Legends of the Elder Statesman:The Many_Sides of Jiang Zemin (Part 2)

One’s destiny is unpredictable. Of course, a person’s fate depends on personal efforts, but it also requires considering the course of history. I absolutely did not know how I, as a Shanghai municipal party secretary, ended up being selected for Beijing. So Comrade Deng Xiaoping said to me, “The Central Committee has decided, you are to become the General Secretary of the Party.” I said, “Please choose someone else; I’m truly not being modest. How did a Shanghai municipal party secretary end up in Beijing?” But Comrade Xiaoping said, “Everyone has already studied and decided.” Later, I recited two lines of poetry: “If it benefits the country, I will face life or death; how can I avoid or shun it because of personal misfortune or fortune?” So I went to Beijing.

This excerpt is from Jiang Zemin’s speech on April 23, 2009, during his inspection of China United Engineering Corporation. This passage reflects Jiang Zemin’s sentiment about his unexpected appointment as General Secretary. He expressed that while a person’s fate relies on personal struggle, it also must take into account the progress of history. To put it in familiar terms, historical circumstances are stronger than individuals.

In the previous episode, we mentioned that after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Jiang Zemin decisively aligned himself with Deng Xiaoping, avoiding the fate of Zhao Ziyang and overcoming temporary difficulties. However, for Jiang Zemin, the crisis of power was far from resolved. At that time, Jiang Zemin faced three major crises:

The first crisis was Deng Xiaoping’s distrust. Although Jiang Zemin expressed loyalty and support for the reform and opening up, he was a newcomer compared to Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping knew that Jiang’s position was due to the effect of the military, which had temporarily suppressed the conservatives after the southern tour. Thus, Deng Xiaoping could not regard Jiang Zemin as his own. Deng’s trust in Jiang Zemin was even less than in Zhao Ziyang. Although Deng Xiaoping dismissed Zhao Ziyang, Zhao was still his favored choice for reform, but the political disagreements between them led to an irreparable situation.

Yao Jianfu, a former researcher at the Central Rural Policy Research Office, revealed in 2004 that before Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Deng had repeatedly sent people to quietly contact Zhao Ziyang, suggesting that if Zhao admitted mistakes regarding the June 4th incident, he could make a comeback and even become General Secretary again. However, Zhao Ziyang was a hardliner who understood Deng’s power tactics too well; he would rather be under house arrest than admit any mistakes. Deng Xiaoping, therefore, had no choice but to choose another target and strongly promote Zhu Rongji, repeatedly praising Zhu in public, indicating his dissatisfaction with Jiang Zemin.

The second crisis was the loss of military power. Deng Xiaoping had placed Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing in high positions within the military commission, completely controlling the military power. Although Jiang Zemin was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he had nominal power but almost no say in military affairs. The Yang brothers were deeply entrenched within the military and did not regard Jiang Zemin with much respect. The appointments and demotions within the military commission were entirely controlled by the Yang brothers, even without informing Jiang Zemin. The Chinese Communist Party has always believed that “power comes from the barrel of a gun”; whoever controls the military is the top leader. Therefore, as long as Jiang Zemin did not control the military, he had to rely on others and could not truly stabilize his position.

The third crisis was the hostility from political opponents. Jiang Zemin was appointed General Secretary directly from being a Politburo member, at a time when there were many senior officials with more experience than him. The most vocal opposition came from Premier Li Peng and Beijing Municipal Party Secretary Chen Xitong. Li Peng was Zhou Enlai’s adopted son, and Chen Xitong was Deng Xiaoping’s man. Both were well-established within the Party. Li Peng became Vice Premier in 1983 and Premier in 1988, holding the second highest position in the Party; Chen Xitong became Beijing Mayor in 1983 and a State Councillor in 1988, holding a higher position than Jiang Zemin. Moreover, both Li Peng and Chen Xitong were strong advocates of suppressing the June 4th incident, considering themselves heroes for preserving the Communist regime. They believed they should have been promoted after June 4th, but were surprised to find Jiang Zemin emerging to replace them. Naturally, Li Peng and Chen Xitong were dissatisfied, leading to constant struggles and hidden traps against Jiang Zemin, forcing him to face numerous difficulties.

