Legends of the Elder Statesman:The Many Sides of Jiang Zemin (Part 1)

Reporter: Chairman Jiang, by announcing support for Mr. Tung so early, might it give the impression that he’s being appointed through backdoor channels?

Jiang Zemin: What I mean is not that I have personally appointed him. You ask if I support him, and I say yes, I support him. I’m telling you clearly. You all are still too young too simple, sometimes naive, understand?

Reporter: Understood, Chairman Jiang. I apologize.

Jiang Zemin: Today, I’m speaking as an elder, you get what I mean. I’m telling you, I’ve been through a lot. You all need to know about Mike Wallace from the United States, who is way beyond your level. I could converse and joke with him.

The above exchange took place in October 2000, when General Secretary Jiang Zemin met with Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, who was reporting his duties in Beijing. This incident where Jiang Zemin lashed out at a Hong Kong female reporter gave rise to the long-lasting internet meme “too young too simple.”

So, how should we evaluate such a leader, who has left countless anecdotes in Chinese folklore and receives mixed reviews online? Jiang Zemin was born in 1926 in Jiangdu County, Jiangsu Province, which is today’s Yangzhou. His family was relatively affluent. His grandfather, Jiang Shixi, was initially a doctor but later switched to business, becoming the agent for a shipping company in Yangzhou. The family was well-off, living in a large residence next to the Grand Canal. Jiang Shixi’s love for reading greatly influenced Jiang Zemin.

Jiang Zemin graduated from Jiangsu Provincial Yangzhou High School, where the famous literary figure Zhu Ziqing was also an alumnus. His father was Jiang Shijun, and he had an uncle named Jiang Shangqing, a member of the Communist underground. Jiang Shangqing died unexpectedly in Anhui in 1938 at the age of 28. Since he had no sons, according to Chinese tradition, Jiang Shijun adopted his son Jiang Zemin to Jiang Shangqing, who was then 12 years old, thus making Jiang Zemin Jiang Shangqing’s son in name.

Some young people might not understand the concept of adoption in this context. Traditionally, Chinese people placed great importance on continuing the family line, with the saying “there are three forms of unfilial conduct, of which the worst is to have no descendants.” In clan-based relations, only sons could continue the family line and conduct ancestor worship. This tradition still persists in rural China today. Hence, families without sons would often adopt a boy from a close relative to inherit the family business. Jiang Zemin was the second of three brothers: Jiang Zegong, Jiang Zemin, and Jiang Zekuan. Jiang Shijun adopting one of his three sons to his brother was a common practice at that time. This adoption made Jiang Zemin the son of a revolutionary martyr, which significantly helped his life after 1949.

During the Anti-Japanese War, all of Jiangsu was under the control of the Wang Jingwei regime. After graduating from high school in 1943, Jiang Zemin was admitted to the Electrical Engineering Department of Central University in Nanjing. When the Wang regime collapsed, the Nationalist government did not recognize the university’s records, requiring all students to retake exams and undergo ideological and political education. Jiang Zemin participated in student protests organized by the Communist underground and eventually secretly joined the CCP.

In 1947, Jiang Zemin transferred to the Electrical Engineering Department at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and graduated the same year. After graduation, he stayed in Shanghai, working as a power supply engineer at Haining Yangxing Company, which produced ice cream and had many large refrigeration devices that needed maintenance. Jiang Zemin’s job was to maintain these. After 1949, Haining Yangxing was nationalized into Shanghai Yiming Food Company, and Jiang Zemin revealed his CCP membership, becoming the company’s party representative and power workshop director.

Meeting His Benefactor and Entering Officialdom

It was here that he met his major benefactor. The general manager of Shanghai Yiming Food Company at the time was Dai Xike, a woman. Although her name might be unfamiliar, her husband’s name, Wang Daohan, is well-known. Wang Daohan, famous for the Wang-Koo talks between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, was a revolutionary who had studied in Shanghai and joined the CCP early on, becoming a backbone of the New Fourth Army and working in Anhui for a long time.

