Hua Guofeng (Part 2):How Did Deng Xiaoping Manipulate Political Maneuvers to Overthrow Hua Guofeng?

“The entire Party, the military, and people of all ethnic groups across the nation must actively respond to the call of the Central Committee, and carry on Chairman Mao’s legacy. We must adhere to Marxism and reject revisionism; unite rather than cause chaos; be a government for the people and not engage in deception and tricks. Under the leadership of the Central Committee, we will continue the proletarian revolutionary cause initiated by Chairman Mao to the end.” (Speech by Hua Guofeng)

In the subsequent criticisms of Hua Guofeng, his “Two Whatevers” became his biggest crimes. The so-called “Two Whatevers” were “We will resolutely uphold whatever decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.” This idea was proposed by Wang Dongxing, and Hua Guofeng also said similar things according to this statement, though not frequently.

The reason Hua Guofeng could rise to the top position amid the turbulent and harsh political environment was not due to his own abilities or qualifications but because he was designated by Mao as his successor, similar to how an emperor appoints a crown prince. Therefore, he had to, at least superficially, continue to uphold Mao’s banner and inherit Mao’s cause. If he had denied Mao’s legacy upon taking office, it would have been equivalent to denying himself. Even Deng Xiaoping, who subtly promised not to make mistakes while Mao was alive, could only use a “70% good, 30% bad” formula to justify Mao’s actions after Mao’s death, so he himself didn’t dare to completely deny Mao.

However, to truly understand a person, one must look at their actions as well as their words. Hua Guofeng’s actions after coming to power actually represented a complete denial of Mao’s line. By staging a coup and arresting Mao’s widow and the Gang of Four left behind by Mao, he fundamentally repudiated Mao’s policies. So much so that in November 1976, the Communist Party USA, during its national congress, publicly condemned Hua Guofeng, accusing him of staging a right-wing coup in China. In fact, after March 1977, Hua Guofeng never publicly mentioned the “Two Whatevers” again. The accusation that Hua Guofeng followed the “Two Whatevers” was entirely fabricated by Deng Xiaoping later to topple Hua Guofeng. One could even argue that Hua Guofeng was the actual initiator and founder of the reform and opening-up.

Why do I say this? Firstly, he was an advocate for emancipating the mind. In February 1978, at the first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, Hua Guofeng made a government work report. In this report, he publicly proposed for the first time the introduction of advanced foreign technology and learning from foreign advanced experiences. At a State Council meeting in July of the same year, Hua Guofeng once again proposed that thoughts be more liberated, courage be greater, methods be more diverse, and steps be faster. Does this sound familiar? Because Deng Xiaoping also said this many times later, but Hua Guofeng was the first to say it.

He also made another shocking statement: Now there is a problem that senior officials’ thoughts can’t keep up, what to do? Go abroad more, inspect more. We are like frogs at the bottom of a well, arrogant and self-satisfied. China is not only the homeland of Mao Zedong Thought but also the homeland of arrogance and self-satisfaction. Following Hua Guofeng’s request, from March 1978, the State Council sent four inspection teams abroad, marking the beginning of large-scale introduction of foreign capital and Western technology. Hua Guofeng also raised the original plan to introduce $4.3 billion of foreign capital to $50 billion. The first Sino-Japanese cooperation project, Shanghai Baosteel, was initiated and started construction under Hua Guofeng’s decision.

In 1978, conservative party member Wang Zhen was sent by Hua Guofeng to Britain for an inspection as Vice Premier. This old conservative was greatly shocked by the state of British society and reported upon his return: The material wealth in Britain is extremely abundant, the three great differences have been basically eliminated, and social justice and welfare are also emphasized. If we add Communist Party governance, Britain would be the ideal communist society. This shows how much impact the foreign inspections had on these conservatives back then.