Due to these three major crises, most people at the time were not optimistic about Jiang Zemin, considering him merely a transitional figure who would eventually be replaced. Against this backdrop, Jiang Zemin, with the strategic planning of his close ally and chief strategist Zeng Qinghong, demonstrated exceptional political maneuvering skills and ultimately turned the situation around.

Zeng Qinghong’s ability to become Jiang Zemin’s right-hand man was closely related to his background and experience. He was also from a prominent family, with his father Zeng Shan serving as the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Deputy Mayor of Shanghai, managing financial work in the East China region for a long time. Zeng Qinghong grew up in Beijing, having many connections with the children of Communist Party elites, including Deng Xiaoping’s son Deng Pufang. Thus, he had extensive connections among the Red Second Generation and was very experienced in political struggles.

After Zeng Qinghong started working in Shanghai in 1984, he was always Jiang Zemin’s subordinate and could be considered Jiang’s right-hand man. Many major policies were devised by him for Jiang Zemin. After Jiang Zemin became General Secretary, he immediately arranged for Zeng Qinghong to serve as Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Committee, eventually succeeding Wen Jiabao as his chief aide.

To help Jiang Zemin stabilize his position, Zeng Qinghong analyzed the situation. At that time, the most urgent and critical crisis Jiang faced was the issue of military power. Therefore, to seize military control, Zeng Qinghong devised a plan to create discord.

In August 1992, on the eve of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping, who was 88 years old, fell seriously ill, and there were rumors of his critical condition. This situation made the Yang brothers, who controlled the military, very anxious, as Deng Xiaoping was their biggest backing. If Deng Xiaoping suddenly passed away, it was uncertain whether they could maintain control over the military. Therefore, the Yang brothers secretly planned a scheme. In late August, they gathered senior military officers for a so-called meeting to discuss personnel matters. Yang Baibing drafted a list of about 100 people for promotion, requiring Jiang Zemin’s approval as he was nominally the Chairman of the Military Commission.

The Yang brothers’ move clearly violated a major taboo. Military leaders privately colluding to decide promotions during the illness of an elder was akin to a coup. In fact, this not only threatened Jiang Zemin but also Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong keenly seized this opportunity to begin their plan to sow discord.

Zeng Qinghong exploited Deng Xiaoping’s two psychological weaknesses: his intense hatred for challenges to his authority and his concern about anyone advocating for a reversal of the June 4th incident. Zeng Qinghong first contacted Deng Xiaoping’s son Deng Pufang, informing him that the Yang brothers were privately drafting a promotion list during Deng Xiaoping’s illness, aiming to place their own loyalists within the military. Deng Xiaoping was known to be intolerant of any challenge to his authority, especially within the military.

Additionally, Zeng Qinghong also reported to Bo Yibo, alleging that Yang Shangkun might seek to reverse the verdict of the June 4th incident after Deng Xiaoping’s death. Although Yang Shangkun was a staunch supporter of Deng Xiaoping, he had opposed the use of force during the early days of the June 4th incident, which made Jiang Zemin’s accusations more convincing. Whether Yang Shangkun had really advocated for a reversal of the June 4th verdict could not be confirmed, but the related remarks and reflections on the June 4th incident indeed caused significant psychological shock to Deng Xiaoping.

Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong’s precise operations successfully exploited Deng Xiaoping’s psychological weaknesses, leading Deng to decide at the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party to remove the Yang brothers from military power. Yang Shangkun was removed from his position, and Yang Baibing was also dismissed from his role as Military Commission Secretary. The senior levels of the Military Commission and major military regions underwent large-scale adjustments. The Yang family’s influence in the military effectively ended, allowing Jiang Zemin to promote his own people such as Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, gradually gaining control over the military and eliminating the biggest threat.

