The Truth of Beiyang：An Era Shrouded in Mystery

I gave a talk about the history of the Whampoa Military Academy and Sun Yat-sen. Some audience members felt that my section on the Beiyang government was too brief and had questions about that period of history. The brevity was intentional to keep the program within its time limits and avoid straying off-topic. Today, I’ll use this members-only program to delve deeper into the story of the Beiyang government. First, it’s important to clarify that the term “Beiyang government” is somewhat imprecise. It actually refers to the Republic of China before 1928. The term was used later to distinguish it from the National Government established in Nanjing after Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition in 1928. During this period, the presidents and prime ministers were mainly Beiyang faction politicians. To justify their rebellion, the Kuomintang derogatorily labeled the previous Republican government as the “Beiyang government.”

The term “Beiyang” comes from when Yuan Shikai trained the Qing Dynasty’s new army at the Xiaozhan in Tianjin, known as the Beiyang Army. Thus, the warlords and politicians associated with Yuan Shikai were called the Beiyang faction.

Although both the Beiyang government and the later Chiang Kai-shek government were officially called the Republic of China, they were fundamentally different. The Beiyang government was established based on the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China following the Xinhai Revolution, modeled after the American separation of powers system. It adopted a presidential system with both a Senate and House of Representatives. Both the president and the members of parliament were elected regularly. Despite the immature democracy, with incidents of bribery and scandal, elections were still held. Unlike the American system, the Beiyang government had a Premier, a powerful position second only to the president, providing a check on presidential power. Thus, the Beiyang government was a hybrid between a presidential and parliamentary system.

Moreover, provinces during the Beiyang era had their own assemblies, exercising full local autonomy. Technically, the Beiyang government was a federal system under the guise of a republic. In contrast, the Kuomintang era was characterized by authoritarian one-party rule, or what was termed as a party-state.

The Beiyang era flag was the Five-Colored Flag, symbolizing the harmony of five ethnic groups, and its national anthem was “The Song of the Clouds.” The Chiang Kai-shek government adopted the Blue Sky with a White Sun flag and the anthem “The Three Principles of the People,” derived from the Whampoa Military Academy’s anthem. Therefore, although both were called the Republic of China, it was essentially a regime change. Despite being the weakest central government in modern Chinese history, the Beiyang government did not lose any territory. Conversely, the subsequent Kuomintang and Communist parties lost significant lands. Many political figures in the Beiyang period were reformists from the late Qing Dynasty, imbued with traditional scholar-official values and the spirit of constitutional democracy. They maintained high ethical standards in both personal and professional conduct. Although the Beiyang factions often fought among themselves, they rarely resorted to ruthless extermination. Many warlords who lost power lived out their lives in peace. Regardless of who was in power, the Beiyang government did not become dictatorial but continued to function democratically. During its nearly 17-year rule, the Beiyang government convened five national assemblies without significant interruptions. Even after suppressing Sun Yat-sen’s Second Revolution, Yuan Shikai did not dissolve the Kuomintang, allowing it to participate in elections as per the established electoral laws.

In 1923, the Beiyang government enacted China’s first true democratic constitution, the “Constitution of the Republic of China.” Modeled after the U.S. Constitution but modified for Chinese conditions, it was China’s only federal constitution that implemented a true separation of powers and local autonomy. It specified the terms and election methods for the president and legislators, clearly delineating central and local powers. Provincial assemblies and county magistrates were directly elected, which enabled local self-governance in Guangdong as implemented by figures like Chen Jiongming.

The Beiyang era was the most pluralistic period in modern Chinese history. There was no official ideology, allowing a diverse range of thoughts to flourish. Intellectuals enjoyed academic and speech freedom, leading to successive cultural enlightenment movements and a golden era in Chinese cultural and educational history. While many know this period for its scholarly giants like Liang Qichao, Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Chen Yinke, Wang Guowei, Zhang Taiyan, and Lu Xun, few realize that China’s technological development was also impressive. For instance, in March 1912, Feng Ru’s Guangdong Aircraft Company produced the first domestically made airplane, a global innovation at the time. In 1918, during World War I, the U.S. contracted Jiangnan Shipyard to build 10,000-ton freighters to transport military supplies to Europe, recognizing China’s shipbuilding capabilities. This partnership was worth a staggering $7.8 million.

