he said, “I cannot imagine fabricating such a party program to tarnish the reputation of the revolutionary party members. We have wasted our acquaintance with Sun Yat-sen.” One could say that he was extremely disappointed in Sun Yat-sen.

However, after the farcical events of Yuan Shikai declaring himself emperor and Zhang Xun’s restoration, Wang Jingwei, deeply disillusioned with the domestic situation, realized that if he wanted to accomplish something, he still could not break away from the influence of Sun Yat-sen. Thus, in 1920, he decided to return to politics, and his thinking underwent a significant transformation, shifting from advocating peace to gradually favoring military force. As a result, he soon became one of Sun Yat-sen’s right-hand men.

Now, let me discuss something here.

Wang Jingwei had a fatal weakness in his character: while he had noble sentiments and his own opinions, he often lacked a firm stance. He and Sun Yat-sen had many disagreements on political programs, but he often failed to hold his ground after opposing them and ultimately followed Sun Yat-sen’s wishes. Either he fled abroad when things got tough, or he resolutely carried out the policies.

For instance, when Sun Yat-sen established a military government in Guangzhou and prepared to launch the Northern Expedition, Wang Jingwei opposed it. However, he didn’t dare stick to his position and ended up fleeing to Europe. Another example is Sun Yat-sen’s policy of forming alliances with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. Wang Jingwei initially disagreed, but under Sun Yat-sen’s persistence, he was forced to comply, even going so far as to promote the benefits of these alliances everywhere in support of Sun Yat-sen.

The only thing Wang Jingwei remained steadfast about throughout his life was the assassination of the regent. After that, political vacillation and indecision became his norm, and this became the key to his eventual downfall.

Chiang Kai-shek could be described as Wang Jingwei’s lifelong political rival, and the power struggle and conflict with Chiang Kai-shek were among the main reasons for Wang Jingwei’s tragic fate. In terms of seniority within the party, as one of the founding members of the Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen’s chief writer, Wang Jingwei’s status in the Kuomintang was far higher than Chiang Kai-shek’s. When Sun Yat-sen passed away in 1925, all three of his testaments were penned by Wang Jingwei, with Sun Yat-sen merely signing them, including the famous phrase, “The revolution has not yet succeeded, comrades must continue to strive.”

During Sun Yat-sen’s final illness, Wang Jingwei was his plenipotentiary representative, while two other senior figures, Liao Zhongkai and Hu Hanmin, were ranked behind him. Therefore, after Sun Yat-sen’s death, Wang Jingwei was the undisputed successor and was soon elected as the chairman of the National Government and the chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. At that time, although Chiang Kai-shek was already the president of the Whampoa Military Academy, he wasn’t even a member of the Kuomintang’s Central Executive Committee, making him a junior figure within the party. His titles of Guangzhou garrison commander and commander-in-chief of the National Revolutionary Army were conferred by Wang Jingwei.

At that time, there were also military powerhouses within the Kuomintang, such as Xu Chongzhi, Li Zongren, and Bai Chongxi. Without Wang Jingwei’s promotion, Chiang Kai-shek wouldn’t have had a chance to rise. However, Chiang Kai-shek quickly seized control of the Kuomintang’s military power through the Northern Expedition, firmly grasping the military forces and becoming the largest power broker within the party, posing a real threat to Wang Jingwei’s position. The conflict between the two gradually surfaced.

The conflicts between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei centered around several issues. One major point of contention was their attitude toward the Communist Party. As Sun Yat-sen’s successor, although Wang Jingwei initially disagreed with the alliance with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, he eventually adhered to this policy. As a result, the Communist Party quickly grew, and many key positions within the Kuomintang were held by Communist Party members, such as Tan Pingshan as Minister of Organization, Lin Zuhan as Minister of Peasants, and Mao Zedong as Minister of Propaganda—all of them were Communists. Furthermore, the Kuomintang’s military advisors were appointed by the Soviet Union and directly intervened in military operations. In the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army, for example, 80% of the political commissars were Communist Party members.

After the Kuomintang began the Northern Expedition in 1927, supported by Soviet funds and weapons, they rapidly conquered large territories and established the National Government in Wuhan, with Wang Jingwei as the chairman. The Communist Party at this time began to reveal its true nature, forming trade unions and peasant associations all over the place following the orders of the Comintern, organizing strikes and land reforms. The process was extremely bloody and quickly faced opposition from many within the Kuomintang, leading to the party’s split.