Today, these things may seem commonplace, but at that time, the Cultural Revolution had just ended, the environment of hostility towards the West and frequent accusations of espionage and criticism of capitalist roaders were still present, and the conservative forces within the Communist Party were still very strong. Hua Guofeng, as the top leader, openly called for stepping out and looking at the world, learning from the West and introducing advanced technology, which was quite rare and carried significant political risks.

Secondly, he was a creator of economic special zones. In April 1978, the Hong Kong and Macao Economic Inspection Group led by Duan Yun submitted an inspection report to Hua Guofeng. In this report, they suggested changing the administrative planning of Guangdong’s Baoan and Zhuhai lines, implementing special economic and foreign exchange policies connecting with Hong Kong and Macao, and building these two areas into export trade processing zones, which were the earliest prototypes of economic special zones. Hua Guofeng affirmed this report and demanded that it be done immediately. Subsequently, Guangdong Provincial Secretary Xi Zhongxun proposed the idea of economic special zones. This kind of capitalist concept was completely new and shocking at the time and was itself a thorough denial of the planned economy, so it was highly controversial. At that time, Xi Zhongxun repeatedly consulted with Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping for approval. Hua Guofeng then made a decisive speech at the second session of the Fifth National People’s Congress in 1979, saying that the Central Committee and the State Council had decided to give Guangdong some special policies, different from other provinces, more autonomy, and establish special zones in Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which might develop faster because Guangdong has special favorable conditions. A month after his speech, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou formally established economic special zones, marking the beginning of the reform and opening-up in Shenzhen. Although Xi Zhongxun and Deng Xiaoping were the main planners, without Hua Guofeng’s decision, it would not have been possible.

Thirdly, he was an advocate of dangerous moves. Many key figures in the reform and opening-up were brought back by Hua Guofeng himself, such as Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Xiaoping, Gu Mu, Xi Zhongxun, and others. These people were able to clear unjust cases on a large scale and establish economic special zones mainly because of Hua Guofeng’s understanding and support. Especially Deng Xiaoping, who was personally targeted by Mao and only kept his party membership for observation. If Hua Guofeng had truly followed Mao’s line, he would not have had the opportunity to make a comeback. Although Ye Jianying first nominated Deng Xiaoping for reinstatement, Hua Guofeng, as the top leader, had to approve it for Deng Xiaoping to have a chance.

In April 1976, at the Politburo meeting after the arrest of the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng announced three measures:

1. Reinstating Deng Xiaoping to work;
2. Making him come out openly at Central Committee meetings;
3. Preparing public opinion for Deng Xiaoping’s return to work.

At that time, Deng Xiaoping had been thoroughly criticized, and Hua Guofeng made great efforts to reinstate him. It shows that after gaining supreme power, Hua Guofeng did not engage in power games to consolidate his position but actively decentralized power and took risks. For political opponents who could threaten his position, he was completely defenseless.

Furthermore, during his four-plus years in power, besides criticizing the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng did not launch a single political movement. Unlike Deng Xiaoping, who initiated several campaigns after taking power, such as the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign in 1983 and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign in 1986, Hua Guofeng was entirely focused on construction, creating a very relaxed political atmosphere.

After being reused by Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang promoted the great discussion on the criterion for testing truth. Hu Yaobang did not communicate with Hua Guofeng about this matter beforehand, and Hua Guofeng faced attacks from party conservatives for it, but he took these criticisms on himself, allowing Hu Yaobang to flourish.

After Hua Guofeng stepped down, Hu Yaobang was severely constrained under Deng Xiaoping, ultimately being forced to resign. This contrast shows how fortunate Hu Yaobang was under Hua Guofeng, who backed him significantly in promoting the discussion on truth criteria and redressing wrongs, earning him considerable credit.

Later, during the Democracy Wall movement in Beijing’s Xidan, where the public posted big-character posters expressing their views, including criticisms of Communist Party leaders and aspirations for freedom and democracy, Hua Guofeng did not suppress the voices, demonstrating tolerance.

