The Tragedy of Whampoa:Another Side of the Founding Father

This is the Er Ye Story. These past few days, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have coincidentally been commemorating the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Whampoa Military Academy. Xi Jinping and Lai Ching-te have each given speeches interpreting the Whampoa spirit in their own ways. Xi Jinping emphasized leveraging unique advantages to firmly oppose independence and promote reunification. Lai Ching-te argued that fighting for the survival and development of the Republic of China is the true path, and anything else is false Whampoa. The interpretations of the Whampoa spirit from both sides of the Strait are diametrically opposed and sharply confrontational.

As many of you know, I used to work in Guangzhou’s Huangpu for 17 years. The Whampoa Military Academy is located on Changzhou Island, which was in my jurisdiction. As a popular tourist spot, I visited it no fewer than 20 times. Whether for private or official receptions, everyone always wanted to visit there because of its fame. So, I am very familiar with the Whampoa Military Academy and have read extensively about its history. However, I believe that the history of this famous military academy, which encapsulates half of modern Chinese history, has been greatly distorted and covered up, leading to misunderstandings on both sides of the Strait today. Therefore, I want to talk about the lesser-known history behind the Whampoa Military Academy. Today’s content might be quite subversive and reflect my personal opinions, which some may find difficult to accept, but that’s okay. Let’s take it step by step.

The establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy is closely related to the Soviet Union’s revolutionary export. After seizing power in Russia, Lenin, adhering to the fundamental principles of communism, was determined to export the revolution. This naturally led to sharp opposition from Western countries, and the Soviet Union was completely blockaded in Europe. To break this global isolation, Lenin established the so-called Comintern, or Third International, in March 1919, under the guise of an international workers’ organization, to begin planning the export of the revolution to the world. One of their important targets was China, which was then in a state of warlord fragmentation. Lenin set up the Eastern Branch of the Comintern, specifically targeting China.

In April 1920, the Soviet representative, Vi-King Ting, who went by the Chinese name Wu Tingkang, secretly came to China and established the East Asia Secretariat of the Comintern in Shanghai, setting up branches for China, Korea, and Japan, and began planning to establish communist parties in these three countries. The Russians then contacted Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu at Peking University to discuss forming a party. Why these two? Because after the Russian Revolution, as a novel event, it stirred considerable interest among Chinese intellectuals, with many seeing it as a way out for China, and Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were the most active, tirelessly promoting Marxism through their magazine, New Youth.

With Russian support, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in Chen Duxiu’s house in Shanghai in August 1920, with Chen Duxiu elected as the first General Secretary. Many believe the CCP was founded during the First Congress in July 1921, but it was actually in August 1920. Since Chen Duxiu later fell out of favor, the CCP avoided the fact that it was founded in his home and instead promoted the 1921 congress as its founding date.

Although the CCP was established, it was just one of many small parties amid a multitude of political movements in China at the time. By the time of the Third Congress in 1924, the CCP had only 432 members nationwide, mostly operating underground, unable to stir up much trouble. Most Chinese people had no idea such a party existed, let alone that it aimed to seize power. The Russians didn’t expect this favored child to grow up either; they never intended to put all their eggs in one basket.

Initially, the Russians targeted powerful warlords. When the Soviet plenipotentiary representative Yevgeny V. came to Beijing in August 1922 to negotiate establishing diplomatic relations, he was met with resistance from the Beiyang government’s Foreign Minister Gu Weijun, who strongly criticized the Soviet occupation of Outer Mongolia. He said that diplomatic relations could be established if the Soviets withdrew from Outer Mongolia. Since splitting China was a long-term goal for the Soviets, and the separation of Outer Mongolia was a critical first step, the Russians would never agree to this. After failing to negotiate with the Beiyang government, Yevgeny turned to Wu Peifu, the most powerful warlord at the time, attempting to establish a cooperative relationship. Although Wu Peifu was a warlord with conflicts with the central government, he was highly patriotic and refused outright, knowing the Russians had ulterior motives.

After Wu Peifu’s refusal, Yevgeny approached another influential figure, Sun Yat-sen. Pretending to help Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary cause, they discussed cooperation. Sun Yat-sen, in a difficult situation, quickly aligned with Yevgeny, and on January 26, 1923, they jointly issued the famous Sun-Joffe Manifesto. In exchange for recognizing the Russian military presence in Outer Mongolia, they forged an alliance, marking Sun Yat-sen’s adoption of the policy of alliance with Russia and accommodation of the communists. Why would the clever Sun Yat-sen fall into the Russian trap so easily?