Right-wing figures led by Hu Hanmin believed that the Communist Party harbored evil intentions and must be expelled. The left wing, led by Liao Zhongkai, insisted on resolutely carrying out Sun Yat-sen’s policy of aligning with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. At first, Wang Jingwei leaned toward the left, supporting the alliance with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. However, after Chiang Kai-shek returned from his visit to the Soviet Union in 1923, he had already seen through the Soviets’ agenda. Especially after the Zhongshan Warship Incident and the Nanjing Incident, Chiang Kai-shek became convinced that the Communist Party was bound to seize power eventually, so he became a staunch right-winger, advocating for the military purge of Communists.

With Wang Jingwei leading the government and Chiang Kai-shek in charge of the military, their conflicts over this issue intensified to the point of open confrontation. To counter Chiang Kai-shek, on April 5, 1927, Wang Jingwei and Chen Duxiu, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, issued a joint declaration, stating that the two parties must continue to cooperate. Unable to tolerate this, Chiang Kai-shek responded just days later, on April 12, by launching a military purge of the Communists in Shanghai. This disagreement eventually led Chiang Kai-shek to overthrow Wang Jingwei’s Wuhan National Government and establish his own Nanjing National Government, an event known in history as the “Ning-Han Split” (Ning referring to Nanjing and Han referring to Wuhan).

However, Wang Jingwei soon contradicted himself. Through secret channels, he obtained a copy of the Comintern’s “May Instructions” sent to the Communist Party. These instructions bluntly called for the Communist Party to organize the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army to completely replace the Kuomintang. When Wang Jingwei saw this document, he realized he had been deceived. His attitude toward the Communist Party underwent a 180-degree shift. On July 15 of the same year, he launched his own purge of the Communists in Wuhan, marking the complete breakdown of the first cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Although Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek eventually reached a consensus on severing ties with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, the rift between them had already been established. Moreover, through decisive actions, Chiang Kai-shek garnered the support of many anti-Communist forces within the Kuomintang, and his prestige within the party began to surpass Wang Jingwei’s.

More importantly, through his resolute anti-Communism, Chiang Kai-shek gained the support of the Jiang-Zhe financial clique domestically and Western countries, particularly Britain and the United States, internationally. The Nanjing government also became recognized by foreign powers as the legitimate government, with guns in hand and full legitimacy. In his conflict with Wang Jingwei, Chiang Kai-shek had firmly seized the upper hand.

Wang Jingwei, as Sun Yat-sen’s successor, did not dare to completely overturn the policy of aligning with the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, which led to his indecision in dealing with the Communist Party. His reputation in both international and domestic circles, as well as among the public, suffered greatly, making it difficult for him to contain Chiang Kai-shek from that point on.

The second major conflict between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek lay in their governing philosophies. Wang Jingwei was an idealist and a staunch supporter of democracy and republicanism. He consistently advocated for resolving issues within a constitutional framework and opposed military intervention in politics, especially dictatorship. After Sun Yat-sen’s death, Wang Jingwei favored collective leadership. Although he is a heavyweight elder of the Kuomintang, he did not form factions or cling tightly to military power.

But Chiang Kai-shek was different. As a strongman who rose to power through military force, after gaining control of the military, he cultivated personal power within the army. His ambition clearly extended beyond simply being the commander-in-chief of the Northern Expedition, which greatly displeased Wang Jingwei.

To avoid division, as a condition for the merger of the Nanjing and Wuhan governments, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei both stepped down. Chiang went to Japan, while Wang went to Europe. However, Chiang’s trip to Japan was not for leisure; he used this opportunity to marry Soong Mei-ling, a woman from the Soong family with American connections, and then extensively lobbied in Japan to gain support. Upon returning to China, he quickly regained his official position and launched a war against various warlords, known as the Central Plains War. Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to resolve the issue through military force.

At that time, Wang Jingwei was naturally pushed by the anti-Chiang forces to become the common leader. In Beijing, he established a national government and openly competed with Chiang Kai-shek. To be realistic, Wang opposed Chiang not out of reluctance to lose power but because he strongly disliked military dictatorship. As a scholar-politician who had been committed to promoting a civil government since the Xinhai Revolution, he preferred dialogue and negotiation over resorting to violence in conflicts.

Therefore, Wang Jingwei was very averse to Chiang Kai-shek, who rose to power through military means and was preparing for a military unification. He feared that Chiang would become a second Yuan Shikai, so it was not surprising that he frequently opposed Chiang.

However, in China during that era, the one with the strongest fist had the final say. Wang Jingwei, who had high prestige and seniority but had never commanded a single soldier, was doomed to be no match for the militarily powerful Chiang Kai-shek. Thus, after Chiang’s victory in the Central Plains War in 1930, he completely defeated his main rivals. Wang Jingwei was forced to flee to Europe again. From then on, the power of the Kuomintang’s political, military, and governmental affairs was firmly in Chiang Kai-shek’s hands.