After 1949, Wang Daohan became the Minister of Industry of the East China Military and Political Committee, overseeing Shanghai’s industry, making him a powerful figure. During this time, Jiang Zemin’s outstanding work led his boss Dai Xike to recommend him to her husband, Wang Daohan, bringing Jiang Zemin into Wang Daohan’s circle. Besides his wife’s recommendation, Wang Daohan had another connection with Jiang Zemin. Wang Daohan had been a revolutionary in Anhui, and Jiang Zemin’s adoptive father, Jiang Shangqing, had also been active in Anhui as an underground member of the CCP. They knew each other well, making Jiang Zemin call Wang Daohan “uncle.” These connections made Wang Daohan’s cultivation and promotion of Jiang Zemin unsurprising.

In 1950, at the young age of 24, Jiang Zemin became the party secretary and deputy director of Shanghai Yiming Food Company. The following year, he was transferred to the larger China Soap Company as deputy director. In 1953, Wang Daohan was promoted to Deputy Minister of the First Ministry of Machinery Industry, and Jiang Zemin followed him into officialdom. In 1954, Jiang Zemin was sent to the newly established First Automobile Works in Changchun, beginning a 20-year career as a technical bureaucrat. As an expert in electrical machinery, he had the rare opportunity to study abroad, spending two years in the Soviet Union and learning Russian. He also frequently attended international conferences in Japan, France, and Germany, where he practiced his English.

These valuable experiences broadened Jiang Zemin’s horizons and significantly influenced his later career. However, during the Cultural Revolution, his major backer Wang Daohan was denounced and demoted, which also devastated Jiang Zemin. He was suspended for two years in Wuhan and then sent to a cadre school for labor.

Later, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated and the socialist camp isolated China, the CCP sought to woo certain countries with benefits. Premier Zhou Enlai agreed to help Romania build 15 machinery plants. As an expert, Jiang Zemin was reinstated and appointed deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the First Ministry of Machinery Industry, sent to Romania to complete the aid task. His capabilities were recognized by Minister Zhou Jiannan, father of former central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan.

Despite the ups and downs in his political career, Jiang Zemin relied on his professional skills to maintain his position. Cautious and obedient, he lacked obvious political ambitions, making him the type of intellectual the CCP liked to use as a tool, setting the stage for his rise during the later stages of the Cultural Revolution.

In 1978, China began its reform and opening up, and Wang Daohan frequently re-emerged, becoming Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. With his strong support, Jiang Zemin was transferred from the Ministry of Machinery Industry to the newly established State Import and Export Administration Commission, responsible for formulating foreign economic policies. During this period, Jiang Zemin led delegations abroad multiple times, returning to draft the Guangdong Special Economic Zone regulations, including tax exemptions, land transfers, foreign exchange retention, and labor hiring flexibility.

Today, these policies seem ordinary, but proposing them in that era required courage. These achievements brought Jiang Zemin to the attention of party elders Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, leading to a major career breakthrough. In 1982, he was elected a Central Committee member at the 12th Party Congress, and in 1983, he was promoted to Minister of Electronics Industry. In 1985, his mentor Wang Daohan, then Mayor of Shanghai, retired. Before retiring, Wang Daohan recommended Jiang Zemin as his successor. In July 1985, Jiang Zemin became Mayor of Shanghai, and two years later, Party Secretary, joining the Politburo and becoming a regional leader.

During his tenure in Shanghai, Jiang Zemin implemented reforms like infrastructure enhancement, attracting foreign investment, expanding exports, and increasing technological exchanges. However, these did not boost his career significantly. In the CCP, where background and factions are crucial, Jiang Zemin, now in his 60s, lacked strong backing in the high echelons. Realizing his career had plateaued, he even planned his retirement, accepting a professorship at Shanghai Jiao Tong University in March 1989, ready to return to academia.

Turning Point: A Reversal in His Career

But fate had other plans. In May 1989, after Hu Yaobang’s death, nationwide protests erupted, demanding political reforms. Shanghai, as China’s economic hub, saw significant student demonstrations. The World Economic Herald, edited by Pingben Li, boldly commemorated Hu Yaobang and criticized the gerontocracy, which Jiang Zemin, fearing repercussions, tried to censor. However, Pingben Li defied Jiang, leading to the publication and Jiang’s subsequent order to shut down the newspaper and fire Li.

This crackdown ignited further protests in Shanghai. Jiang Zemin’s fear led him to Beijing to explain himself to General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who criticized Jiang’s handling of the situation. Facing backlash, Jiang returned to Shanghai, attempting self-preservation.