Sun Yat-sen was a very complex figure, often considered the father of the nation but without fully deserving that title. Though he was the leader of the Tongmenghui, it’s fair to say he wasn’t the most crucial in overthrowing the Qing dynasty. During the Wuchang Uprising, he was abroad and not directly involved. Huang Xing led the revolution domestically, and the greatest contributor to the fall of the Qing was Yuan Shikai, who held the most elite military force, the Beiyang Army. If he had decided to fight the revolutionaries, the outcome could have been different. Yuan Shikai’s defection and coercion were pivotal in the Qing’s peaceful abdication. So, it’s not an exaggeration to say the success of the 1911 Revolution owed most to Yuan Shikai in the north and Huang Xing in the south. While Sun Yat-sen, as a spiritual leader, had undeniable contributions, he wasn’t the most critical figure.

The biggest controversy about Sun Yat-sen arose after the revolution’s success. As Yuan Shikai assumed the presidency and tensions grew between the north and south, the Tongmenghui reorganized into the Kuomintang (KMT), with key members like Song Jiaoren advocating for parliamentary struggle and abandoning armed conflict. However, Sun Yat-sen, aiming to wrest power from Yuan Shikai, continued to push for armed struggle. After Song Jiaoren’s assassination, Sun Yat-sen repeatedly called for armed resistance against Yuan, but his stance on violent revolution didn’t even gain much support within the KMT. Many party members wished to cherish the hard-won republic and resist Yuan without violating the Provisional Constitution. Sun Yat-sen, however, broke away from the KMT and formed the Chinese Revolutionary Party, which operated more like a secret society than a political party, requiring members to swear absolute loyalty to him. This approach, contrary to modern parliamentary politics, even alienated his old comrade Huang Xing, who refused to join.

In this context, Sun Yat-sen did not hesitate to sell out national sovereignty. On May 11, 1914, he wrote to the Japanese Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, asking for Japanese support against Yuan Shikai. In return, he promised to open the entire Chinese market to Japan, exempting all Japanese goods from taxes after he seized power. On March 14, 1915, upon hearing that Japan and Yuan Shikai were about to reach an agreement on the Twenty-One Demands, he feared losing Japan’s support and wrote again to the Japanese Foreign Minister, promising even more favorable terms than the Twenty-One Demands if they helped him overthrow Yuan Shikai. The draft of the Sino-Japanese alliance proposed by Sun Yat-sen contained 11 articles, granting Japan extensive military, economic, and financial privileges in China, amounting to a total surrender of national interests. In 1966, Fujiwara Ieyasu, a professor at Japan’s Fuji International University, published “A Study of Sun Wen,” revealing the full content of this secret agreement, which later caused an uproar when the original documents were made public. Those interested can look it up. The Japanese used this secret agreement to blackmail Yuan Shikai, eventually forcing him to accept parts of the Twenty-One Demands. In this process, Sun Yat-sen played a highly detrimental role by disregarding national and ethnic interests for his power struggle.

Sun Yat-sen’s reliance on Japan stemmed from his deep connections with Japan through the Tongmenghui. When the Republic of China was founded, he relied on Japanese financial support and appointed many Japanese to his service, including Kita Ryohei, a Japanese adventurer who advocated for the division of China and planned the independence of Manchuria and Mongolia. These actions show that while Yuan Shikai’s power grab was a fact, and he deserved criticism, Sun Yat-sen was not much better. He had lost his revolutionary ideals and was willing to invite foreign intervention and sell out national sovereignty for power, a step far beyond Wu Peifu’s actions.

Unfortunately, the Japanese did not favor Sun Yat-sen. After Yuan Shikai’s failed attempt to declare himself emperor and subsequent downfall, the Japanese leaned towards supporting the weaker Beiyang government to safeguard Japan’s established interests in China. Therefore, they showed no interest in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary plans. In this desperate situation, Sun Yat-sen turned his attention to another rogue actor, namely Soviet Russia. Isolated globally, Soviet Russia urgently needed to export revolution to China and cultivate agents. Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen, with no other options, sought external help for his revolution. The two sides struck a deal, leading to the inception of the First United Front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