The Communist claim that pre-1949 China was a backward society unable to produce even nails or matches is a baseless lie. Despite frequent local conflicts among warlords, China’s economy grew rapidly, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing economies during that time. Economists call this the golden age of Chinese national capitalism.

In my previous talk about Whampoa, I mentioned that the Beiyang government was assertive in foreign affairs, especially against Russia, reclaiming Outer Mongolia, deploying troops to Vladivostok, and evacuating Chinese nationals. However, their tough stance wasn’t limited to Russia. The Beiyang government also stood firm against Britain, an established power.

In 1914, Britain and the Dalai government of Tibet signed a secret treaty. Britain promised support for Tibetan independence in exchange for about 90,000 square kilometers of territory in Southern Tibet, now known as the McMahon Line. Despite its inability to control Tibet, Yuan Shikai’s government refused to recognize the treaty, defying Britain. This stance remains the root of the unresolved Southern Tibet issue. In 1917, the Beiyang government strategically joined the Allies and declared war on Germany and the Central Powers. Though they only sent laborers rather than troops, they leveraged their status as a victorious nation to reclaim German and Austro-Hungarian concessions in Tianjin and Hankou. More importantly, they abolished extraterritorial rights and suspended the Boxer Indemnity payments. Other nations followed suit, and China even received 84 million taels of silver in war reparations from Germany, the largest indemnity China had ever secured voluntarily in modern history.

At the 1921 Washington Conference, the Beiyang government recovered Japanese-occupied Shandong and effectively nullified the Twenty-One Demands. These significant diplomatic achievements have been largely overlooked in later historical accounts. However, many still view the Beiyang government as traitorous, primarily due to its relationship with Japan. From Yuan Shikai onwards, the Beiyang government’s diplomatic approach was criticized for being too pro-Japanese, favoring loans from Japan, and granting Japan many privileges. This dynamic stemmed from the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. After the Boxer Rebellion, Russia occupied Northeast China and seemed unwilling to leave, displaying clear ambitions. Japan, having annexed Korea, clashed with Russian interests. Lacking the strength to reclaim the Northeast, the Qing Dynasty secretly invited Japan to expel the Russians, promising them the transferred Russian interests.

Though inviting another nation to fight on home soil was humiliating, it was a desperate yet pragmatic choice for the Qing, which proved successful. Japan, eager to dominate East Asia, waged a costly war, losing nearly 100,000 troops and depleting its reserves, to defeat Russia and preserve the Northeast for the Qing Dynasty.

At that time, the Qing court and officials had a great admiration for Japan, and it was during this period that the peak of learning from Japan occurred. For the Japanese, fighting on behalf of the Qing was certainly not out of altruism; such significant sacrifices were made with the expectation of some return. This return was the special rights in Northeast China. In this sense, the Beiyang government inherited the Qing policy and had to bear this historical debt from the start. The subsequent troubles were actually influenced by this Qing legacy, leaving the Beiyang government with no choice.

The so-called Twenty-One Demands were later delayed by the Beiyang government with various excuses and were not implemented. Eventually, a few years later, they were abolished at the Washington Conference. From a diplomatic perspective, this was a classic case of the Beiyang era’s diplomatic achievements. However, from the public’s point of view, any unequal treaty signed would tarnish one’s reputation, as ordinary people care more about the outcome than the process. Political figures are often judged in a binary manner of good or evil, with little consideration for the historical context.

The diplomatic failure at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, particularly the transfer of German rights in Shandong to Japan, is regarded in textbooks as one of the greatest diplomatic failures of the Beiyang government. In reality, the Beiyang government’s diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference was not a failure. The delegation made several demands, with the return of Shandong’s rights being just one of them.

After negotiations with the major powers, the delegation achieved the abolition of consular jurisdiction, the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity, tariff autonomy, and compensation for losses, among other things. Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang believed that the rights in Shandong were already effectively controlled by Japan and could not be reclaimed without military action in the short term. If they did not sign under the current conditions, the already achieved negotiation results might be lost. This practical consideration was the main reason Lu advocated for signing the agreement at the Paris Peace Conference, which had nothing to do with treason.

As I mentioned, although China was a victor in World War I, it did not send any troops to the battlefield, only laborers. Given this situation, expecting to gain rights equal to those of other major powers was unrealistic in the international order of the time. Diplomatic negotiations often involve compromise, especially for weaker nations. It’s easy for the public to express indignation and chant slogans under nationalist fervor, but the actual implementation is far more challenging.