On May 16, 1989, Jiang Zemin presided over a symposium of intellectuals in Shanghai. The famous writer Sha Yexin, who was the president of the Shanghai People’s Art Theater at the time, also attended this meeting. Later, he wrote an article titled “My Contacts and Conversations with Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong in 1989,” in which he mentioned that Jiang Zemin, in an effort to ease tensions, severely criticized himself in front of everyone, even calling himself a cowardly turtle, hoping to quickly calm the situation. Sha Yexin was also quite unyielding and criticized Jiang Zemin’s lack of democracy face-to-face. Jiang Zemin did not get angry and even admitted that Sha Yexin was right. Despite facing fierce public opinion, Jiang Zemin was actually very clear about the senior leaders’ attitudes towards the student movement. Therefore, he superficially admitted his mistakes and appeared conciliatory according to Zhao Ziyang’s requirements, while firmly carrying out Deng Xiaoping’s instructions.

On May 25, 1989, when Wan Li, the Chairman of the National People’s Congress, returned to China and had a stopover in Shanghai, Jiang Zemin personally handed over a handwritten letter from Deng Xiaoping to Wan Li and forcibly detained him in Shanghai. Those who have seen my previous video about Wen Jiabao should know that Wan Li was the only political ally Zhao Ziyang could rely on at that time, and the National People’s Congress was the only institution that could legally overturn the martial law order. By being forcibly detained in Shanghai and unable to return to Beijing, Wan Li’s detention effectively marked the failure of Zhao Ziyang’s last effort. Wan Li, knowing it was futile, had no choice but to eventually announce his support for martial law, leaving Zhao Ziyang completely powerless.

Thus, despite the immense torment Jiang Zemin endured after the Tiananmen Incident, he was unaware that his actions of shutting down the World Economic Herald and detaining Wan Li in Shanghai served as a qualified political pledge at a critical moment, earning him positive evaluations from the party elders and significantly altering his political career. After deciding to remove Zhao Ziyang, the elders led by Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun found it difficult to find a suitable candidate within the top ranks of the CCP. To be precise, they couldn’t find someone who satisfied both Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping. In the decade-plus following China’s reform and opening up, the true power behind the scenes was held by three giants: Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian. Deng Xiaoping was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chen Yun was the Director of the Central Advisory Commission, and Li Xiannian was the President of the State, all holding significant positions.

I want to emphasize the Central Advisory Commission controlled by Chen Yun. This institution was created after Deng Xiaoping ousted Hua Guofeng to facilitate the rise of his own people and reduce resistance from the elders. It brought together the former elders into a committee known as the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), the first session of which had 172 members. To put it inappropriately, it was akin to the Roman Senate. CAC members could attend Central Committee meetings, and CAC vice-chairmen could attend Central Politburo meetings, with equivalent status and political treatment. Therefore, these old figures, although not holding actual positions, could directly participate in political affairs, effectively surpassing the Politburo in power distribution. As the director of the CAC, Chen Yun, representing the elders, wielded political power comparable to Deng Xiaoping. Both Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun had deep-rooted influence within the party, each leading powerful factions, making them the true behind-the-scenes manipulators of the CCP.

Within the CCP, there was a saying: Deng Xiaoping had the nomination power, while Chen Yun had the veto power. Although they shared a common goal of maintaining CCP rule and rejecting democratic reforms, they had significant differences in their governance philosophies. In short, Chen Yun had been a proponent of a planned economy since the founding of the PRC, making him a conservative inclined towards Leninist ideology. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping vigorously promoted economic reforms, aiming to implement a market economy while firmly controlling the government, leaning towards pragmatism ideologically. This led to different approaches in governance and personnel appointments.

After consecutively removing his own appointees Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, Deng Xiaoping faced backlash from Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Constantly replacing his appointees reflected poorly on his judgment of people. Thus, after Zhao Ziyang’s downfall, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian immediately nominated Jiang Zemin. Why did Chen Yun and Li Xiannian favor Jiang Zemin? There were two main reasons:

First, Jiang Zemin’s stance during the Tiananmen Incident, where he shut down the World Economic Herald, aligned with the party’s conservative faction, earning him severe criticism from Zhao Ziyang and public opinion. This inadvertently served as a politically reliable pledge. As a leading conservative, Chen Yun naturally found Jiang Zemin reliable, unlikely to later challenge their legacy.