After Duan Qirui came to power in 1917, power struggles within the Beiyang government persisted. Sun Yat-sen took advantage of this and moved south to Guangzhou, organizing the Constitutional Protection Movement to protect the Provisional Constitution. Subsequently, China entered a period of North-South division. This coincided with World War I, during which the Beiyang government leaned towards joining the Allies (Entente powers), which concerned Germany. Thus, the Germans aimed to weaken the Beiyang government, compelling them to change their stance. They quickly saw Sun Yat-sen, who had long sought to overthrow the government, as an opportunity. In March 1917, German Consul General Kriegsmann secretly contacted Sun Yat-sen and provided him with £2 million in funding to support his uprising. With this substantial sum, Sun Yat-sen immediately bribed parliamentarians to establish a new government in Guangzhou. Eventually, about one-third of the parliamentarians were bought off and moved south to Guangzhou. In September 1917, they formally established a military government, marking the beginning of the North-South division and confrontation.

Unfortunately, Germany soon suffered defeat, cutting off Sun Yat-sen’s financial support. He struggled for several more years until January 1921, when he convened a portion of the National Assembly to elect himself as the Grand President. He prepared for the Northern Expedition, initiating a new round of violent seizure of power. However, Sun Yat-sen lacked sufficient military forces at the time, mainly relying on two warlords from Guangdong, Chen Jiongming and Chen Jiongming. Chen Jiongming was Sun Yat-sen’s staunch supporter, but Chen Jiongming was not.

Chen Jiongming was a hero of his time. He and Sun Yat-sen were fundamentally different. Chen Jiongming was born in 1878 in Haifeng County, Guangdong Province. He passed the imperial examination at 20 and attended Guangdong Law and Political School at 26. After graduating, he returned home and founded the Haifeng Local Autonomy Association, advocating and practicing local autonomy in China’s first batch of regions. In July 1909, Chen Jiongming was elected as a Guangdong provincial legislator, actively promoting various social reforms and human rights protection bills. In the Huanghuagang Uprising of April 1911, as a legislator, Chen Jiongming led by example as captain of the fourth squad of the vanguard. It can be seen that he was both scholarly and martial, a rare combination. Crucially, he possessed high moral standards, refraining from smoking, drinking, or engaging in gambling or prostitution in daily life. Politically, he advocated for China to remove centralized power and implement provincial autonomy, akin to the federal system of the United States. He was truly a visionary politician. At that time, Chen Jiongming received high praise from people. In 1920, Shanghai’s “New Declaration” described Chen Jiongming as: “Procedurally a person, resolute and decisive, taciturn. His personal morality can be said to be a model for the whole of China.” The scholar Zhang Taiyan praised Chen Jiongming highly.

As a poet in the final days of the Qing Dynasty, based in Guangdong, you can certainly find solace. Even Sun Yat-sen praised him, saying he didn’t visit inns, avoided uncles, and endured hardships. I am no match for him. In the latter half of 1918, Chen Jiongming, as Commander-in-Chief of the Guangdong Army, marched into Zhangzhou, Fujian. Over the course of more than two years in Zhangzhou, Chen Jiongming implemented social reforms and construction, putting his political ideals into practice. He initiated extensive governance projects and improved local elections, earning recognition as the “New Policy of Zhangzhou.”

An official from the American Embassy in China visiting Zhangzhou described it as follows: “Development is evident everywhere in Zhangzhou. Roads are widened, new houses abound, streets are clean, and public safety is good. American expatriates take pride in the city’s governance.”

Due to his outstanding achievements, Chen Jiongming was appointed Governor of Guangdong Province in 1920. Immediately, he put his political ideas about local autonomy into practice. In August 1921, based on the local autonomy regulations announced by the Beiyang government, Chen Jiongming introduced the first-ever direct elections of county magistrates and county councillors in 15 counties of Guangdong. This marked the first time in China’s 2000-year imperial history that ordinary people directly voted for county magistrates and councillors, unprecedented and unparalleled in 1921. Furthermore, Chen Jiongming also pioneered judicial independence in Guangdong. Civil reports and litigation were all transferred to courts for adjudication. For example, in Panyu, electoral fraud was reported. After investigation, the election results were declared invalid by the court, rejecting the appointment of the county magistrate. Can you imagine that? In addition to these reforms, Chen Jiongming also implemented compulsory education in Guangdong, launching the “one township, one school” initiative. He appointed Chen Duxiu as Chairman of the Education Committee in Guangdong, allocating one-tenth of the province’s tax revenue for education, ushering in an unprecedented era of prosperity in Guangdong’s education.