In contrast, when Deng Xiaoping came to power, he immediately shut down the Democracy Wall and arrested related individuals. Comparing Hua Guofeng’s and Deng Xiaoping’s approaches shows their stark differences. Hua Guofeng’s inclusiveness and democratic attitude were most evident in the 11th Central Committee’s Third Plenary Session in November 1978, which is considered the most democratic meeting in Communist Party history.

Hua Guofeng began by saying, “I am determined to let everyone speak. Since everyone is here, we should let everyone speak extensively.” Therefore, at the beginning of the meeting, many people raised the issue of resolving historical cases and directly criticized the “Two Whatevers” policy, targeting Vice Chairman Wang Dongxing and Hua Guofeng himself. The meeting was sharp and intense, but Hua Guofeng did not suppress these criticisms; instead, he publicly self-criticized twice, admitting that as the Central Chairman, he bore responsibility for the criticisms raised. In a party like the CCP, which is historically resistant to admitting mistakes, this unprecedented tolerance by Hua Guofeng was remarkable and unique.

According to later recollections by Hu Deping, Hu Yaobang’s son, Hu Yaobang was very excited after attending the meeting. He told his son that Hua, the Chairman, had made a breakthrough. The extent of this breakthrough would depend on the people’s power, and no one could predict it beforehand. Not only Hu Yaobang, but also Hu Xiwei, the editor-in-chief of People’s Daily at the time, and Yu Guangyuan acknowledged that the success of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee was closely related to Hua Guofeng’s democratic posture and spirit. In his later years, Hu Xiwei reflected that during Hua Guofeng’s brief tenure as the party chairman, he was one of the more enlightened and democratic top leaders in the party’s history.

Although Hua Guofeng earned a good reputation in the political arena, merely having a good reputation was insufficient to consolidate power in an authoritarian party. When it came to power plays, Hua Guofeng was admittedly not on the same level as Deng Xiaoping.

A few days after the Hua Hall incident, on October 10, 1976, Deng Xiaoping wrote a letter to Hua Guofeng pledging his loyalty. This letter was extremely sycophantic, stating that Comrade Guofeng was the most suitable successor to Chairman Mao, not only politically and ideologically but also because his age would ensure the stability of proletarian leadership for at least 15 to 20 years. He expressed his genuine feelings and declared his loyalty to the Central Committee led by Hua Guofeng.

On April 10, 1977, Deng Xiaoping impatiently wrote a second letter of loyalty, fully supporting Hua Guofeng’s policies and deployment of current issues and work. To show his solidarity with Hua Guofeng, Deng even endorsed the “Two Whatevers,” stating, “We must always uphold and defend this great and glorious banner. We must always use the accurate and complete Mao Zedong Thought to guide our party, army, and people.” Deng Xiaoping later criticized Hua Guofeng for the “Two Whatevers,” which was truly a case of turning against him.

Hua Guofeng was ultimately too young and naive, being misled by Deng Xiaoping’s stance. With the support of Ye Jianying, Hua quickly released the tiger back into the mountains. In July 1977, Deng Xiaoping was reinstated to important positions such as Politburo Standing Committee member, Central Vice Chairman, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA. These were all significant positions in the party, government, and military, handed over to Deng Xiaoping, allowing him to regain his power smoothly.

Hua Guofeng believed that Deng Xiaoping would be grateful to him, but Deng Xiaoping fundamentally looked down on him. As mentioned earlier, when Deng Xiaoping reached the highest leadership within the party, Hua Guofeng was only a county committee secretary, with qualifications not on the same level. Deng Xiaoping, with his strong desire for power, could not be content with staying behind someone with a lesser background. After his return, Deng Xiaoping immediately began his path to seize power. With deep-rooted support within the party and the army, he quickly regained significant influence. He allied with Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, and Hu Yaobang, secretly working while Hua Guofeng was abroad, forming a strong alliance against him and effectively isolating him.