Second, Jiang Zemin was a technocrat with no extensive involvement in power struggles. His major backer was Wang Daohan, part of the early CCP’s East China faction, which had intricate ties to Chen Yun, as many figures in this faction, including Wang Daohan, had been Chen Yun’s subordinates. Thus, broadly speaking, Jiang Zemin was part of Chen Yun’s faction. Although Jiang Zemin and Chen Yun had no direct connection in their careers, being Wang Daohan’s protégé made him more acceptable to Chen Yun.

So why did Deng Xiaoping eventually accept Chen Yun’s nomination? This was related to Deng Xiaoping’s situation post-Tiananmen. After the Tiananmen Incident, although Deng Xiaoping had removed Zhao Ziyang, he faced unprecedented doubts from other elders within the party and a tarnished reputation among the public due to the bloody suppression, severely damaging his political prestige. In such a context, even though he held military power, nominating his own candidate again would have been difficult to gain acceptance, forcing him to temporarily compromise with the conservative faction led by Chen Yun and reluctantly accept Jiang Zemin as the General Secretary.

The Future General Secretary Jiang Zemin

In this manner, amidst the power struggles and calculations of the party elders, Jiang Zemin was pushed to the position of General Secretary as a compromise candidate, ascending the throne in a state of fear. On May 29, 1989, an Air Force special plane took off from Shanghai and landed in Beijing, bringing with it the future General Secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin.

In 2009, Hong Kong’s “Asia Weekly” published an anonymous memoir from a former high-ranking CCP official, titled “Jiang Zemin’s Succession: Whether Willing or Not, He Had to Accept.” The article stated that Jiang Zemin was brought to Beijing by the party elders without prior knowledge and was then informed by Deng Xiaoping that he would be made General Secretary. At that time, Jiang Zemin was extremely fearful, repeatedly and politely declining, saying, “If I become General Secretary, it would only be at the level of a primary school student.” Finally, Deng Xiaoping got angry and said, “You have to do it whether you want to or not.” Only then did Jiang Zemin acquiesce.

Although this piece of history cannot be verified, I believe it completely aligns with Jiang Zemin’s situation at that time. The position of General Secretary was indeed a hot potato, extremely dangerous. The previous two General Secretaries, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, had been ousted midway through their terms. With a multitude of power brokers above him, Jiang Zemin, who had no significant foundation, would have been precariously positioned. However, Jiang Zemin had no other choice but to reluctantly accept the role.

Previously, Jiang Zemin was only a member of the Politburo, not a standing committee member, so directly assuming the position of General Secretary was equivalent to a double promotion, an exceptional appointment. Moreover, before governing Shanghai, he had always been a technocrat responsible for specific tasks without central government experience, making his political resume less convincing. Any veteran member of the Politburo at the time had a more impressive resume than Jiang Zemin. Being suddenly pushed to the highest position, his fear was understandable, and his situation was indeed perilous.

After the Tiananmen Incident, leftist ideology significantly resurged within the CCP. The conservative faction, led by Chen Yun, openly proposed the need to prevent peaceful evolution in the name of opposing bourgeois liberalization. Not only were many political reforms from the Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang eras canceled, but even economic reforms pushed by Deng Xiaoping were stalled or regressed. Jiang Zemin, being promoted by Chen Yun and not Deng Xiaoping’s preferred candidate, was a product of compromise among the elders. Thus, as a technocrat with no solid support or reliance within the central government, Jiang Zemin found himself in a precarious position, having to adopt a strategy of siding with whoever held the upper hand.

In November 1989, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping, whose prestige was greatly affected by the Tiananmen Incident, reluctantly retired, handing over the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission to Jiang Zemin as a form of concession for the incident. However, Chen Yun did not retire and remained the director of the Central Advisory Commission. Consequently, Jiang Zemin felt he had to listen to Chen Yun for the time being. He followed Chen Yun’s advice by organizing so-called anti-peaceful evolution training courses at the Central Party School. During the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, he publicly reiterated the concept of class struggle. He said, “The current focus of class struggle is the battle between the Four Cardinal Principles and bourgeois liberalization.” He even agreed to launch a socialist education campaign in the countryside and initiated pilot programs in Hunan, among other things. These activities were typical of a Cultural Revolution revival.