Chen Jiongming’s vision for local autonomy extended beyond these reforms. For instance, he proposed that each province should have its own constitution as a foundation for local autonomy. These initiatives demonstrated his modern and forward-thinking approach. His political ideals, advocating federalism, were fundamentally at odds with Sun Yat-sen’s approach as a revolutionary leader solely focused on seizing power, making reconciliation between the two inevitable.

In 1922, insisting on launching the Northern Expedition, Sun Yat-sen dismissed Chen Jiongming from his position as Governor of Guangdong Province. Subsequently, Chen Jiongming initiated a mutiny and besieged Guangzhou in June 1922, driving Sun Yat-sen out. This event, commonly referred to in our textbooks as Chen Jiongming’s betrayal.

Later, in the histories written by the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, Chen Jiongming was portrayed as a warlord motivated by power struggles, betraying the revolution for personal gain. However, the true historical record tells a different story. The split between Sun Yat-sen and Chen Jiongming was fundamentally a clash of political ideologies. The true villain later became the founding father, while the true hero ended up branded a criminal.

To eliminate Chen Jiongming, who diverged from his path, Sun Yat-sen bought off Yang Ximin from Yunnan, Liu Zhenghuan from Guangxi, and Xu Chongzhi from Guangdong in 1923, forming an alliance to suppress Chen Jiongming. However, the results were not satisfactory; after all, warlords each pursued their own interests, unwilling to risk everything for Sun Yat-sen’s dreams of power. This realization led Sun Yat-sen to conclude that warlords were ultimately unreliable, necessitating the establishment of his own tightly controlled armed forces. This led to the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy.

Earlier, Sun Yat-sen had already established contact with the Soviet Union’s representative in China, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, as early as December 20, 1922. Sun Yat-sen wrote to Vyacheslav: “My recent work has made it possible for me to request support from your government in practical matters. We need weapons, equipment, technical assistance, and experts.” Successfully lured, the Soviet Union subsequently reached the Sun-Vyacheslav Declaration in January 1923. In his subsequent report to the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav said: “Mr. Sun has promised that once his party takes control of the Chinese government, he will guarantee recognition of Russia and form an alliance with Russia.”

Clearly, Sun Yat-sen employed the same strategy again, bargaining with the devil for the sake of national interests. This was precisely what Soviet Russia desired. In 1921, Soviet Russia invaded Outer Mongolia, promoting its independence, intending to divide and weaken China. Thus, instigating Sun Yat-sen to launch a war in the south of China was perfectly aligned with Soviet Russia’s interests. Stirring up civil war in China was in the best interests of Soviet Russia.

On March 8, 1923, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union convened a meeting, formally deciding to provide Sun Yat-sen with economic aid of 2 million Mexican silver dollars and dispatch a military delegation to assist in building an army. In addition, the Soviet Union provided 8,000 rifles, 15 machine guns, 4 cannons, and two armored cars. It was with the support of this substantial funding, personnel, and weapons that Sun Yat-sen began the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924.

The subsequent history need not be elaborated upon. Leveraging the elite and backbone provided by the Whampoa Military Academy, the Kuomintang established the most powerful army in China at the time, not only defeating Chen Jiongming but ultimately succeeding in the Northern Expedition, formally unifying China and establishing the one-party rule of the Kuomintang.

Of course, Soviet Russia was not a charitable organization; as the main sponsor, it naturally exerted control over Sun Yat-sen. Hence, the “unite with Russia, unite with the Communist Party” assisted the “agricultural workers” three major policies came into effect. At that time, the relatively unknown Communist Party of China also legitimately penetrated into various levels of the Kuomintang leadership. For example, Zhou Enlai was the head of the political department of the Whampoa Military Academy, and Mao Zedong was the Minister of Propaganda of the Kuomintang Central Committee. Among the Communist Party members in the army, there were countless numbers.

In October 1923, the Soviet representative stationed in China privately said: “In the newspaper, I say it’s the Kuomintang, but for us, it’s actually increasing the ultimate influence of the Communist Party. Never forget, what we are actually doing is to stabilize the Communist Party. This goal should be remembered forever.” Later, during the rectification period in Yan’an, Zhou Enlai reflected on the reasons for the failure of the First United Front. He said: “The main reason for the failure of the Great Revolution was not following the instructions of the Communist International to infiltrate the party, government, and military. Transforming the Kuomintang to include large numbers of workers and peasants is infiltrating the party; turning the Farmers’ Associations into rural governments is infiltrating the government; forming a 70,000-strong army, including 20,000 Communist Party members, is infiltrating the military.”