After eliminating the most significant military threat, Jiang Zemin adopted a carrot-and-stick approach towards his political enemies, combining rewards with coercion.

For Li Peng, he adopted a “carrot” policy to win him over. Li Peng was also promoted by Chen Yun. Although Li Peng’s personal abilities were not as strong as Jiang Zemin’s and his achievements were far inferior, in terms of background and seniority, he was always above Jiang Zemin.

Originally, Li Peng’s intense involvement in sidelining Zhao Ziyang in the mid-60s was driven by his belief that he could advance further, perhaps even become General Secretary. Unexpectedly, in terms of public punishment and reward, he was left out. Naturally, he couldn’t support Jiang Zemin. However, Jiang Zemin accurately grasped this aspect of Li Peng and chose him to lead the Three Gorges Project.

It is well-known that the Three Gorges Project has faced opposition since its inception. Many believed that its benefits did not outweigh its drawbacks, and this view has been vindicated. Li Peng was the driving force behind the Three Gorges Project. In the first half of his political career, he was deeply involved in the water resources and power sectors. He rose through departments like the Northeast Power Administration, the Beijing Power Bureau, and the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, establishing strong interests in the power system. It is no exaggeration to say that the water and power sector was his “territory.” His son, Li Xiaopeng, and Li Xiaoning also worked in the power system. The entire Chinese power system was controlled by the Li family. Therefore, it is not surprising that Li Peng, disregarding expert opposition, was determined to push the Three Gorges Project forward, as it was essentially his own domain.

Jiang Zemin capitalized on Li Peng’s ambitions and, in coordination with him, pushed through the resolution for the Three Gorges Project in the National People’s Congress as a political trade-off. Naturally, Li Peng had to cooperate with Jiang Zemin administratively and could no longer oppose him.

In contrast, Jiang Zemin adopted a “big stick” approach with another political rival, Chen Xitong. Chen Xitong, a local warlord who was promoted by Deng Xiaoping, had a low opinion of Jiang Zemin, who was recommended by Chen Yun, and even considered sidelining Jiang Zemin. Knowing that Deng Xiaoping was dissatisfied with Jiang Zemin, Chen Xitong, in early 1995, allied with 17 central committee members to write to Deng Xiaoping, demanding Jiang Zemin’s removal. Jiang Zemin had to eliminate such an openly challenging local warlord.

What was the best method? Indeed, it was to exploit the situation repeatedly. In 1995, Zhou Guanyu, Chairman of Beijing Shougang, was dismissed due to corruption. Zhou Guanyu had deep connections with Chen Xitong and Deng Xiaoping’s son, Deng Zhifang. Jiang Zemin keenly seized this opportunity, instructing the disciplinary committee to investigate, which led to Beijing Vice Mayor Wang Baosheng’s suicide in April 1995. Wang Baosheng’s suicide was secretly promoted by Zeng Qinghong to media, causing a nationwide sensation. Party media extensively covered the story. At that time, there was a saying in China: “On stage is Kong Fansheng, off stage is Wang Baosheng,” implying that Wang Baosheng was Chen Xitong’s direct backer. Naturally, Chen Xitong could not escape responsibility. Since the case also involved Deng Xiaoping’s son, Deng Zhifang, Deng Xiaoping had to abandon Chen Xitong to protect his son. Ultimately, Chen Xitong was sentenced to 16 years for bribery. This not only struck a blow to Chen Xitong but also to the Deng family. Jiang Zemin’s move was truly a twofold victory. From then on, the prince party and local warlords dared not openly challenge Jiang Zemin, who finally established himself as General Secretary.

With the retirement of the CCP’s Elder Council in 1992 and Chen Yun’s death in 1995, Deng Xiaoping was the only remaining constraint on Jiang Zemin, though his power was waning. Under Jiang Zemin’s series of power maneuvers, Deng Xiaoping was effectively unable to alter the situation. Jiang Zemin claimed that during his tenure, he accomplished three major tasks and one minor one:

• First, establishing the socialist market economy;
• Second, incorporating Deng Xiaoping’s theory into the party constitution;
• Third, founding the “Three Represents” ideology.