Later, in order to counterbalance Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Jingwei and other bigwigs like Hu Hanmin established a national government in Guangzhou in May 1931 to prepare for military action against Chiang. Wang even publicly condemned Chiang Kai-shek as “brutal and tyrannical, which pains my heart.” However, unexpectedly, the Mukden Incident soon broke out, leading to the Japanese occupation of Northeast China. Under the pressure from various factions within the Kuomintang demanding a halt to the civil war, Wang Jingwei had no choice but to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek again and returned to Nanjing to become the Minister of the Executive Yuan, never to regain the upper hand.

The third disagreement between Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek was their attitudes toward Japan. Contrary to popular belief, after the Mukden Incident, Wang was a pro-war faction, while Chiang Kai-shek favored peace. After the Japanese invaded Shanghai, Wang immediately announced the relocation of the capital to Luoyang, stating that the Chinese government “would never be intimidated by force and would never cede an inch of territory.” Moreover, because the Northeast Army fled without a fight, Wang also fell out with Zhang Xueliang. He repeatedly urged Zhang to resign in disgrace while he himself took the lead in resigning as the Minister of the Executive Yuan.

On the other hand, at that time, Chiang Kai-shek believed that he could not defeat Japan and advocated “to first secure the internal front before dealing with external threats.” He viewed the Communist Party as a greater threat than the Japanese, thus supporting negotiations with Japan. After the Mukden Incident, Chiang delivered a speech stating, “The survival of the country is our priority. If the nation perishes, we too shall perish.” He asserted, “At this moment, we must unite as a people, respond to strong power with reason, and face barbarism with peace, enduring pain and anger while temporarily adopting a submissive attitude, awaiting the judgment of international justice.” In October 1931, Chiang even sent his special envoy Xu Shiying to Japan to negotiate, proposing the terms for peace talks: “If Japan can guarantee the integrity of China’s eighteen provinces, the National Government will agree to negotiate with Japan or concede Northeast China as long as it does not undermine our national dignity.”

However, Wang Jingwei’s attitude later underwent a significant change, aligning with Chiang Kai-shek. After the Japanese further occupied North China and established a puppet government there, Wang also acknowledged that it was indeed impossible to defeat Japan. Consequently, he gradually adjusted his stance to a dual policy of resistance and negotiation. From then on, Wang became a pro-peace faction, and along with Chiang Kai-shek, signed the Tanggu Agreement with Japan in May 1933, tacitly accepting Japan’s occupation of Northeast China and Rehe Province.

The signing of this agreement caused a nationwide uproar. Both Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek were harshly criticized, and the label of traitor was attached to both of them from then on. When explaining why he signed the Tanggu Agreement, Wang stated, “Previously, people criticized the government for not resisting and losing territory. Now that we have resisted, we have lost even more territory. China is a weak country, which determines that this national crisis of invasion is not a chance occurrence. Given China’s current national strength, there is no possibility of victory, regardless of the form of resistance. This was clear to us from the very beginning. Since there is no hope for victory, why should we resist?”

This politically incorrect statement might have been a reflection of reality at that time, but it was unacceptable in terms of national sentiment and righteousness, and it was not conducive to establishing a country’s international image. Therefore, it was not surprising that in July 1935, amid a tidal wave of public condemnation, Wang Jingwei was forced to resign again, relinquishing his positions as Minister of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ultimately, survival is merely survival; it can serve as a means but should not be a goal. Wang Jingwei’s transformation from a pro-war faction to a pro-peace faction not only cost him support within the party but also resulted in the loss of the public support he had built from his previous reputation, making him the target of widespread criticism. Against this backdrop, an assassination attempt occurred in November 1935.

A retired soldier named Sun Fengming, extremely dissatisfied with the Kuomintang’s policy of compromise with Japan, planned to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek during the fifth plenary session of the fifth national congress of the Kuomintang. As fate would have it, Chiang suddenly decided to skip the group photo session that day, prompting Sun Fengming to change his target to Wang Jingwei instead. Wang was shot three times; although none of the wounds were fatal, one bullet lodged in his spine and could not be removed, causing irreversible damage to his health, which ultimately led to his death.

Before he died, assassin Sun Fengming told his interrogators, “Please look at the map. Is the whole of Northeast and North China still ours? If we don’t fight back, the country will perish, and we will become slaves!” After Wang was attacked, Tang Yongren, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who took over the implementation of policies towards Japan, was also assassinated. Thus, Sun Fengming’s sentiments reflected the simple nationalistic feelings of the majority of Chinese at the time, who believed it was better to stand and die than to kneel and live.