It can be said that relying on Sun Yat-sen’s reputation and the Kuomintang as a strong base, the Communist Party, originally with just over 400 members, found a suitable host and ushered in a leap in development. From then on, the Communist Party truly entered the stage of competing for power. Various Communist Party organizations also penetrated deeply into various strata of Chinese society during this cooperation period, including some senior leaders, most of whom emerged during this period, gaining widespread influence. These became their significant capital for later successful rebellions. Therefore, while Sun Yat-sen’s alliance with Soviet Russia laid the foundation for the Kuomintang’s Northern Expedition and seizure of power, it also planted the seeds of a great disaster for the Communist Party. If one word could describe it, “uniting with Russia” was akin to drinking poison to quench thirst. It resolved Sun Yat-sen’s long-sought goal of seizing power in the short term but fed himself a chronic poison in the long run.

In fact, such concerns arose early. At the end of 1923, as Sun Yat-sen’s representative, Chiang Kai-shek went to Russia to discuss cooperation. Upon returning, Chiang Kai-shek was deeply concerned. He reported: “The Soviet Union’s so-called strategic goal of world revolution is more dangerous than Western colonialism’s impact on the Eastern national independence movement.” Sun Yat-sen reassured him, saying, “Once our Northern Expedition military achieves victory, the Three Principles of the People can be implemented as planned. By then, even if the Communist Party wants to sabotage our national revolution, it will be beyond their ability.” It shows how naive Sun Yat-sen was. The tragedy lies here.

Sun Yat-sen himself never believed in communism and thought that the Soviet system was not suitable for China. That’s why in the first article of the “Sun-Wen-Yue Fei Manifesto,” he insisted on stating: “Communism, and even the Soviet system, are in fact unsuitable for China.” Due to his early revolutionary experiences, he had a stronger affinity towards Japan and the United States. Therefore, he was unwilling to give up on an alliance with the United States and Japan. Unfortunately, both the United States and Japan did not support his dreams of internal conflict, so he took a risky path. Despite knowing the impure motives of the Soviet Union, he ultimately insisted on making deals with the devil, believing he could control them and gain advantages.

In reality, which country has ever profited from making deals with Russia? Who has ended up well? Sun Yat-sen’s dealmaking led China to taste bitter fruits even now. After hearing what I have said, perhaps you all have a better understanding of Sun Yat-sen. He used the guise of revolution to seize power, cooperating with the Japanese, Germans, and Soviets at different times, always using the interests of national democracy as an exchange, dividing the country, and inciting armed uprisings, using every means possible. He owed favors to both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, so both parties regard him as a sacred figure. This is justifiable, because without Sun Yat-sen, there would be neither of them.

Strictly speaking, Sun Yat-sen is not worthy of the title “Father of the Nation.” He did play a role in founding the nation, but he also played a significant role in its chaos. It can even be said that his faults outweighed his merits in the history of the Republic of China. Strictly speaking, he is the founding father of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but he cannot be considered the father of the Republic of China. Some might oppose this. The Beiyang government was so corrupt, warlords were harsh, and people lived in misery. What’s wrong with Sun Yat-sen overthrowing them? This was a good thing. Don’t rush; listen to me slowly explain.

First, I want to clarify a fact for everyone: as Asia’s first republican government, was the Beiyang government really as incompetent, corrupt, and terrible as later history books depict it? The Beiyang government peacefully succeeded the Qing Dynasty through a treaty and established Asia’s first republic. Although its parliamentary politics and local autonomy were immature and had many flaws, it represented a legitimate political power in China. Despite the shameful farce of Yuan Shikai’s restoration, after Yuan Shikai stepped down, the Beiyang government struggled but remained standing, not dictatorial, and still legitimate. It was also the only central government in modern Chinese history to achieve separation of powers.