In February 1980, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun brought Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang into the Politburo as Standing Committee members. With control of the Politburo, they launched a major criticism of the “Two Whatevers,” accusing Hua Guofeng of adhering to an extreme leftist line. This forced Wang Zhen, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Chen Yonggui, and Wu Guixian, who supported Hua Guofeng, to resign, completely stripping Hua of his political influence.

During this process, Hua Guofeng, despite holding power, avoided taking significant countermeasures to prevent party division. This indecisiveness and concern for party unity greatly damaged his prestige, leaving no one willing to follow him. By this point, Hua Guofeng was essentially a lone commander. His last ally, Ye Jianying, was aging and primarily convalescing at home after the Hua Hall incident, providing little support. Thus, Hua Guofeng was at a complete disadvantage in his struggle against Deng Xiaoping.

In August 1980, under the control of Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, the CCP Politburo convened a meeting where many proposed that Hua Guofeng’s multiple roles were too much under the principle of separating party and government. This forced Hua to resign as Premier, with Zhao Ziyang taking over, and Hu Yaobang taking control of the Central Secretariat. This loss of party and government power in 1980 marked the beginning of Hua Guofeng’s political decline.

In November 1980, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun relentlessly pursued Hua Guofeng, holding nine consecutive meetings to criticize him and discuss his leadership. Chen Yun and Li Xiannian led the charge, demanding Hua’s resignation. Even Hu Yaobang, who had greatly benefited from Hua, turned against him under Deng Xiaoping’s direction. In the end, Ye Jianying, Hua’s last ally, was forced to speak against him, sealing Hua’s fate. Hua Guofeng accepted the criticism and proposed his resignation on the spot.

At the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in June 1981, Hua Guofeng was forced to resign from his positions as Chairman of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Military Commission, with Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping taking over, respectively. By the 12th Party Congress in 1982, Hua’s only remaining title was that of a nominal Central Committee member, completely fading from the high-level power circle.

At this point, many might wonder: as the supreme leader, why did Hua Guofeng fall so easily to Deng Xiaoping in just over two years? This can be attributed to three fatal flaws in Hua Guofeng as a political leader.

The first flaw was his heavy baggage, wanting to have it both ways. The biggest weakness Deng Xiaoping exploited was Hua’s adherence to the “Two Whatevers” of the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong was both Hua Guofeng’s protective talisman and a liability. Hua did not deeply understand the Cultural Revolution, so although he effectively overturned its policies, he continued to uphold Mao’s sacred status in official propaganda, unable to deeply criticize or sever ties with the Cultural Revolution. This dual stance provided the opposition with ample ammunition.

Hu Yaobang once criticized Hua, saying, “Logically, Comrade Guofeng did not fully agree with Mao Zedong’s late mistakes. But after the Gang of Four was crushed, he spoke differently. This created a problem of utilitarianism, which is critical.” This ungrateful remark by Hu Yaobang was a stain on his life, but it showed how Hua’s inability to discard Mao’s banner burdened him, leading to contradictory actions and propaganda, ultimately benefitting others.

This was because Hua lacked the ideological commitment to political reform. If he had decisively repudiated Mao’s political legacy, he might have garnered more support from reformists.

The second flaw was Hua’s shallow experience and unstable foundation. Hua was chosen by Mao for his loyalty and honesty, not for his political prowess. Compared to the political heavyweights of his time, like Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Wang Zhen, who had weathered many storms and had their own factions, Hua had no comparable influence. His rise was mainly due to Mao’s favor. Without strong political achievements to solidify his leadership, Hua was essentially a rising star in a faction-ridden CCP, isolated and without a support base. After the Gang of Four was crushed, he did not promptly build his power base, relying on the older generation’s support, making him vulnerable once their support waned.

As a leader without his own faction, Hua had two options to secure his position: elevate his supporters to form a faction or decentralize power to balance the factions, positioning himself as the final arbiter. However, Hua did neither. He was overly impartial, handing over power to heavyweights like Deng and Chen before stabilizing his own authority, quickly becoming a nominal leader. Especially in a party that valued military power, Hua had no influence in the military. As Chairman of the Military Commission, he couldn’t command the army, a critical mistake.