So, did Jiang Zemin really support these measures from the bottom of his heart? I don’t think so. Judging from his governance in Shanghai, while he wasn’t as enlightened as Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang, he certainly wasn’t conservative. Many of his reform measures were ahead of their time and quite vigorous. Although he lost public support by shutting down the World Economic Herald, this was due to his cautious and pragmatic personality. At the time, Chen Yun’s faction had overwhelming control within the CCP leadership, and as a puppet General Secretary, Jiang had to appease them. However, these actions ultimately angered Deng Xiaoping, who, despite his nominal retirement, could not tolerate any challenge to his policy of reform and opening up. Thus, he quickly took measures to counteract Jiang Zemin and Chen Yun.

After the June Fourth Incident, although Deng Xiaoping officially retired, he remained influential, particularly in military affairs. He left many traps for Jiang Zemin in the military, appointing his trusted ally Yang Shangkun as the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Yang’s brother, Yang Baibing, as the CMC secretary-general. The Yang brothers effectively controlled the military. Jiang Zemin, having never dealt with military affairs, had no foundation within the military, rendering his position as CMC chairman nominal. In reality, Deng Xiaoping still held firm control over the military.

As Jiang Zemin’s political stance increasingly aligned with Chen Yun’s, Deng Xiaoping became restless. His rise to power had relied on the banner of reform and opening up. To negate reform and opening up would be to negate Deng Xiaoping himself. While Jiang Zemin might not have been sincere in following Chen Yun’s path, it was intolerable to Deng Xiaoping. This set the stage for Deng’s Southern Tour speeches.

Before the Southern Tour, at the end of January 1991, Deng Xiaoping visited Shanghai for the Chinese New Year. He made a series of speeches urging bold reforms and rejecting any return to past ways, implicitly targeting Jiang Zemin. However, Deng’s speeches had no effect, with most party media not even publishing them. This angered Deng, prompting him to plan the Southern Tour.

Those familiar with CCP history might recall that Mao Zedong often traveled around to build public opinion before launching power struggles. Deng Xiaoping adopted this tactic to challenge Jiang Zemin and Chen Yun. In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping and his family toured Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai, making numerous significant statements. For example, “Whoever does not reform will step down,” and “The policy of one center and two basic points cannot change; anyone trying to change it will be overthrown. Reform and opening up require boldness and experimentation, not timidity like bound feet women,” among others. Deng Xiaoping’s words were clear threats.

Though he held no official position, Deng openly convened a high-level military meeting in Zhuhai, Guangdong, during his Southern Tour. The meeting included military heavyweights like Yang Shangkun, Liu Huaqing, and Yang Baibing, but excluded Jiang Zemin, the CMC chairman. In ancient times, this would have been considered rebellion, highlighting who the true power behind the scenes was.

At this meeting, Yang Baibing publicly declared that the People’s Liberation Army would support reform and opening up. This was a veiled statement indicating military support for Deng Xiaoping. Indeed, Deng was not just talking. Two months after the Southern Tour, in April 1992, he visited Shougang Group, publicly stating, “Zhu Rongji understands economics, so let’s make full use of him.” Zhu Rongji was then the Party Secretary and Mayor of Shanghai. Essentially, Deng’s words implied using Zhu Rongji to replace Jiang Zemin.

Jiang Zemin, being astute, surely understood Deng Xiaoping’s moves and speeches. Although backed by Chen Yun, Chen lacked military power. If Deng decided to use force, there would be no recourse. Realizing the precariousness of his position, Jiang Zemin ultimately abandoned Chen Yun’s political line and aligned himself with Deng Xiaoping.

After Deng Xiaoping’s public threat to replace Jiang Zemin, Chen Yun had to compromise to protect Jiang. The compromise was that Jiang could remain in power, but Deng’s reform agenda had to be implemented. Jiang Zemin subsequently convened a Politburo meeting to convey the spirit of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour speeches, requiring all party members to study them thoroughly. This officially signaled the complete realization of Deng’s political objectives. Jiang Zemin’s political pivot allowed him to navigate the precarious situation and avoid the fates of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. However, his path to consolidating power was far from smooth.

What challenges would he face next? How would he consolidate his power?

(Stay tuned for the next episode, which promises to be even more exciting.)