The minor task was banning military commercial activities. Honestly, his self-assessment was relatively objective. After gaining actual power, Jiang Zemin did not abandon Deng Xiaoping’s policies. From a personal perspective, he was a technocrat and not inherently conservative. Therefore, while Deng Xiaoping never liked him and sought to replace him, Jiang Zemin effectively inherited Deng Xiaoping’s legacy and continued the reform and opening-up policy.

For instance, Zhu Rongji, who was promoted by Deng Xiaoping to potentially replace Jiang Zemin, was known to Jiang Zemin through their past collaboration in Shanghai. Hence, after Deng Xiaoping’s death in 1997, Zhu Rongji succeeded Li Peng as Premier. This reflects Jiang Zemin’s political acumen. He did not exclude Zhu Rongji due to being a potential rival. Moreover, Zhu Rongji’s vigorous reforms, such as tax reform, financial system reform, real estate regulation, and the industrialization of education and healthcare, were substantial at the time. The reforms were implemented with Jiang Zemin’s strong support. It is no exaggeration to say that Zhu Rongji’s role was crucially facilitated by Jiang Zemin.

During his tenure, the political climate in China was relatively relaxed. Ordinary citizens had some freedom of speech. For example, many political jokes and even risqué jokes about high-level leaders like Jiang Zemin and Li Peng circulated on the internet, and very few people were censored. Even many prominent political dissidents could publish books. For example, when I was studying at the Public Security University, I was the editor of the university’s youth journal. I invited intellectuals who participated in June Fourth to give academic talks at our university. At that time, this was considered very normal, and no one opposed it. Such activities today, even in ordinary universities, would be unimaginable.

Regarding his crackdown on qigong and pseudoscience, it also reflected Jiang Zemin’s emphasis on science. Since the 1980s, qigong and pseudoscience were rampant in mainland China, with a nationwide craze for qigong. Various charlatans and fraudsters, even endorsed by many national institutions, were rampant. When CAS academician He Zuoxiu wrote a series of articles against qigong and pseudoscience, he was attacked and even criticized by government departments. To encourage him, Jiang Zemin personally wrote a letter to He Zuoxiu expressing support, stating, “I don’t believe water can turn into oil.” During Jiang Zemin’s tenure, these qigong charlatans were eventually dealt with, making him the most hated figure among Falun Gong practitioners.

Jiang Zemin’s political openness, although not as significant as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, was still better than the later Hu-Wen period and far superior to Xi Jinping’s era. Political openness reflects a leader’s vision and magnanimity. The more confident a leader is, the more open they are; the more narrow and insecure a dictator is, the less they allow others to speak. During Jiang Zemin’s 13 years in power, China’s economic reform and opening-up continued to deepen on the previous foundation, with an average annual GDP growth of 9.3%, leading the world. China’s economic scale rose from the 10th to the 6th place globally, making substantial progress towards becoming an economic powerhouse. Reform and opening-up became the mainstream consensus within the CCP, with no one daring to openly oppose it.

In diplomacy, Jiang Zemin was arguably the most pragmatic and successful party leader in CCP history. He traveled abroad many times in his youth, spoke foreign languages well, and had a certain understanding of Western civilization. He was very fond of symphonies. In 1999, he even publicly required his descendants to learn English. Despite major events during his tenure, such as the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1998 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, Jiang Zemin managed to stabilize the situation, not being swayed by populist sentiments, and always sought compromise at crucial moments, unlike Xi Jinping’s wolf warrior diplomacy. Thus, U.S.-China relations did not deteriorate due to these crises but continued to maintain cooperation and development. Especially after the shocking 9/11 event, despite domestic jubilation, Jiang Zemin remained clear-headed. He immediately expressed condolences and support to U.S. President Bush, and officially, the CCP aligned with the U.S. This was a critical step in changing the trajectory of U.S.-China relations, leading to a significant softening of the U.S. stance towards China and ultimately facilitating China’s successful entry into the World Trade Organization, laying the foundation for the rapid economic growth during the Hu-Wen era.