Hua Guofeng’s third flaw was his limited ability and indecisiveness. There is an old Chinese saying: “The kind should not command troops, the righteous should not manage finances, the good should not be officials, and the benevolent should not be involved in politics.” In essence, kind-hearted people are not suitable for leading troops in battle, those who are generous cannot manage finances, overly kind people cannot be officials, and those who uphold benevolence and righteousness find it hard to navigate politics. In a nutshell, within the political struggle of a despotic system, it is fundamentally a zero-sum game. More often than not, it requires decisive actions, ruthlessness, and being merciless. Indecisiveness leads to chaos. Especially within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is not a modern parliamentary party but an authoritarian one, its power struggles are not conducted openly according to rules but rather through intrigue and covert rules. History is always ruthless and extremely cruel. As a straightforward and honest person unable to be ruthless, Hua Guofeng struggled even as a regular official in the political arena, let alone as a leader. He neither centralized power to establish authority nor launched political movements to consolidate his power and purge dissidents. Unlike Mao, he did not play political tricks to balance and control factions within the party. With weak foundations, attempting to steer an authoritarian party with tolerance and kindness was destined to be undermined by powerful and ambitious individuals.

After Deng Xiaoping’s return, he actively engaged in private activities, forming alliances with party elders like Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, ultimately isolating Hua Guofeng within the higher echelons. Hua Guofeng was aware of these actions. On October 12, 1979, Hua Guofeng began his visit to Western Europe. During his absence, Deng Xiaoping privately convened secret meetings with various party elders, primarily discussing military personnel issues. During this period, Deng Xiaoping held talks with over a hundred individuals. Upon Hua Guofeng’s return to Beijing, elder Peng Zhen quietly complained to him, saying that Deng Xiaoping had been summoning many people for discussions over the past month, suggesting Hua Guofeng should be mindful of this trend and consider also holding meetings. Peng Zhen’s warning was explicit: Deng Xiaoping was undermining him, and he should be vigilant. However, Hua Guofeng responded, saying, “I am somewhat aware of the situation. If I were to act similarly, it could lead to the party’s division, a historical responsibility I cannot bear.” This response highlighted Hua Guofeng’s naivety and perhaps cowardice. He dared to topple the Gang of Four, who were similarly weak, but lost the courage and determination to confront a powerful figure like Deng Xiaoping.

Even on the eve of his stepping down, on the night of August 30, 1980, Ye Jianying sought him out to preserve his position. Ye Jianying asked Hua Guofeng about his plans regarding Deng Xiaoping. Hua Guofeng expressed his intention to resign from all positions. Ye Jianying sighed, questioning if Deng Xiaoping was more formidable than the Gang of Four, revealing his disappointment. Consequently, it was no surprise when Hua Guofeng was later abandoned in meetings. Hypothetically, if Hua Guofeng had fought back with some political maneuvers, given his legitimate leadership status and the support of elders like Ye Jianying and Peng Zhen, it might not have been easy for Deng Xiaoping to overthrow him. Unfortunately, Hua Guofeng showed weakness and retreated at critical moments, lacking the courage he once demonstrated during the Hua-Ren Hall incident, leaving him beyond rescue.

After stepping down, Hua Guofeng led an extremely low-profile life in Beijing, rarely participating in political activities. Despite this, he continued to serve multiple terms as a Central Committee member. Remarkably, in the 15th National Congress of the CCP in 1997, sixteen years after stepping down, he was still elected as a Central Committee member with a full vote. In the CCP’s nominal elections, getting elected wasn’t hard, but achieving a full vote was indeed challenging. It’s notable that even Xi Jinping was the last alternate member at the time, indicating not everyone was in favor. However, Hua Guofeng, despite being an overlooked figure, still managed to secure full votes, indicating his high regard within the party.