From our perspective now, it was a typical small government managing a large society. Under its governance, China was effectively in a state of high local autonomy. Warlords frequently fought each other, that’s a fact, but the country remained intact, another fact. Which warlord independently founded a new country, right? This government often seemed chaotic due to the confrontations and squabbles among various warlord factions, but it was not incompetent and certainly not weak. In 1919, despite severe financial difficulties, the Beiyang government borrowed money to send troops. Under Xu Shuzheng’s leadership, they successfully recaptured Outer Mongolia, which had declared independence from China at the time, especially reclaiming the Tang Lu and Ulianghai regions stolen by Russia. They even sent naval and army forces to Vladivostok and forcefully evacuated hundreds of thousands of Chinese during the turmoil of the October Revolution, a process that lasted three years. This caused intense hatred towards the Beiyang government from Russia, making China one of the fourteen armed states that intervened against the Soviet Union.

Under the Beiyang government’s rule, China regained consular jurisdiction over many foreign concessions. They also reclaimed rights to roads in the northeast and Shandong, abolished privileges of foreign nationals, and more. The Beiyang government was firm externally and not overly oppressive internally. On May 21, 1918, a year before the May Fourth Movement, Beijing students learned of an impending military agreement between China and Japan and staged a rally demanding to see President Feng Guozhang. Feng not only personally met with the students but patiently explained each clause of the treaty to satisfy them that the negotiations were not a betrayal, until the students were content and dispersed.

During the Beiyang era, with minimal cultural control, within just over a decade, it fostered a cultural renaissance and produced many eminent scholars rarely seen. Many of China’s academic giants in modern history emerged during that period. Simultaneously, national industry developed rapidly; between 1913 and 1920, private industrial capital in China grew at an average annual rate of 11.9%. This laid the foundation for what was called the Golden Decade of the Republic. In short, although the Kuomintang later overthrew the Beiyang government, it wasn’t necessarily bad for China at that time. In many ways, it was even better than the two governments that followed.

Its tarnished reputation, aside from Yuan Shikai’s attempt at restoration, was also demonized by both the Kuomintang and later the Communist Party who overthrew it. For example, what is commonly viewed as the Treaty of National Humiliation, the 21 Demands, actually culminated in the 13 Articles of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, where only 10 of the demands were agreed upon with Japan. Yuan Shikai’s negotiation strategy at the time was to concede rights that Japan had already effectively obtained but firmly refuse those they had not. Negotiators like Cao Rulin and Gu Weijun antagonized the Japanese by disputing each clause, much to their frustration. Yuan intentionally leaked the negotiations to Western powers and domestic audiences, generating pressure and backlash from all sides. As a result, the final outcome was far from what Japan had initially desired, which was much better compared to the secret treaty Sun Yat-sen signed with the Japanese.

One can imagine, without Sun Yat-sen’s Northern Expedition, if China had continued under the Beiyang era’s small government and large society model, truly achieving the federal dreams of figures like Chen Jiongming, what would China be like today? How many detours could have been avoided? After saying all this, how should we look back at the Whampoa Military Academy a century later? Although it did indeed produce many prominent figures and condensed half of China’s modern history, frankly speaking, its birth itself was a tragedy for the nation, a misfortune for the people. The so-called Whampoa Spirit is essentially a violent logic that uses military force to seize political power, hardly worthy of promotion and praise. After Yuan Shikai stepped down, Sun Yat-sen, driven by personal desires, disregarded democratic principles, refused negotiation and compromise, and repeatedly launched military actions to seize power, even resorting to colluding with foreign powers, inviting the wolf into the house. His actions were undoubtedly treasonous. He is now revered as the founding father on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, a profound tragedy in history. The Kuomintang’s successful Northern Expedition in 1927, overthrowing the legitimate Beiyang government, was actually a setback and regression for the republic. The authoritarian era of the Kuomintang he initiated tacitly accepted the legitimacy of so-called violent revolutions. Therefore, if the Communist Party can rise with the same revolutionary slogans, what objections can the Kuomintang have? If you can seize power through violence, why can’t I?

Even today, certain perspectives on modern history, especially regarding imperialist aggression and colonial history, are still highly similar across the Taiwan Strait. Essentially, they originate from the same logic of violent revolution of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, completely detached from the core of modern democratic politics. Today, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have not yet escaped from this tragic core. The CCP uses the Whampoa Spirit to talk big about national unity, while Taiwan uses the Whampoa Spirit to exaggerate cross-strait opposition. Both sides endlessly debate the Whampoa Spirit, which in reality benefits neither the people on either side of the strait.

Looking back over a century, China’s future is long and the night is dark. How can we truly return to the republican spirit and democratic dreams we once had a century ago? This is the topic we should deeply contemplate today. Thank you for watching this episode of “February Stories.” （This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）