Lu Zhengxiang, the foreign minister criticized during the May Fourth Movement, was actually one of the few professional diplomats of the Beiyang era. He had served as ambassador to the Netherlands during the Qing Dynasty, held very progressive views, married a Belgian woman, and cut his queue in 1905, even before the Qing fell. During his tenure as Foreign Minister, he abolished the practice of appointing diplomats through high official recommendations and insisted on selecting highly educated and qualified diplomats.

During the Beiyang era, diplomats were required to have foreign language and diplomatic expertise, even causing Yuan Shikai’s own nephew to lose his position for not meeting the requirements. Beiyang-era diplomats were recognized as the best-educated and most qualified in modern Chinese history, incomparable to today’s “wolf warrior” diplomats.

Despite his professionalism, Lu Zhengxiang, burdened with infamy from the Paris Peace Conference, never returned to China and later became a clergyman in Belgium.

The most prominent slogan of the May Fourth Movement was “Fight for sovereignty externally, eradicate national traitors internally.” These “traitors” included Cao Rulin, Minister of Transport, and Zhang Zongxiang, Minister to Japan, who were key figures in Sino-Japanese diplomacy at the time. However, they were not the decision-makers.

The famous burning of Zhao Jia Lou involved setting fire to Cao Rulin’s residence, but he escaped, leaving Zhang Zongxiang to be beaten severely. Zhang Zongxiang later requested the government to release the students who beat him, and those arrested for arson were treated well in custody, with the police chief personally visiting them. Public pressure soon led to the dismissal of these high officials.

After being dismissed, Cao Rulin’s reputation was ruined. Deeply affected, he withdrew from politics and turned to industry, founding the Central Hospital, the predecessor of today’s Peking University People’s Hospital. This hospital, established for charitable purposes, provided free treatment to the poor, funded entirely by Cao Rulin.

During the War of Resistance against Japan, Cao Rulin steadfastly refused the lucrative positions offered by the Japanese, despite being considered an ideal candidate for collaboration. Although the Japanese forced several titles on him, he never accepted them. Ironically, Mei Siping, a student leader in the May Fourth Movement who had labeled Cao a traitor, later served in high positions in the puppet government and was executed for treason after the war. The so-called patriotic youth ended up betraying the country, while the alleged traitor upheld national integrity.

Similarly, Beiyang officials were notably strong in their national integrity. For example, after the September 18 Incident, warlord Wu Peifu, though retired, fiercely denounced Japan’s actions. When Japan occupied Beiping in 1935 and proposed so-called North China autonomy, Wu Peifu, despite being highly respected, adamantly refused their overtures.

Japan’s top envoy in Beiping, Kenji Dohihara, personally invited Wu Peifu to return to power, but Wu firmly refused. Living without an income, Wu relied on financial support from his old subordinate Qi Xieyuan, but he cut ties with Qi upon learning Qi had accepted a position in the puppet government. Wu Peifu declared, “I’d rather be poor than take your money.”

In December 1939, Wu Peifu died of sepsis in Beijing after a tooth extraction by a Japanese dentist, with rumors suggesting he was poisoned for refusing Japan’s offers.

Other Beiyang officials, such as Duan Qirui, Yuan Keding, and Jin Yunpeng, also refused to collaborate with Japan, despite their high social standing and Japan’s attempts to recruit them. Compared to the opportunistic political figures of the KMT and CCP, these Beiyang officials displayed a commendable level of integrity.

Modern Chinese textbooks only retain the May Fourth Movement as the legacy of the Beiyang era, mainly focusing on the cultural heritage of Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science. However, the broader May Fourth Movement, which started with the founding of “New Youth” in 1915 and lasted until the early 1920s, emphasized human rights and science equally. Chen Duxiu, founder of “New Youth,” advocated for personal freedom and individualism, aligning with the social reform declarations of figures like Cai Yuanpei at the founding of the Republic of China, promoting public morality and human rights, and opposing despotism and superstition with a scientific spirit.

Hu Shih, a prominent figure in the May Fourth Movement, emphasized that the core of the New Culture Movement was the liberation of thought and individual rights. This concept was highly advanced, even more significant than democracy and science, highlighting the importance of protecting personal rights and freedom as the foundation of modern civilization. Understanding this helps us better appreciate the true achievements of the May Fourth Movement and the Beiyang era over a century later. （This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）