However, due to Deng Xiaoping’s authority, Hua Guofeng’s status in the CCP’s official history was completely erased and distorted. For instance, the restoration of the college entrance examination is often credited to Deng Xiaoping, but it was actually Hua Guofeng’s decision. In July 1977, Hua Guofeng presided over the Politburo meeting, deciding to restore the college entrance examination. At that time, Deng Xiaoping had just returned for less than ten days, far from making such decisions. Thus, those whose lives were changed by the college entrance exam should thank Hua Guofeng.

In May 1989, while discussing the CCP’s third generation of leadership, Deng Xiaoping remarked on Hua Guofeng, saying:

“Hua Guofeng was just a transitional figure, not a full generation. He didn’t have anything original, just the ‘Two Whatevers,’ which were complete nonsense.”

Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policies were, in essence, a continuation of Hua Guofeng’s earlier policy of ending class struggle and focusing on economic construction. Deng Xiaoping inherited Hua Guofeng’s policies. In fact, Hua Guofeng was the greatest benefactor to Deng Xiaoping, yet Deng Xiaoping was ungrateful, smearing Hua Guofeng with baseless accusations to overthrow him. For instance, Hua Guofeng’s role in redressing unjust cases and the return of senior cadres were falsely attributed to Deng Xiaoping. Without Hua Guofeng’s support, there wouldn’t have been Hu Yaobang’s large-scale redressal or the return of senior figures. Significant cases like the Inner Mongolia People’s Revolutionary Party case and the 61 Traitors case were directly redressed by Hua Guofeng.

Due to the long-term promotion of Deng Xiaoping, many now believe that removing Hua Guofeng was beneficial for China’s progress. This is a misunderstanding. Even without Deng Xiaoping, the reform and opening-up had already become a popular trend during Hua Guofeng’s tenure and was substantively driven by him. Objectively speaking, Hua Guofeng was against Mao’s policies under Mao’s banner and was a genuine pioneer of reform and opening-up. If he had continued to lead, due to his lack of strong dominance like Deng Xiaoping, the political environment might have been more relaxed, providing more space for reformists like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, potentially leading to better and more stable reform progress in China.

Strictly speaking, Hua Guofeng was not a reformist. Unlike Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, he did not have a grand blueprint or strong desire for political reform. However, he was the kind of leader who could protect reformists and steadily advance society. He wouldn’t use political movements to suppress dissidents for power, and he recognized talent and was willing to compromise, listening to correct opinions. In the post-Cultural Revolution environment, an enlightened, weak leader was more suitable for China than a strong, autocratic one centered on personal will.

China’s first enlightened emperor to receive the posthumous title “Ren” (benevolent), Song Renzong, was very similar to Hua Guofeng. He didn’t have outstanding abilities but was kind and generous, willing to accept advice and recruit talented people, leading to a prosperous era for forty years during the Song Dynasty, marking a peak of civilization in Chinese feudal society. A good top leader doesn’t need to have extraordinary abilities; they need to be open-minded and tolerant, placing the right people in the right positions.

We can hypothesize that if the Tiananmen Square incident had occurred during Hua Guofeng’s tenure, he would never have mobilized the military to suppress the students like Deng Xiaoping did. He might have been more inclined to follow public opinion and promote political reform. He would not have replaced Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang to maintain his grip on power.

However, given Hua Guofeng’s personality, even if Deng Xiaoping hadn’t removed him, someone else might have. Hua Guofeng’s tragedy was similar to that of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. In an authoritarian system, good people don’t last long. Only ruthless individuals like Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping, who disregard rules and morals, can survive and thrive. This system gives bad people such advantages and privileges.

Discussing Hua Guofeng today is not about overturning his historical judgment but about honestly restoring historical truths. Only by understanding the true history can we have a clear understanding of China’s future direction. Hua Guofeng’s tragedy illustrates that good people cannot change a flawed system and will only be swallowed by it, trapped in a vicious cycle. Breaking this historical cycle requires establishing a system that confines power within a cage. Such a system is more reliable and desirable than relying on good people.

（This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）