Strictly speaking, the new round of rapid economic development and the substantial rise in international status during the Hu-Wen era were largely based on the good relations with Western countries, especially with the U.S., established during Jiang Zemin’s period. Jiang Zemin made significant contributions in this regard, and his international vision and pragmatic diplomatic skills are unmatched by the current leaders.

I also need to mention the “Three Represents” from Jiang Zemin’s major accomplishments. As a Leninist party, the CCP has always positioned itself as a representative of the proletariat since its inception. After seizing power through violence, it did not alter this. This creates a fundamental paradox: you claim to be the vanguard of the proletariat while also representing the Chinese people. According to your class struggle theory, not all Chinese people are proletarians. Representing both the proletariat and the entire people seems contradictory.

The “Three Represents” theory introduced by Jiang Zemin was an attempt to address an intractable issue in the CCP’s theoretical framework. It claimed to “represent the development requirements of China’s advanced productive forces, represent the progressive direction of China’s advanced culture, and represent the fundamental interests of the majority of the Chinese people.” While it may seem like empty rhetoric, in reality, Jiang Zemin aimed to theoretically reposition the CCP from a class struggle party to a party representing the entire population, thereby fixing the theoretical “bug” in CCP ideology. However, without accompanying political reforms, this theory was essentially a castle in the air. The subsequent theories, such as Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Outlook on Development” and Xi Jinping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” were even more mere word games and became a joke.

During Jiang Zemin’s tenure, although the environment for public speech was relatively relaxed, political system reforms were completely stagnant. Moreover, in order to consolidate his power and secure his position, Jiang Zemin reverted to cultivating factions, exacerbating the old problems within the party. He vigorously promoted his subordinates from Shanghai, creating the Jiang faction, including figures like Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Xu Kuangdi, Meng Jianzhu, Chen Liangyu, Huo Jian, and Chen Zhili, who occupied most of the high-level positions. Many of these people had not been trained in other places or central departments, making their sudden promotion difficult to accept. It’s not that Shanghai cadres were inherently bad, but as a politician managing the overall situation, one should not be overly partial to personal connections or the interests of a small circle. Although this allowed Jiang Zemin to firmly grasp power in a short time, it led to the deterioration of the political ecosystem.

Following this, Hu Jintao also vigorously developed his own faction to secure his position. For those within the party who were neither Jiang’s faction nor Hu’s faction, no matter how well they performed, they had no way out. If forming cliques and blindly seeking connections was the only way to survive in the party, then who would be willing to do the real work? One of the worst consequences of such factional infighting was the selection of the morally and personally lacking Xi Jinping as the successor. Xi Jinping was recommended to Zeng Qinghong by Jiang faction’s major general Jia Qinglin, who then recommended him to Jiang Zemin. Originally, Hu Jintao’s designated successor was Li Keqiang, but the Jiang faction, aiming to counterbalance the Hu faction, was unwilling. After the fall of their own Chen Liangyu, they nominated Xi Jinping, who appeared to be honest and easily controlled. The Jiang and Hu factions eventually compromised, with Xi Jinping becoming General Secretary and Li Keqiang becoming Premier. This has led to unprecedented disasters for China today. Jiang Zemin is undoubtedly at fault for this. The intensified factional struggles during Jiang Zemin’s era resulted in the entrenchment of the CCP’s elite economy, with various red families amassing wealth while controlling their respective domains. For example, the Deng Xiaoping family held extensive real estate projects, the Li Peng family controlled the power system, Jiang Zemin’s family managed the telecommunications industry, and the Zhu Rongji family controlled financial investments, etc. To maintain political balance, Jiang Zemin had to tacitly approve the development and expansion of the elite economy. In fact, much of the economic development during this period was siphoned off by the red aristocrats and their proxies, leaving only a small share for the grassroots.

A more controversial or seriously damaging aspect of Jiang Zemin’s tenure was his signing of a series of treaties to resolve territorial disputes with neighboring countries, particularly with Russia, which led to territorial losses. For example, in December 1999, Jiang Zemin signed the “Sino-Russian Border Treaty Supplementary Protocol,” handing over over 3.44 million square kilometers of disputed land to Russia—equivalent to 300 Taiwans, including territories like the Tarim Basin, which had been clearly under Chinese sovereignty throughout history. Although these lands have effectively been annexed by Russia, from an international legal perspective, this annexation is illegal. As long as China does not acknowledge it, there remains a possibility of reclaiming these lands in the future. For instance, if Russia were to disintegrate one day, reclaiming them might be a real possibility. However, by signing these agreements, China legally relinquished these territories, making any future reclamation impossible. Even if Russia disintegrates in the future, it won’t be China’s opportunity to reclaim these lands. The series of agreements signed by Jiang Zemin effectively resulted in a permanent renunciation of Chinese territory, a betrayal of ancestral interests, and a roadblock for future generations, which is unforgivable.

In November 2022, Jiang Zemin passed away at the age of 96. At that time, Xi Jinping held a grand memorial service for him, and there were many public tributes. After all, in comparison to Xi Jinping, Jiang Zemin’s image was indeed quite prominent. As an intellectual cultivated in the Republican era, Jiang Zemin was relatively unique among CCP leaders. He was well-versed in foreign languages and music, and had a positive understanding and evaluation of Western civilization and systems. Although he sometimes had a tendency to be pretentious, his personal qualities were undoubtedly quite good. Comparatively, even primary school students might appear “too young to be simple” next to him.

As a technocrat, although he did not implement political reforms during his 13 years in power and only carried out major economic surgeries, he neither acted dictatorially nor conservatively, allowing China to develop at a high speed while smoothly integrating into the international community. This laid a solid foundation for the rapid economic development during the Hu-Wen era. Notably, his governing style was relatively mild and did not disrupt the lives of ordinary people. After the June Fourth Incident, he managed to create a relatively relaxed atmosphere, allowing intellectuals and the public to express opinions and criticisms, which was quite rare. Due to his personal style, he also won a broader space for the CCP in the international community. His embrace of the United States was actually very self-aware and correct.

In contrast, Xi Jinping’s overambitious “wolf warrior” diplomacy and attempts to establish a so-called “community with a shared future for mankind” have resulted in joint sanctions by Western countries led by the United States, leading to economic chaos and forced concessions. Compared to this, Jiang Zemin’s approach appears far superior.

However, Jiang Zemin, who emerged from the CCP system, could not genuinely accept Western democracy and constitutionalism due to long-term party culture indoctrination and power struggles. His core governance principle was to preserve the CCP’s rule. Therefore, his openness and reform measures were always compromised. In early 2010, a book was published in Hong Kong by Du Daozheng, a former subordinate of Zhao Ziyang and former head of the CCP’s News and Publishing Bureau. The book revealed Zhao Ziyang’s evaluation of Jiang Zemin. Zhao Ziyang had said that no matter what China pursued, the primary issue to address was the problem of autocracy. The “Three Represents” was designed to block political reforms and provide a theoretical basis for one-party rule. This is the fundamental reason why Jiang Zemin’s historical status cannot match that of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. His economic reforms did not solve China’s deep-rooted fundamental issues but only delayed their eruption. His political methods, in fact, further exacerbated the inherent problems of the CCP’s centralized power, inevitably leading to a return to the Cultural Revolution’s path.

Frankly speaking, in terms of personal ability, he was stronger than most CCP leaders, but in terms of political reform, his understanding lagged far behind, possibly even less than Wen Jiabao’s. Of course, many people today reminisce about him, the elder statesman under a relatively relaxed atmosphere, and the unique “mohai” culture, which is actually a contrast to Xi Jinping’s regressive policies. The choice of Xi as successor was undoubtedly his biggest mistake, likely marking the end of both his and the CCP’s era.

(This article is from “Second Master Stories” and does not represent the position of this site.)